Naval professional papers

NAVAL PROFESSIONAL PAPER, No. 18.

TRAINING

(.T

EJSTLISTED MEN.

THREE PAPERS REPRINTED FROM THE "JOURNAL OF
THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION."

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,

NAVY DEPARTMENT.

^P»THS07^

2580— No. 18

WASHINGTON:

GOVERNMENT' PRINTING OFFICE.
1885.

NOTE.

The within papers are republished from the " Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution," to call attention to the necessity for the
more elaborate training of enlisted men in the Navy, and to the sev-
eral systems advocated and carried out in foreign armies.

The general principles of such training are as applicable to navies
as to armies.

Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, August, 1885.
2

SOME GERMAN VIEWS UPON THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY IN
PEACE AND ITS ACTION IN WAR/

" Militiirische Briefe II. Ueber Iufanterie." Von Kraft Priuz zu
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingeu, General der Iufanterie a la suite der Armee,
General- Adjutant seiner Majestiit des Kaisers und Konigs. (Berlin,

1884.)

" Beiheft zum Militar-Wochenblatt, 1884." Heft 6. Herausgegeben
von V. Lobell, Oberst. z. D. Die Heranbildung v. Unterfiihrern
auf dem Exercirplatz. (The training of leaders of the lower grades
on the field of exercise.)

Twice during her short history as a kingdom has Prussia established
her superiority in war — the first time under Frederick the Great, the
second time under Frederick William and v. Moltke. On each occa-
sion her army has become the pattern for all European armies, and her
annual fields of maneuver the meeting ground for students of the art
of war. Her first period of military supremacy was but of short dura
tion, principally owing to political causes, but also to a falling off from
the high standard of warlike efficiency which had been attained, a de-
cline which had commenced even before the death of the great warrior
statesman whose genius had raised his little kingdom to one of the fore-
most places among nations, a decline so rapid that within twenty years
of Frederick's death the army which he had made a model one, imitated,
and sometimes only too blindly, by other nations, entirely broke up and
collapsed under the blows of a younger and more vigorous organization.
As far as the military question goes, the reasons for this rapid decay of
Prussia's fighting power are not far to seek. They are to be found
mainly in the torpor which is too often with nations, as with individuals,
the natural consequence of great success, in the idea that the system
which has suc< eeded so well must be perfect and must always succeed,
that in fact it is only necessary " to let well alone," as the saying is.
You may slumber in peace. Unfortunately for the slumberers the world
does not stand still, and while they are taking their rest changes un-
noticed or unappreciated by them are constantly being made, till all of
a sudden they are rudely awakened to the consciousness of a new order
of things for which they, with their old-world notions, are utterly unpre-
pared; and so they and those who have been guided by them give way

3

before men and nations who have kept awake. Situated as Prussia is
geographically and politically, military decline must inevitably in a
very short time produce a national catastrophe. Such was the case in
1806. The lesson was not lost upon the nation or its rulers. The pain-
ful reawakening of Jena led eventually, through some years of suffering
and humiliation, to renewed life, and the warlike spirit, thoroughly
aroused by the struggle for independence, has never since ceased to
animate more or less the Prussian people notwithstanding a long pe<
riod of peace, though had it not been for the fine example set by the
present sovereign and his family, for the genius, energy, and persist-
ency displayed by the statesmen and soldiers at the head of the Govern-
ment and of the armies, this spirit could not have produced the mighty
results which we in these latter days have witnessed. Again, for the
second time in her history, has Prussia overcome every army which has
met hers in the field, and again has her army, and this time, through
its teaching, that of united Germany, become the best sample of war-
like efficiency which the world can produce. During this second period
of preponderance her success has been far more rapid, complete, and
continuous, also on a much greater scale than during the former period.
There would consequently appear to be rnore justification for allowing a
course of placid repose to follow upon one of tremendous exertion ; but
no such feeling has arisen, or if there be some few among the older offi-
cers for whom age and weariness make a quiet life the one thing to be
desired, their number and influence are not great enough to affect the
general result ; so that, instead of the torpor succeeding Frederick's suc-
cesses, we find after v. Moltke's much greater victories constant, unre-
mitting exertion and a never-ending struggle for improvement through-
out the ranks of the army. Not a shot has been fired by it on an enemy
since the spring of 1873 ; consequently a period of peace has elapsed
about equal to that which intervened between Frederick's last war in
1779 and the invasion of France by the Duke of Brunswick in 1792 ; but
whereas after Frederick's wars military knowledge remained at a stand-
still, while military spirit and efficiency degenerated, during the present
peace, on the contrary, military spirit remains as strong as ever, while
military knowledge and efficiency have largely increased. As far as
can be seen, there is every prospect of a continuation of this reigu of
progress, for it has become the prevailing fashion of the army not to
accept any part of its institutions as perfect, and to be constantly aim-
ing at improvement. The saying " nothing is so successful as success"
does not apply to the estimate formed by the German army of itself.
It was successful in three successive wars within a period of only seven
years, in the latter two of which wars success was on a scale hitherto un-
precedented ; yet after each of these wars, particularly after the last and
greatest, there has been a general inquiry, " How can we do better next
time ? " Hundreds of busy heads are continually occupied in originat-
ing or carrying out improvements in administration, in armament, in

equipment, in organization, in tactics, in short in everything which con-
duces to efficiency in tear. No invention of these inventive days which
can iu any manner be useful in warfare passes unheeded, even such a
matter as the rearing and training of carrier pigeons being carefully
studied. An enormous amount of new military literature appears an-
nually, officers of all ranks contributing to it, and being thought the bet-
ter of by those in authority for doing so. Many of these writers enjoy
a world-wide reputation, their works being known and appreciated
everywhere. Amongst the latest who has come into the lists as an
author is one of the highest-placed officers in the German army, one
who has held important commands on service during the late wars,
and also during the subsequent time of peace. He is thus amongst
those best qualified both by war and peace experience to give his opin-
ion on military subjects. I speak of Kraft Priuz zu Hohenlohe-Ingel-
fingen, who has within the last twelvemonth published a series of let-
ters on the three arms, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, a little volume
devoted to each having appeared in the order above given. The au-
thor, so well known as an artillery officer, commanded the " reserve" ar-
tillery of the Guard Corps during the campaign of 1866, being wounded
at the battle of Koniggriitz, and the whole artillery of the same army
corps in 1870-'71, playing an important part both in the battle of the
18th August at St. Privat and in that of the 1st September at Sedan.
Though not in command of either infantry or cavalry on service, he
had ample opportunities of watching the action of those arms in battle,
particularly of the former, and after the peace commanded for seven
years an " infantry division," which contains in the German service,
as we know, detachments of the other arms also. Prince Hoheulohe's
experience during his thirty -five years' service has been thus of a suffi-
ciently varied character to qualify him as an authority on the subjects
of which he treats, and I think that all those who read the letters will
be struck by the breadth of view and earnestness which he displays. It
is evident from his writings that he is a man of judgment and of obser-
vation, moreover of an ingenious and inventive turn of mind, and en-
dowed with the true spirit of a soldier, whilst his record of service
proves him to have been a cool-headed and able commander. The de-
scription of the scenes iu which he took part or of which he was an
eye witness is graphic and picturesque, bearing at the same time the
impress of reality and accuracy.

In the introduction to the first volume of the series he gives his rea-
sons for publishing his opinions and experiences in the form of letters.
He states that having been often asked to give the army the benefit of
his views upon professional matters, he was doubtful as to the form
which the publication should assume, at first thinking of bringing out
a book of memoirs, but rejected this idea because memoirs, or, iu other
"words, the account of what a man sees and hears, differ very much in
moments of excitement from what actually occurs, each mans views

being- colored by his own immediate environment ; consequently per-
sonal memoirs are sure to promote controversy and disagreement, things
which it is well to avoid. Then the idea of a scientific work on the tac-
tics of the three arms occurred to him, but this also was rejected, for,
as he says, " there are so many and such excellent works of this nature.
I could only repeat what has long been known and has been repeated
over and over again." He ended by presenting his ideas to his com-
rades in the form of letters written in a familiar, gossiping style, and I
do not think that his decision is to be regretted. It will be found, as
may naturally be expected, when we consider the intimate connection
between the different arms iu war, that the action of all the arms is fre-
quently referred to in each volume, for as all must work iu combination
it would be impossible to treat the subject iu a fitting manner if atten-
tion were exclusively given to the one arm at the moment under con-
sideration. My own remarks will be confined to the second volume of
Prince Hohenlohe's letters, from which I shall give as copious selec-
tions as my space will allow, concluding with an extract from the "Mili-
tar Wochenblatt," the views advocated in wh:ch in a very clear and
practical manner are, as will be seen, in complete accordance with cer-
tain opinions held by the prince. The passages which I have selected
from his letters on " Infantry " appear to me such as specially require our
attention, but I recommend a careful study of the three volumes, of
which a complete translation would be desirable.

The first letter begins with the following striking passage : "After
reviewing the performances of German infantry in the war of 1870-71,
one comes to the conclusion that it is not only the most perfect force of
that arm which has ever existed, but that no more perfect infantry can
be imagined. It is true that the Emperor Napoleon remarked, after the
catastrophe of Sedan, that German victories were due to the Prussian
Uhlan and to the Prussian artillery. Bazaine makes a similar state-
ment in his ' Episodes.' It was doubtless owing to our cavalry that our
adversary was blindfold, and that our armies had complete freedom of
action; doubtless, also, German artillery had often to take a very active
part iu the work which properly belonged to infantry when the range
was too long for the needle-gun to reply to the chassepot; but after all
it was always the infantry which had to do the main part of the work.

" Nothing would have been more natural than that our infantry should
have believed itself to have attained the acme of perfection, and that
it should holdfast to every detail of its institutions. But no; we have
been surprised, on the contrary, to remark that a general desire for im-
provement prevailed throughout its ranks."

This desire has been maintained ever since, and is still maintained,
not only in the infantry but throughout the army, as before remarked.
With regard to the principal arm, it is well to bear in mind that great
tactical changes were contemplated before the French war, and that a

new edition of the Field Exercise was actually published in the first
half of 1870. Its adoption was, however, wisely deferred, and after the
war so much consideration was required, owing to the experience gained
during its progress, that the result was only made known to the army
in 1870, when the edition now in force was issued. The tactical changes
introduced are discussed here and there throughout the letters now be-
fore us, and are generally approved of, the great merit and salient point
of the present regulations being that while extreme steadiness and pre-
cision of movement, complete adherence to established forms, are insisted
upon at drill and when maneuvering in close order, very great discre-
tion is allowed in the so-called "■ battle exercises" and in their counter-
part, actual battle. The author's criticisms are chiefly confined to the
manner in which the spirit of the regulations is understood and acted
upon, and here he has a great deal to say. The first few letters are de-
voted to the individual drills and instruction of the soldier, which, as
the writer points out, cannot be too careful in these days, when such a
variety of knowledge is required, and when so much depends upon in-
dividual proficiency. I have made no extracts from the letters in ques-
tion, because, though full of good hints, the system described in them
appears not to differ materially from that in operation at home. It is,
however, and this is an important point, worked out in a more steadily
progressive and systematic manner than with us. Then we come to
company drill, looked upon with justice by the Germans as a matter of
paramount importance, not only for training but also for discipline.

It is within the limits of the company that, as Prince Hohenlohe
phrases it, the soldier learns the " how," that is to say, the details of ex-
ecution of the " what " afterwards practiced at battalion exercises, and
later on applied to the requirements of the battle-field. It is in the
company principally that he learns the duty of obedience, and that he
gains that confidence in and respect for those in authority over him
without which true discipline cannot exist. The chapter upon the com-
pany officer is excellent and instructive. We now arrive at battalion
training and inspections. The manner in which these matters are con-
ducted by commanding officers and inspecting generals is severely
criticised, aud it is somewhat surprising to find how much " unreali-
ties "are in vogue even under the very practical military system of
Germany.

Prince Hohenlohe does well in drawing attention to the fact that the
prevailing style of inspection virtually regulates the manner in which
troops are trained, for giveu good material you can work it into any
shape required. It is for the heads of the army to choose the right
shape. The importance of developing individual initiative in -subordi-
nates is strongly insisted upon, and this can be accomplished to a great
extent by a judicious system of training ; but if officers are not accus-
tomed to think and act for themselves upon occasion in peace time,
they must learn to do so on service, and often do not acquire the habit

8

soon enough for themselves and for their country. It may be consid-
ered superfluous nowadays to preach the necessity of fighting in ex-
tended order, using the term in a large sense, not only as applied to
the individuals composing a tactical unit, but also to those units in re-
lation to one another; yet such exhortations are evidently required even
in Germany, where the principle of extended order has long been firmly
established. How much more so with us, seeing that the form of tac-
tics supposed to be the most suitable to modern requirements, and prac-
ticed accordingly by our soldiers in peace time, has to be so often de-
parted from in the wars which one part or other of our army is almost
always waging under conditions which render it necessary to return in
greater or less degree to tactics considered obsolete in civilized warfare.
Consequently, I think that no occasion should be lost of reminding our-
selves that, necessary as formations in close order may often be wben
encountering foes such as Zulus, Afghans, or Soudanese, to meet a civT-
ilized army in such a manner would be to court disaster. Tbe author's
remarks upon this subject are well illustrated by battle pictures drawn
from his own experience. In the same manner he adds force to his
views upon flank and frontal attacks, upon the action of infantry against
and combined with cavalry, and upon the supply of ammunition to
troops in action, one of the most difficult problems to solve, and one
which v. Moltke is reported to have pronounced insoluble, meaning
probably when engaged at close quarters. The author's suggestions to
infantry upon this point are practical, and will be found further on.
The eleventh letter treats of the attack of a position by infantry sup-
ported by artillery across perfectly open ground, the most difficult op-
eration which infantry can in these days be fairly called upon to per-
form, and one for which a great many recipes have been invented in all
countries since tbe breech-loader was introduced. The author gives a
very good picture of such an attack, which, if conducted properly, is,
however difficult, far from impossible, as we know from the history of
the last European wars. The chapter on fire discipline is well worthy
of study by officers of all armies, not excepting our own, which is far
from being as superior to all other armies in that material point as it
used to be in the days of the smooth-bore musket. The reason of this
is, I think, not far to seek. I do not believe it to arise from any dete-
rioration in the physical and moral qualities which contribute to " stead-
iness" in the soldier, but from the want, till quite of late years, of the
most practical part of training in the use of the rifle, what we call "field
firing" and the Germans call "battle shooting." They and other for-
eign nations have carried it on systematically for some years. We have
only taken to it recently, and I believe that even now we do not put the
men through a preparatory course of individual field firing, as do our
continental friends. The next letters, portions of which are included in
the following extracts, treat of the training of the regiment and of the
brigade. The concluding letter, that on the " Geist der Iufanterie " —

9

the spirit of infantry — that true soldier-like spirit which maintains firm
discipline throughout the most rigorous hardships in moments of exces-
sive peril and impending disaster, throughout periods of depression
when mere excitement, enthusiasm (lief/eisterung), so animating at the
commencement of a popular war, has faded away, or at any rate is
not sufficient to make men bear up against hard times. The prince
says, "The spirit of our troops manifested itself in the fact that they
never considered themselves beaten." Napoleon I said something of
the same sort of our infantry. I think that recent events have shown
the saying to be as true now as it was then, and that in the matter of
Geist at least we have no occasion to envy the Germans.

The supplement to the " Militar Wochenblatt" contains four examples
of tactical exercises, of which I give the first two, which appear to me
good specimens of what such exercises should be, being very simple and
instructive. The critique at the end of each is specially worthy of study.
The other two exercises are more complicated, and in some ways more in-
teresting. The little book forms an excellent sequel to Prince Hohen-
lohe's letters, as the writer, whoever he may be, enters fully into the
prince's views as to tactical training and attempts to carry them out in
practice.

SELECTIONS FROM " MILITARISGHE BRIEFE."

Individual action and extended order in battle.

When we examine the further development of our infantry training
we perceive that both in the movements of the soldier individually and
in combination with others, both in ritie drill and in the practical use of
the weapon, the same care is taken to make each man a reliable inde-
pendent agent as we noticed when treating of the elementary instruction
of the recruit.

As soon as each man has learned to march well, that is to say, natur-
ally, freely, with confidence, without constraint, and with upright, manly
bearing ; as soon as small squads with three paces interval between the
men can march on a point keeping a good alignment and can make good
wheels, there will be but little trouble in mastering company drill. How
well the proficiency attained by the individual soldier repays you for
the trouble expended upon his training !

In this we find one of the many reasons for the excellence and supe-
riority of our infantry, for we cannot doubt that the careful training of
the soldier to act for himself in battle, and yet to pay every attention
to the orders of his leaders, contributed greatly to our late successes.
Whenever this excellence of individual training was taken full advan-
tage of our infantry was very successful, with comparatively little loss ;
whereas whenever the commander acted upon the opposite principle
our casualties were so numerous that not only was success endangered,
but defeat would most surely have resulted had he not quickly reverted

10

to action in extended order. In my first letter I referred to a certain
combat as evidence of the small loss incurred by regiments attacking
in skirmishing order as compared with the fate of those obliged to at-
tack in company column.* Allow me now to describe an incident in
the battle of Sedan, of which I was myself an eye-witness. We were
in position on the east of and fronting towards the deep valley of G-i-
vonne, containing the village of the same name, which was occupied by
rifie and fusilier battalions of the Prussian Guard, It was about 1 p. m.
The enemy's infantry had abandoned the opposite face of the Givonne
Valley, retiring up to the Bois de la Garonne, situated on higher ground.
Certain companies of our infantry had taken advantage of this circum-
stance to establish themselves on the further side of the valley. Thus,
a company of the rifles (Jllger) of the Guard advanced from Givonne
right in front of my line of artillery, whilst in front of its left flank two
companies of the Franz Regiment, under Captain v. C , moved for-
ward from Haybes and extended in a single thin line of skirmishers
along the brow of the opposite hill-side. The enemy's artillery fire was
almost silenced. Suddenly a dense mass of French infantry emerged
to the south of the Bois de la Garonne from the depression which runs
from that wood into the Fond de Givonne, rushing at full speed straight
on Haybes, a movement which could not fail to bring it into collision
with the two companies of the Franz Regiment. At the moment I esti-
mated this mass of men at from 5,000 to 6,000, and I still think that my
calculation was not far out, for it appears from the French accounts to
have been the Grand Champs Division, forming the left wing of the force
with which Wimpffen made his desperate attempt to break through our
line. These masses of men formed in deep columns, rushed on, firing
incessantly as they ran, with rifle held horizontally to the hip, thus en-
veloping themselves iu clouds of smoke. I could see distinctly with
my telescope how the men ran along, loading and firing, without rais-
ing their rifles to the shoulder; but all that was visible to the naked eye
was an enormous lump rolling forward, the upper part of which was
blue (from the coats) with a broad whitish gray band below (smoke),
and below this again the red of the trousers glittering on the quiver-
ing legs. I immediately directed the whole of the batteries constitut-
ing my line of ninety guns to open a rapid fire upon this column; still
I could not but feel anxious for the two companies of the Franz Regi-
ment pushed forward across the valley, because should the enemy suc-

* See page 5 of " Ueber Infanterie." Iu an attack on a village, during the latter
part of the war, two regiments took the portion of the outskirts told off to them al-
most without loss, two other regiments on the same occasion suffering severely. The
reason of this was that they were commanded by officers who, having been wounded
at St. Privat, had only rejoined their regiments the day before the tight in question,
and had not yet practiced the new form of attack. They led their men on in the old
fashion, in company columns, and exposed them to fearful loss. Both these gallant of-
ficers met their death on this occasion. — Tr.

11

ceed in getting within 200 yards of our people my guns would no longer
be able to fire upon the head of the attacking column for fear of hitting
our friends. And in fact, though our shells fell and burst amidst the
dense throng, causing fearful havoc and producing to the eye the effect
of a tangled skein made up of smoke and dust, of various colored
clothes, with human limbs and bodies hurled into the air, yet the con-
fused mass kept rolling on and drew nearer and nearer, for the enemy
was inspired with the courage of despair. The time soon came when I
was obliged to forbid further firing on the head of the column, and then
we saw the front ranks of the assailants detach themselves from the
crowd and rush upon our two companies. The contrast which our men
presented to their foes was striking. Instead of the thick cloud created
by the heavy fire of the Frenchmen, I could, with the aid of my telescope,
only make out a puff' of smoke here and there along the Prussian line
of skirmishers, who lay flat on the ground, with rifle at the shoulder and
taking steady aim.

Captain v. C alone could be seen moving along tbe line, looking

as smart as we remembered him of old in a ball-room. He was cau-
tioning his men (as we afterwards heard) to aim steadily and to fire
slowly. Every shot laid an assailant low ; the number of those ap-
proaching the Prussian line got smaller and smaller; a few actually
closed with our men, meeting death at the very muzzles of their rifles;
two of our skirmishers were even bayoneted in the back from above
as they lay; but the attack, though conducted with greatdetermiuation,
entirely collapsed, and the few survivors took to flight, pursued by the
deadly bullets of our riflemen. The entire mass was broken up in ten
minutes. On the other hand, the total loss of the Kaiser-Franz Regi-
ment at Sedan was only 2 officers and 80 men,* of which loss only a
small fraction can have fallen to the lot of the two companies in ques-
tion. So great is the superiority of a well-aimed and well-directed in-
dependent fire from a body of soldiers individually well trained over
the " shock tactics " of dense masses.

The war of 18G6 had already borne evidence to this truth through the
annihilation of the gallant Austrian columns of attack, but at that
time the success of our infantry wras attributed more to the superiority
of its breech-loaders than to its battle tactics, for in that war our in-
fantry often fought in close order. In the case just described, however,
it was the troops with by far the better fire-arm who adhered to forma-
tions in mass, and who did nothing against their worse-armed enemies,
notwithstanding their great numerical superiority — 6,000 to 300 ; and
even though the gallant 300 were supported by such a tremendous ar-
tillery fire that we may assume half the French column to have been

* In Dr. Engel's official report of losses of the German army the total number of
casualties in the Kaiser-Franz Regiment at Sedan is put at ouly (i~. — Ti;.

12

destroyed by it, the proportion of assailants to defenders was only
thereby reduced to 3,000 v. 300—10 v. 1*

We may assume that the superiority thus existing of the independent
fire of skirmishers on the defensive against the charge of masses must
now be still more striking in consequence of the subsequent improve-
ment in small-arms. We can well understand how painful it must be
for leaders grown worn and gray in the service to relinquish such fa-
miliar and well-loved battle pictures as presented by the formations of
Frederick the Great, who in person led to the assault battalions in close
order, with colors flying and bands playing, halting them to fire a volley
at 100 paces from the enemy; but such formations can now no longer
be dreamt of in these days of " Gras and Mauser." Even that tine pict-
ure of the brigade of six battalions, of which three are deployed in
front line and fire volleys, the others thereupon passing through the
intervals to charge with the bayonet, is no longer in keepiug with the
times. New inventions produce changes, and pictures which have been
dear to our imaginations " melt into thin air." We must reconcile our-
selves to this. The dearly-loved battle tactics of the mediaeval chiv-
alry had long ago to be given up, and with them the ideas of rivaling
an Arnold of Winkelried, and of deciding the fate of battles by gather-
ing the enemy's spears into your breast, thus making a breach in the
hostile ranks. And in like manner we also must make up our ininds
that the magic influence exerted in former days by the measured tramp
of the advancing column to beat of drum is now dispelled, and, indeed,
tells the other way, as the fate of such a column would now be annihi-
lation. On that account, indeed, the expression " column of attack" has
been expunged from the last edition of our field-exercise book, giving
place to the form " double column " (Kolonne nach der Mitte), a proof
that the use of the old battalion column of attack under close fire is
completely abandoned; and even the employment of the company col-
umn is very much curtailed. Nine times out of ten it will merely act
as reserve to the fighting line, and only quite exceptionally will it be
able to march up to the front in close order at the decisive moment.
On the few occasions when this is feasible the movement will certainly
produce great effect. For instance, at night, when darkness diminishes
the effect of arms of precision ; again, when smoke or the physical and
moral influence of severe losses clouds the defender's vision, or when
the nature of the ground is such as to afford cover to the advancing
column. The individual action of skirmishers in the firing line will,
however, be on all occasions the most important part of the infantry

* The prince, who was commanding the artillery of the Guard Corps, perhaps
hardly makes sufficient allowance for the effect prdouced by the fire of his batteries
on the French masses. Probably the moral as well as the physical effect of this tire
had more to do with the discomfiture of the Grand Champs Division than the resist-
ance, brave and skillful as it was, of the Prussian skirmishers.

Wimpffen, in his book on Sedan, gives uo details of this affair. — Tr.

13

soldier's fighting, and the army which learns best how to train each in-
dividual foot soldier to make the most of his fire-arm, and at the same
time to act upon the signs, the orders, and the example of his leaders,
will gain a decided preponderance in war.

For of what use is action, however vigorous, unless directed with
good judgment upon the decisive point? In this consists the difficulty
of military training. The men must be accustomed, though fighting in
extended order, to obey the commands of their officers and to maintain
perfect discipline. This combination of discipline (steadiness) with in-
dividual initiative was the great secret of the superiority of our infantry
in 1870-'71, and will surely give the preponderance to any infantry over
another inferior to it in that respect. This fact has been recognized by
our authorities, and is the motive for all the alterations to be found in
the Infantry Field Exercise Book of 1876. Not only, as already noticed,
has the old "column of attack" disappeared as a battalion formation,
without leaving a trace behind it, giving way to the " column on the
center" (double column), which again is only employed as a formation
for assembly out of fire,* but it is worthy of remark that in Chapter
XIV the formation in two ranks (company columns) is established as
the normal fighting formation, and that the greatest part of the book is
devoted to fighting in extended order. The alterations thus made
prove that those at the head of our army gathered from the experience
of the last war, successful as it was, the necessity for tactical improve-
ments, thereby admitting the previous existence of imperfections. This
admission entails no shame on those who made it, but is, on the con-
trary, highly creditable to them.t In fact, if we trace the course of the
combats during 1870-71 in all their details, we cannot fail to be con-
vinced that whenever any portion of our infantry met the enemy for
the first time they exposed themselves to fire in columns which were too
large and too deep, and that this was one of the principal causes of the
severe losses experienced in the earlier actions. I myself can only speak
as a spectator, and that a distant one, of the part played by the Guard
Corps in the battle of the 18th August, for I was in the center of the
line of artillery,^ that is to say, a good deal to the right of where the chief
infantry attack took place. I need tell you no more about the way in
which the infantry of the Guard attacked St. Privat, for you have read
and heard enough about it, and you are well aware that the losses ex-
perienced by the corps on that occasion gave rise more than anything

* The double column of " company columns," i. e., of Ziige formed in two ranks,
is the normal rendezvous formation for infantry when prepared for action. (See last
edition of "Exercir-Keglement fur die Infanterie," March 1, 1876, page 11:5.)

Our old double column of half-companies was equally handy. — Tr.

tThe conduct first of the Prussian army, afterwards of the German army, in con-
stantly seeking to surpass itself, is one of the most noteworthy points in the military
history of the nation. Most armies after such unparalleled successes would have gone
to sleep and rusted on their laurels. — Tr.

tThe artillery of the Guard Corps commanded by the prince. — Tr.

14

else to the many suggestions and experiments made with a view to de-
vising- some tactical formation calculated to prevent the recurrence of
such fearful bavoc in the case of a similar offensive movement over an
open plain. One thing deserves notice as evidence of the destructive
nature of the fire from St. Privat. A flock of sheep took flight, broke
out of the village of Ste. Marie, and galloped along the front of the
Prussian infantry, creating a great dust, owing to which it was prob-
ably mistaken by the French riflemen for a body of cavalry, and per-
ished under their Are to the last sheep (a godsend to our guardsmen,
who all dined on mutton the next day). There are situations in battle
in which men's minds are so occupied by the dangers of the moment
that all evolutions become impossible; in such cases you don't know
right from left ; the only thought is " forwards" or " backwards."

When our men, on the day in question, came all at once, under full
force of the enemy's fire, of which they had hitherto thought but little,
the only thiug dreamed of was to continue the forward movement ;
recognizing the necessity of this, all the battalion commanders and their
officers merely shouted "Forward," "Have at them"; and so it came
that those very "shock tactics" which four years before had failed be-
fore our fire were to all appearance to be tried by us in our turn.

But out of this attack of masses action in extended order soon de-
veloped itself, for the fearful gaps made by the enemy's bullets soon
loosened our serried ranks, converting the companies into an open line
of groups (Schiviirme), which, honor be to the gallant fellows, kept
moving on till near enough to the enemy's position to be able to reply
to his fire.

They then were ordered to lie down, taking cover as well as they
could in the furrows, and to keep up as hot a tire as possible, thus, with
the support of our advancing batteries, preparing the way for the final
assault, which was necessarily postponed till the left wing of the Twelfth
Army Corps was able to act upon the flank of the defenders.

The company.

You have entirely misunderstood me if you have gathered from the
wish which I expressed for some alteration in our drill regulations that I
desire to reduce in the least degree our steadiness and precision. On
the contrary, whilst wishing to see such details as practice in turning,
in the rifle exercise, and such like, discontinued as a part of battalion
drill, I meant to insist all the more upon such elementary branches of
instruction being taught most thoroughly and exactly at company drill;
and at the same time I recommended that these details should be
limited to what is absolutely necessary, so that each point should re-
ceive all the more attention, and that drill should be conducted under
the closest supervision ; in short, my desire is that elementary tactical
instruction should be completed in the company instead of being carried
on, as now, in the battalion. For the mode of fighting rendered neces-

15

sary in tbese days by the perfection of fire-arms lias made it incumbent
upon us to operate with companies instead of with battalions, as every
action portrayed in onr general staff history of the late war demon-
strates. Hence the company has become the real tactical unit, although
for the sake of convenience and control we still reckon by battalions,
because the company has not lasting power enough for any length of
time, and may easily be used up in action. We must thus pay the most
careful attention to the training of the company in all details, whilst in
dealing with the battalion we go beyond the elements and enter more
or less into the domaiu of applied tactics. I have, therefore, always
tried, as far as possible, to confine the attentions of the company to the
"how" rather than the u what," whilst applying just the opposite rule
to the battalion, for the captain is very rarely called upon to perform
great tactical or strategical operations on service. His objective,
whether he be on the offensive or on the defensive, is in general very
clearly marked out for him, but his own immediate share in the action
is successful or not according to the manner in which he carries out his
instructions, to the way in which his men take advantage of the ground,
to their skill and steadiness in firing, to their attention to all signals
and orders ; for the more the fate of battles depends upon the independ-
ent action of the individual the greater is the demand upon discipline,
that is to say, upon ready obedience, thanks to which the independent
action of the many is concentrated iuto one great whole, one great
power. We have had quite lately a proof of how all the latest inven-
tions— breech-loaders, mitrailleuses, rifled guns — count as nothing
against the most primitive of all weapons, the spear, in the absence of
discipline. I allude to the destruction of Baker's 'troops near Suakin.
For 1 cannot allow that the Egyptian is by nature a coward. The
troops of Mehemet Ali and of Ibrahim proved the contrary in the first
half of this century. To resume : I consider that up to and within the
company all tactical instruction should be confined to the correct per-
formance of specified evolutions, and even this will give the captain quite
enough to do.

The company officers, captaius and lieutenants, are xeally the very
soul of an infantry regiment as regards instruction and performance of
duty. The corresponding officers of other arms are doubtless of similar
importance, but still we must remember that when dealing with cavalry
we reckon by hones, with artillery by guns, whereas with infantry we
have only to do with men, which shows that in the last-named arm hu-
man nature is aloue in question, and the influence exercised upon the
individual soldier, therefore, attains its highest importance in the infan-
try.

This influence, this power over the feelings of the men, is only pos-
sessed by the company officer. The non commissioned officer is the
assistant of the captain and of his subalterns, carrying out their orders.

16

having himself been formed by them, whilst the field officer, again, is
too far removed from the private, and cannot be expected to have an
intimate knowledge of all the men of his battalion. The company offi-
cer alone knows each Tommy Atkins individually, having instructed,
praised, blamed, punished, and rewarded him. On that account the
soldier follows his officer into battle with confidence, aud it is his im-
mediate superior who can best rouse him to deeds of valor. Who has
not witnessed many examples of this in war1? During an outpost skir-
mish which took place on Easter Monday, 1864, in front of the redoubts
of Diippel, when the enemy's rifle-pits were attacked at night, two com-
panies of our Eighteenth and Eighth Regiments ran beyond the pits, in-
stead of occupying them as intended, found themselves at daybreak close
to the Danish redoubts, which were too strong to be carried by assault,
and had to retire with severe loss. An Upper Silesian private being
blamed for having gone so far ahead by his squire, who had followed the
army as a Knight of St. John, replied in his broken German, u But, my
good sir, when the lieutenant goes ahead one is bound to follow." Again,
during a fight in a village before Paris the church-yard on one side of it
was occupied by a half-company of ours. The regiment to which this
detachment belonged had always been remarkable for gallantry, so we
were all the more astonished when the enemy, making a sortie, carried
the church-yard with a rush, in consequence of which we had to storm
it again. After the fight I asked some of the men belonging to the first
garrison how it was they let the French turn them out. " It is just this,"
said they ; " there was no officer to tell us what to do, so we just bolted."
Both officers had unluckily been knocked over by the enemy's ar-
tillery fire at the beginning of the affair, one being killed, the other
wounded and insensible. But no further examples are necessary.
Every infantry officer who has been in action cau cite many instances
which prove that in our army the company officer is the guiding spirit
of the infantry, inspiring the men with his own ardor and followed by
them with perfect confidence.* Even in the last century General v.
Riichel remarked, "The officers are the soul of the Prussian army;"
and since in these days it has become necessary at the most critical period
of battle to dissolve the mass of (ighting men into atoms, which can
only be reached by the voice of the nearest lieutenant, the truth of the
general's saying has become all the more striking ; so that if I main-
tained in my second letter that it was not the Prussian schoolmaster
but the Prussian non-commissioned officer who had gained our victories,
further consideration now leads to the assertion that it was neither
the schoolmaster nor the non-commissioned officer but the lieutenant
who gained the day for us. Not but what this same lieutenant is in

* And so it should be in all armies. Iu few, if any, however, is the influence of the
company officer as strong as in that of Germany, for in few armies are the power and
responsibility of the company officer sufficiently recognized. — Tk.

17

peace one of the soldier's schoolmasters. In saying this I do not for ;i
moment mean to depreciate the work done by officers of higher rank,

and 1 will at once warn my readers that in my farther observations 1
shall carefully guard myself against doing so. At present it will be
sufficient to remark, in order to prevent any mischievous deductions be-
ing drawn from the rather paradoxical statement just made, Hint all
officers of higher rank were once upon a time lieutenants, and that all
lieutenants will some day become offieers of the higher grades. lint
just now we have to deal more especially with the infantry lieutenant,
or rather with the company offieer, including the captain, and we ask-
whence arises the influence which he exercises over the masses — an in-
fluence which creates marvels of heroism, and which lends men to obey
his every nod even in moments of the greatest peril, when the loosening
effect of the modern mode of fighting has emancipated them from im-
mediate control and supervision. The answer to this question is, it
arises from the officer's unwearied energy, from his spotless honor, from
his Spartan frugality. There have been times of piping peace when to
men in general the work of an officer appeared limited to mounting
guard and to spending, during spring and summer, some hours daily at
drill or in maneuvering across country. It was during this period that
certain nicknames for the lieutenant originated, such as " pavement
crusher," and such like; but wheu do you now see a lieutenant idling
in the streets ? If ever, it is at midday, when the men are dining and
he is on his way to a restaurant to get his lunch, for his dinner hour is
at 3 or at 4 ; and again on Sundays, when he is paying visits to his friends.
Otherwise he is fully occupied from early morn to dewy eve. At sun-
rise he has to inspect his men, to see that they are clean and orderly, and
to find fault if occasion arises. Then he instructs and drills each man
individually. Gymnastics, marching exercises, construction of the rifle,
practice with it, field duties, and interior economy — all these things have
to be taught, and he should in every way furnish in his own person an
example to be followed, because the soldier will only learn to do anything
at all as long as the officer can do it better. And so he is busy through-
out I he livelong day. To the casual observer, who only gains an oc-
casional glance at a parade-ground in crossing it, it seems as if the little
matters of drill cau be got through easily iu a few hours, but the infantry
officer knows what pains and labor are required for the purpose; and
whoever, even without being a soldier, will read my former letters with
unprejudiced mind, will understand this, particularly if he takes count
of the time expended in learning the use of the rifle. A company tires
away 15,000 to 20,000 shots annually at target practice, not a shot being
fired except iu presence of an officer, who is responsible for the observ-
ance of all regulations to iusure safety, and for the entry of every shot
in the company register. There are seldom more than two officers in a
company available for this duty. What a trial it is to the nerves, to
the endurance, to the conscientiousness of the officer, who must never
2580— No. 18 2

18

for a moment allow his attention to relax when on the practice-ground,
but must stand there hour after hour, winter and summer, at one time
in snow and frost, at another under a scorching sun, watching every shot,
seeing to the position of the firer, to the observance of all rules for the
prevention of accidents, to the correctness of all entries. For if there
is the slightest neglect, accidents will arise, and the officer at the firing-
point will be tried by conrt-martial. In addition to this, he has often to
perform his duty in spite of the ill-will aud opposition of civilians, and
even of the civil authorities; for the latter have sometimes taken upon
themselves to prohibit officially the continuation of target practice be-
cause a rifle has happened to go off when pointed up in the air, thus
endangering people behind the butt. And this may well be, for we have
known men accidentally wounded in action at a distance of 4,000 paces
from the enemy's skirmishers. Many think that the lieutenant has done
all his work by 4 o'clock, when he goes to dinner. Not so. Hardly is
dinner over when the lecture time begins, when it is the business of some
of the lieutenants to give theoretical instruction to the non-commis-
sioned officers, of others to instruct the privates. This branch of in-
struction is positively necessary, especially in military matters, to which,
however, the instructor does not confine himself entirely ; on the con-
trary, he teaches his men many things which are afterwards useful to
them in civil life, and the few recruits who join without knowing how
to read and write acquire these arts whilst in the army. Many men
learn more whilst in the ranks than they have done during the whole
of their previous schooling. I remember when I was a lieutenant I
taught reading, writing, and arithmetic to a recruit who had plenty of
brains but whose education had been neglected, and who afterwards
became sergeant, and later on an excellent paymaster's clerk. Army
schools produce better results on an average than civil schools, because
the scholars in the former, being twenty years of age aud over, have
greater application and appreciate the advantages of education better
than the children who attend the latter.

On that account they lean more upon the teachers of their riper
years, following their lead in times of hardship and of danger. But
the day's work of our lieutenant is not yet over, for besides having to
perform his daily duties he has to perfect himself in performing them.
He must himself practice gymnastic exercises; he must study, give lect-
ures, attend all regimental conferences, write professional essays, and
take part in the war games. Three or four evenings of each week
are spent in this manner, the remaining evenings being alone availa-
ble for society and amusement. In fact, so hard is the work of the
regimental officer that those who succeed in gaining admission to the
Krieysakademie (which answers to our Staff College) hud the course
of study there, severe and trying as it is, quite a relief after the worry
of regimental duty. But the captain is even harder worked than the
lieuteuaut. He shares the labors of his subs, and whilst they give

19

special instruction goes from one to the other to superintend and at
the same time to assist and give counsel to the more inexperienced
amongst them. If he goes to his quarters, hoping to devote an hour
to relaxation or to family intercourse, the company sergeant-major is
sure to make his appearance with a "crime" which has to be inquired
into and disposed of, the entry being duly made in the defaulter's book.
Another time it will be some question of accounts; or his presence will
be required at the " stores" to fit his men's clothing; or he will have to
see to some irregularity in the barrack -rooms, for he is responsible for
all that concerns his company down to the minutest details, and must
be conversant with everything. And thus it has passed into a proverb
that the commander of a company can never be sure of his life, because
he can never enjoy it. I know well that officers of similar rank in the
other arms have their time quite as fully occupied, but the infantry lieu-
tenant must run about on foot during the hardest part of his work, that
is to say, at drills or maneuvers, whilst cavalry and artillery officers
ride; so thatgreater demands are made upon the strength of the former.
But labor and exertion alone would not qualify the officer to exericse
so remarkable an influence over his men if he did not pride himself,
as he does, upon his spotless honor, and if the private soldier were not
convinced that he cau depend most entirely upon that honor. The
soldier is well aware that the officer is his superior in that respect; he
knows that the officer will always of his own accord go to the front to
set him an example ; that the officer will, for the sake of his own reputa-
tion, always be the first where there is danger; and thence comes the
feeling that he, as it were, belongs to the officer, that it is impossible
to leave him in the lurch ; in short, that spirit which found its expres-
sion in the words, " When the lieutenant goes ahead we are bound to
follow him."

I might fill volumes before exhausting all I could say upon this point
of the officer's honor; but were I to pursue the subject further with
you, it would be a case of " carrying coals to Newcastle." The high
standard of honor in our corps of officers is recognized with admiration
by all cultivated civilians, and is viewed with ill-will by all those who
desire to upset our social and political institutions. How such men re-
joice and scream with delight when an occasional instance occurs if one
out of ten thousand officers disgraces his position. For some time the
papers are full of it, and make use of the case to throw discredit upon
the whole corps of officers; but in vain, for as a body it remains un-
sullied. It drives from its midst, without pity and without hope of
pardon, the erring individual, and rises in public estimation by its
honesty and plain dealing, because showing that it cares not for an
outward varnish of respectability, but must be honest to the core.

The third quality mentioned as productive of the officer's influences
over the men is Spartan frugality, iu which the infantry subaltern sur-

20

passes tbose of the other arms, and this same frugality, amidst his
many labors, testifies to his high feeling- of honor. There are certainly
some cavalry officers equally frugal, but one finds, as a general rule, that
most of the young gentlemen who are comparatively well off, and thus
need not live so penuriously, join the latter arm. But the great ma-
jority of infantry officers are wretchedly poor, and the pay which they
receive for their increasing labors is very small — so small that our
great statesman when in the Chambers spoke of the " brilliant misery f>
of the lieutenant of the period. Even now a lieutenant's pay and al-
lowances* are so small that he is exposed to bitter privations unless
helped by his family — privations which he bears quietly in private,
whilst in public he maintains the dignity of his position. Many parents,
doubtless, when their sons join the service, draw upon their capital to
give them an allowance as long as they are subalterns, but many
more cannot do this. I have known young gentlemen from the Cadet
Corps join my regiment whose mothers, officers' widows, could give
them nothing but $5 once for all and an old coat of their fathers';
others belonging to good old families who did not even get their $5,
and whose sisters reckoned upon getting some of their scanty pay.
You must not, therefore, be surprised to see a young officer who has
been invited to tea by some friends display a wonderful appetite for
bread and butter. He may confess some day, when he is better off,
that on the evening in question he was so hungry because he had gone
all day without food for want of money. Another will buy the daily
bread rations of bis servant, who is better off than himself, under the
pretext that it suits his health better, but really because it is cheaper
than any other bread. That officers such as these freeze in their rooms
because they cannot afford to buy fuel ; that they walk about in cold
weather without overcoats, so as not to wear out their good uniforms
too quickly, pretending that they can't bear warm clothing — all this
will be well understood. At the same time, when these same stoics have
to appear on parade, in public places, or in society, they are remarkable
for the elegance of their appearance and for their cheerful mien. You
may perhaps object that there are exceptions to this rule; that there are
officers who give way to the prevailing love of pleasure, who waste their
own money and the family property, ending by being plunged into
debt. 1 reply, How can you expect all officers to escape infection by
the prevailing epidemic? But the exceptions prove the rule, and the

* The pay and allowances of an —

Infantry first lieutenant are (maximum) £ 105

Infantry first lieuteuant are (minimum) , 83

Infantry second lieutenant are (maximum) 96

Infantry second lieutenant are (minimum) 73

the pay being the same everywhere, hut the allowances varying according to the
nature of the garrison town. — Tr.

21

wonderful hubbub created by such exceptional cases is of itself suf-
ficient proof that the public is accustomed to and expects .Spartan
frugality on the part of our lieutenants. What, now, is the private
soldier's feeling with regard to such an officer? He does not pity, but
is full of respect for his lieutenant. He soon learns from his comrade,
the officer's servant, how his master fares, and when he finds out that
the latter is comparatively poorer and worse paid than himself, and can
afford to spend less on amusement than he can — although his instructor
in all matters and his guide in danger and difficulty — how can he help
following such a leader with all his heart?*

The battalion.

The training of the battalion is divided into two parts, namely, drill
and battle training. Our Field Exercise Book gives all necessary direc-
tions for both. Those concerning battle training are so elastic that
they can be adapted to every situation, and are not only quite sufficient
for the purpose, but we can hardly imagine them capable of improve-
ment, affording as they do a good foundation to build upon, and at the
same time leaving plenty of room for individual actiou, thus encourag-
ing to the utmost that initiative on the part of subordinate officers which
is so necessary an accompaniment of fighting in extended order. The
more I study our Field Exercise Book the more I admire the spirit which
inspires it, and which finds full expression in paragraphs 112 and 127,f
the latter of which is intended specially for the brigade, but is also
applicable to the battalion. Yet we often — nay, generally — find that
those paragraphs are not acted up to at battalion exercises. On the
contrary, the further we get from our last experience of war the more
stiff, conventional, and formal become the tactics and training of our
battalions, unless inspecting officers use their influence against this
pedantry, and insist upon the form being subordinate to the spirit.
This is, however, a difficult matter, for the existence of stiffness and
formality in such things is not a sign of indolence, but rather of exces-
sive zeal on the part of the battalion commander. Hence it follows
that the manner in which the officer handles his battalion becomes day
by day more and more incompatible with the realities of war, whilst
this very consequence is produced by the commander's earnest endeavor
to bring his battalion up to the highest pitch of perfection. I will
cite, by way of example, a few cases in support of my assertions. Al-

*The comparative poverty of tbe German landed gentry is doubtless favorable to
her military strength. — Tr.

t Paragraph 11*2 contains "general remarks" upon the eighteenth chapter, which
treats of "The battalion in battle; the use of skirmishers aud of company columns
in general."

Paragraph 127 contains "general remarks" upon the twentieth chapter, which
treats of "Movements of the brigade when iu order of battle." Both paragraphs eon-
tain much that is noteworthy founded upon the latest experience of war. — Tr.

22

though we find at page 152 of our Field Exercise Book* the employ-
ment of the battalion column distinctly prohibited except under certain
special circumstances, the greater part of the time spent in battalion
exercise is devoted to extending skirmishers from the battalion column,
which, after the skirmishers have extended and opened fire, remains so
close to them that it would most certainly share their losses if thus
situated iu actual warfare. The utmost they do is to push forward the
flank companies, and the great aim is to arrive at this normal forma-
tion with the central companies exactly in rear of the middle of the in-
terval. One rarely sees advantage taken of the latitude given as to
which and how many companies are thrown forward, or of the variations
sanctioned t in paragraph 111, or, again, of the injunctions given in para-
graph 112. At the outside one sees towards the end of the drill some
movements with companies in two or three lines, but without any ap-
plication of such movements to battle.

Observe the manner in which the simple operation of re-en forcing a line
of skirmishers who are lying down and firing is carried out. Accord-
ing to regulation tactical order must be preserved, and intermingling
of different units in the firiug line must be avoided. So when a fresh
Zug comes up in extended order to re-enforce the old skirmishers, the
latter generally stand up and close right or left to make way for the
new-comers-! Would such a flank movement be feasible if the action
were sufficiently severe for re-enforcements to be required1? Would not
the men who stand up and close be sure marks for the enemy's fire ?
Might not the Zilge which first move out leave intervals between
them for any re- enforcements which may subsequently be required ?
Would uot the men, moreover, be thus more under control of their of-
ficers, being extended over less ground, and would not their fire be thus
more effective? Being thus kept together also, would they not have
better opportunity of availing themselves of cover by taking advantage
of accidents of ground? The de ect referred to becomes more evident
when several battalions are side by side in brigade, the skirmishers
being then often directed to cover the whole front, and to extend them-
selves equally along it, so that they are often ten paces apart, although
the maximum interval sanctioned by regulation is three paces a man

* The passage reads as follows : "Under effective fire of the enemy the employment
of the battalion column is only justifiable under particular circumstances. The nor-
mal fighting formation of a battalion in first line is therefore iu company column." —
Tit.

i Paragraph 111 treats of the use of " company column," and is well worth study,
as it gives a good account of the many ways in which this valuable formation may
be employed. — Tr.

1 1 am surprised to find that anything so unpractical should be still tolerated in
the German army. The absurdity of such a practice was pointed out to me when, as
a recruit, I began to learn the art of skirmishing in the Forty-third Light Infantry,
nearly forty years ago, and doubtless neither that regiment nor any of the old light
division regiments had been allowed to act as described in this letter since the days
of the camp at Hythe. — Tr.

23

and six paces a file. As if there could by any harm in leaving inter-
vals of even 200 paces between the skirmishing- Ziige, and as if any
body of euemies could make its way through such an interval without
being destroyed. Again, when do you see a battalion commander al-
low officers in the firing line to judge for themselves whether to employ
individual or rapid independent fire, the group volley or the fixed num-
ber of rounds, as most adapted to the circumstances of the moment ?
Or does the battalion commander ever permit captains of companies
which are moving up in support to employ the formation which each
thinks best for the occasion — line, column, or what not? Does he not,
on the contrary, prefer that all companies should act alike, for the sake
of appearance and uniformity"? Would he, however, on actual service
be always able to regulate such things himself1? I will only mention
one of the formalities to which the regular shape of the drill-ground is
apt to give rise, and which often has a damaging effect on the intellect.
When a battalion has been skirmishing and the assembly sounds for
double column to be formed, according to the usual custom, at the end
of the exercise, the front of the column generally faces exactly towards
the side of the drill ground, because the battalion is generally expected
to march past before going home. Therefore, an oblique formation is
rarely practiced, so that there would be a good deal of bother and loss
of time if the battalion were called upon to assemble fronting a certain
position, we will say on a certain church tower. To gain the power, how-
ever, of doing this sort of thing quickly is an important part of war train-
ing, without which there would be an excessive waste of time and a
great deal of useless fatigue entailed upon the men if an officer were
ordered to form up masses of troops in a position suitable to the ground;
for instance, under cover in rear of a line of heights, and such like.*
Barrack-square customs such as that just referred to exist in great
numbers, without mentioning the little shifts and dodges inapplicable
to war, but which promote smart and steady drill before au inspecting
officer. Every soldier knows this, and I will not weary you by detail-
ing them, but will proceed to treat of the personal action aud demeanor
of the battalion commander.

At the commencement of the " battle exercise" you will see him on
horseback by the side of the first skirmisher who opens fire, and who is
made to lie down flat for the sake of shelter. He remains in the firing
line during the whole action ; or should it occur to him that he could
not exist there in battle, he retires at the utmost to some point between
the skirmishers and the nearest support, from which post he issues or-
ders and makes signals. Should, however, a movement of any sort be-
come necessary, a flank attack or a re-enforcement, he is certain to ride
to the place and see to it himself. You may be especially sure that he
will do this if a mistake has been made, an order misunderstood, a wrong

*I have known excellent practice in this way given at our own brigade and bat-
talion drills when ''changes of positions" are made. — Tr.

24

mode of tiring used, or, in short, if anything has been done contrary to
his wishes. If he met his deserts he would be put hors de combat by an
umpire a hundred times an hour. He goes everywhere except to the
one point where if on actual service he would have remained the whole
time, namely, with the company kept back as his last reserve, and with
which he should show himself for the first time in the fighting line, un-
less he wishes to let his battalion get out of hand sooner than it need.
Such unreal scenes from life in the drill-field create very false impressions
upon those who have not seen war, for they are naturally led to suppose
that such things occur in action; and when they find how unlike the
realities of war are to their peace experience many of them get bewildered.
And, again, the private soldier, who has been always accustomed to see
the major* well to the front at drill, is apt to make unflattering remarks
when this gentleman betakes himself to his reserve company as soon as
the bullets begin to whistle ; and the consequence of this is that field
officers, to avoid such remarks, make a practice, at any rate at their first
battle, of riding to the same points which they frequented when under
fire of blank cartridge. A general in high position and a veteran of
the old wars, however, said, in 1850, when criticising a maneuver and
remarking upon unrealities of this kind with characteristic irony, he was
sure that the first ball cartridge would set things right. But he was
mistaken. At St. Privat mounted officers rode just where they had
been in the habit of riding in peace time, the consequence of which was
that at the end of that day only a few of the field officers and adjutants
of the infantry of the Guard Corps were fit for duty, most of them being
killed or wounded. Very honorable to them, indeed, but quite unneces-
sary, and most damaging to the interests of the service and of our coun-
try. When we discuss this question quietly it appears as clear as pos-
sible, and one only wonders how such unrealities can be tolerated. But
there must be good reason for their general occurrence, and it is well
worth while to seek for this reason if we wish to avoid the evils result-
ing from them. The first and foremost reason is that the battalion com-
mander, when beginning to train his corps, cannot remain at the post
which he would occupy in action, namely, with the rear company, be-
cause he finds occasion every moment to instruct and correct, being-
obliged in consequence to ride backwards and forwards; and if he re-
turns to his |>roper place at any moment, something is sure to happen
again in the fighting line which makes his presence there necessary.
He therefore prefers remaining in front. In theory it would be better
to pass over mistakes for the time, and to defer remarks to intervals of
repose and to the end of the drill. But this is not practicable. There is
always so much to criticise that he would have to interrupt the operations
very frequently to call the officers together and give them long lectures,
or else he would give way to the temptation of deferring the whole critique
till next morning's parade, when he would find that by the end of his lec-

* Major commanding the battalion. — Tr.

25

tare the whole time available for drill was over, and that he had to dis-
miss the men to their dinners — a scene which 1 once myself witnessed.
Moreover, a few words on the spot at the very moment have much greater
effect, and are much more instructive than the most complete and exhaus-
tive dissertation given sometime after. Besides which, the battalion com-
mander must be near the fighting line if he wishes to notice and remark
upon all mistakes, for he cannot from his proper battle-post near the re-
serve hear wrong words of command, should such be given, as to the mode
of firiug, nor can he see whether proper aim is taken. The battalion
commander must, therefore, necessarily place himself, on the first day of
li battle practice," where he would not be able to remain in action, and
this afterwards becomes a habit with him. The only occasion on which
he might place himself where he should be according to the rules of war
is the day of inspection ; but it is too much to expect of a man that he
should all at once, for that one day, give up what has become a fixed
habit, aud still more that he should get his battalion to adapt itself all
at once to a new mechanism of command just when he wants to show it
off to the best advantage, and, if possible, to avoid all mistakes. You
may, perhaps, suggest that the commander might well, during the first
elementary period of training, go about from place to place as he wishes,
but that during the second period, when he comes to " battle practice,"
he should always remain where he would be in action. A very good
idea, but hardly practicable. The period allowed for battalion training
is so short that the commanding officer is glad if he can find time to
practice even once in the course of the period each movement included
in the Field Exercise Book, so that he is unable to divide the days which
are allowed him into two periods, the former devoted to elementary, the
latter to applied tactics. For during the three weeks allotted to bat-
talion training, if he gets — after making allowance for Sundays, holi-
days, garrison guards, and fatigues — ten full working days, he may con-
sider himself fortunate. Any commanding officer who has tried to work
out the plan suggested has arrived at the outside at getting two days
for real " battle practice," namely, the inspection day aud that preced-
ing it. Thus, he was naturally led to rehearse on the day before the
inspection the exact movements which he intended to perform at the
latter, so that the inspection was degraded iuto a mere theatrical dis-
play, a sort of military ballet, thus rendering the work of both days
worthless for the purpose of battle training.

The inclination of the battalion commander to be everywhere himself
and to see to everything himself is increased by a fact which is easily
intelligible, namely, that the inspecting officer makes him responsible
for every error which may be committed. " Just look, major, how that
company is formed;" or, " See! the skirmishers of that company are ad-
vancing at the double ; that is all wrong." After one or two such re-
marks from the general you will see the major galloping from Zug
to Zug to prevent a repetition of the mistake. In consequence many

26

a battalion commander restricts himself to practicing- from paragraphs
77 to 98 of the Field Exercise Book, and rarely soars into the higher
regions of tactics treated of in Part IV.* If able to perform the various
evolutions described in the paragraphs mentioned with satisfactory pre-
cision, the battalion is sure to make a good impression, and some im-
perfections iu rendering' the contents of Part IV will be condoned.
This, however, means a return to stiffness and to mass formations,
which are out of keeping with the present fire-arms, and can only lead
to massive losses. I have often heard the habit of " working a corps
up "for its inspection bitterly condemned; but if blame was ever ill-
deserved it is in this case, for the strength of an army depends upon its
power of obtaining an object at the will of one man, that is to say, it
depends upon obedience and discipline; not that formal obedience
which consists in merely doing what you are told and in awaiting orders,
but that active obedience which leads a man to discover and anticipate
the wishes of his superiors. The officer, therefore, who endeavors to
present his corps before the inspecting officer in a condition such as he
knows will be pleasing to him is not necessarily a time-server, but one
who acts in that true spirit of obedience which has made our army
great. I myself have been affected in a remarkable way by the pre-
vailing inclination on the part of commanders to see to everything
themselves. I believe I told you once before how, when a single bat-
talion was engaged in a reconnoitering skirmish, the divisional, brigade,
regimental, and battalion commanders, with their several staffs and
accompanied by a reigning German prince, were all in the foremost
line of skirmishers. Accustomed as those gentlemen were at all in-
spections to see to everything themselves, and looking upon battle
merely as a sort of first-class inspection, they behaved just as they
would at a peace maneuver. On another occasion a division iu close
formation was advancing qh some enterprise against the enemy. The
divisional general, as well as the commanders of the leading brigade,
regiment, and battalion, were riding just in rear of the foremost troops.
The first man wounded was a mounted orderly, who was struck by a
bullet iu the breast, and fell from his horse just behind the general.
Not to mention the disproportionate number of casualties amongst su-
perior officers produced by this practice, together with the uncertainty
in transmission of orders arising from it, we may notice another bad
result. To each man is allotted by nature a certain portion of bodily

* These paragraphs form the fourteenth chapter, " Formation of the battalion in
two ranks (battle formation)," which treats almost entirely of movements in close
order, column formations, deployments, &c, three of these paragraphs only being
devoted to the extension of skirmishers from line and column. Part IV is entirely
confined to "battle practice" (Gefechtaubung), comprising two chapters, one of
which treats of the training of the men individually and collectively for fighting in
extended order, also of the part played therein by officers and non-commissioned offi-
cers', whilst the other explains the action of the battalion in battle, the general use
of skirmishers and of company columns. — Ti;.

27

and nervous power. If you try your bodily strength prematurely, before
the actual necessity for doing so arises, you run the risk of finding it
fail just when it is most needed. The same thing applies to the nerves.
No one is insensible to danger. Strength of nerve alone enables a man
to overcome his apprehensions. The superior officer who goes into the
fighting line sooner than he need, runs the risk of finding his nerve fail
him at the critical moment. This does not produce a sudden outbreak
of cowardice — by no means. Shakiness of nerve does not act in so
straightforward a manner, but works upon a man surreptitiously by
suggesting to him strategical and tactical caution, by proving to him
that according to all the rules of art he is bound to temporize, to remain
on the defensive, to break off the engagement, or to do whatever the
fine scientific term for the thing may be. For instance, a divisional
general who has been from sunrise till midday in the foremost line of
skirmishers, has heard the bullets whistling about his head for five or
six hours, whilst the advanced guard was driving back the enemy's
outposts, and has at last arrived in front of the main position strongly
occupied by an enemy, who perhaps must needs do his best to hold it
because he cannot see his way to retiring from it in safety — a general,
I say, thus circumstanced will be very apt to think that his troops have
done enough for the day, being himself tired by having been six hours
under fire ; yet all except the leading battalions are perfectly fresh. So
he decides to put off the attack till next day, because then the other
divisions will be forwarder, throws out his outposts, and lets his people
rest. The enemy is for a second time surprised, but on this occasion
agreeably so, for he now has an opportunity of retiring without loss,
and escapes from the impending catastrophe. Now, if this general had
taken it easier himself, had he not used himself up in the six hours'
skirmish, he would, at the very moment when he stopped the attack,
have come, for the first time on that day, to the front, fresh in body and
mind, would have found that nothing serious had hitherto been done,
and would have ordered a general attack. Thus, untimely excess of
zeal, which leads an officer to look to the smallest details himself, may
produce subsequent want of energy; premature gallantry may be the
cause of eventual indecision and want of enterprise. These mistakes
were not committed by our generals in action during the latter part of
the French war, which lasted long enough for them to see their errors,
and for some time after that war these mistakes were also banished
from peace practice. But little by little these bad habits crept in again,
and now bid fair to become more and more firmly rooted the longer
peace lasts, not only because the requirements of peace service, culmi-
nating as they do in the inspection, confirm these habits, but also be-
cause the experience gained in the field dies away.*

* There is no European army in which these bad habits arising from eoutinued
peace have been more prevalent than in our own, I believe ; yet one part or other of
our army is almost always engaged in warfare of some sort, which cannot be said of
any other European army. — Tk.

28

"War experience lias only a restricted value," once remarked a mili-
tary bookworm, to the amusement of his friends. But to a certain ex-
tent he was right. The officer of each rank gains experience in war
only for the performance of his own duty and of that appertaining to the
next higher grade. Thus, the captain learns what concerns the com-
mand of a company and of a battalion, but not how to handle a regi-
ment or brigade. The only exception is in the case of young officers^
who keep their eyes open whilst acting as aids-de-camp to some gen-
eral in high command.

2fow, however, after thirteen years of peace, promotion has gone on
a good deal, and I cannot help wishing, for the sake of the younger
generation, that there may be soon no more battalion commanders in
existence who took part in the last war as subalterns in companies, or
how can you expect a lieutenant, whilst commanding a Zug of skir-
mishers in battle, to gain the experience which will teach him how to
lead a battalion in action1? When he has to do it he will act as he
would do at an inspection. As we have pointed out the tendency
which exists on the part of battalion commanders for unpractical
methods of command, for stiffness of formation, for putting themselves
in the wrong place, for a system of direction which is impracticable on
service, the question naturally arises, " Where to find a remedy for
these evils'?"

That they have been recognized by others, and, if not acknowledged
in so many words, that their existence has been fully admitted, is evi-
dent from the many attempts made to find a remedy for them. Up to
the middle of the present century the practice at battalion exercises
was to confine yourself to elementary tactics in stiff formation, in fact
to such exercises as inarching to a flank, wheeling, manual exercise,
column formation, deployments, direct and oblique movements. Skir-
mishers were but little used, being only thrown out from the whole
battalion. The great point of all was the march past. But the old
fashion was modified about the middle of the century, and battalion
commanders were allowed at inspection, when the drill was over, to go
through some "battle practice," including evolutions which they them-
selves had thought out and which were not " in the book." This prac-
tice made field officers reflect, and produced much that was novel and
good. Whoever brought out anything new, even if it were not quite
practical, got the reputation of being at least a man who thought for
himself. This naturally led to excess. Every commanding officer
wished to invent something, and made a secret of his invention up to
the inspection of the battalion, tinkering at it throughout the year, so
as to be able to show off something even surpassing his chef-d'oeuvre of
the year before. Then many wonderful sights were seen, of which,
perhaps, the least startling was the chronic appearance of a river on
the drill-ground, indicated by some men, and probably on an eminence.

29

These eccentric performances soon got the nickname of "Turks' ma-
neuvers," or, briefly, "Turks," on account of the disorder which accom-
panied them. But as every battalion commander thought himself bound
to show off his own special "Turk" before the inspecting officer, the
authority of the Field Exercise Book became much impaired, because
every one began to think that once on active service you might and ought
to shake yourself free from all its shackles. Precision in drill began to
fall off and discipline to suffer. The old drill instructor of the day gave
rather an original turn to the acknowledgment of this evil when he re-
marked, "The march past, gentlemen, is like painting on glass — an art
which has been lost." After some years the higher powers interfered to
check the prevailing tendency towards a departure from regulation and
towards inventions such as alluded to, insisting firmly upon command-
ing officers only practicing movements to be found in the book if they
chose to indulge in their " Turks."

The company column, in combination with fighting in extended order,
became more and more widely used, in accordance with supplementary
instructions issued. After our war experiences, especially that gaiued
in 1870-'71, permission was again given to bring tactical suggestions
forward on the drill ground in a practical way.

These were principally attempts at solving the problem how best to
advance to attack over open ground under tire. Once again the most
wonderful formations were witnessed. One saw at times files of men
sown broadcast over a whole drill-ground some 300 paces square, and
one could not help feeling that the practice of utter dislocation was here
raised to a system.* One saw battalions, after running till the men
became breathless and fell from exhaustion, commence firing while
still in a state of feverish excitement, so that one might fairly doubt
whether a shot from them would tell. One even saw dense clouds of
skirmishers firing as they ran, without aiming and with the rifle held
horizontally to the hip. An endless mass of literature, full of tactical
suggestions, troubled the brains of thinking officers, who at length be-
came utterly puzzled in distinguishing what they had only read in
pamphlets from what was really in " the book." The new edition of
that work which appeared in March, 1876, put an end to this state of
uncertainty. The fourth and fifth parts of this work are sufficient for all
service requirements, and admit of infantry being always handled ac-
cording to the military situation and to the character of the ground, the
rules laid down being of the most elastic nature.

What, then, is to prevent our relapsing into stiffness, and placing our
whole reliance on the chapters of Part III? The real remedy lies in
the nature of the inspection, for a corps will certainly be trained so as
to fit it for the sort of inspection it will have to undergo. In our army,
at least, discipline is, thank Heaven, still so good that such will be the
case. The inspection of a battalion is generally conducted so that

* Can some adventurous German have tried the four-deep system of attack f — Tr.

30

after the parade and inarch past a portion of the time is devoted to
Part III and the remainder to Part IV of the book. The inspecting
officer generally states which evolutions out of the former part he wishes
to see, afterwards allowing the commanding officer to give a represen-
tation of a combat in accordance with the rules laid down in the latter
part, or else he gives him leave to do what he likes out of both parts.
The consequence of this is that during the second part of the perform-
ance, usually called " battle practice," the commanding officer has to
show how he thinks a battalion should be brought into action. He
therefore tries his best to prevent each individual skirmisher from doing
anything but what he wishes. He will have rehearsed his field-day be-
forehand with his captains, dividing it exactly into periods, and he wdl
try to prevent the slightest departure from his fore-arranged plan,
lest the whole programme should be spoilt. But this preparatory re-
hearsal converts the wh >le thing into a theatrical display, which differs
essentially from reality on account of the little knowledge any one has at
the commencement of a real action of what nature will be its later
phases, and, further, because in his endeavors to prevent all departure
from his scheme the commanding officer is obliged to go to many points
where he could not show himself on actual service. In both ways the
initiative of inferior officers is crippled, and the practice is therefore to
be condemned, though there is this much to be said for it, that it gives
a commanding officer the power of showing exactly how he wishes his
battalion to act in battle, in order to do which it is advisable to prevent
all mistakes and fa'se movements from being made. Another result of
leaving the practice of " battle exercises" entirely to the commanding
officer's discretion is that he often plunges into the most scientific tac-
tics mixed up with strategy, and that, in consequence of the compara-
tively slow rate at which infantry can move, much time is taken and
the strength of the men is sorely tried. This applies particularly to
the tendency, which is in principle fully justified, of representing turn-
ing movements, for if a commanding officer wishes to avoid exposing
the company told off to turn the enemy's flank to a crushing tire whilst
making its flank movement, he must detach it whilst still beyond effect-
ive range that is to say, if the field of exercise is extensive enough, at
2,000 meters distance from the enemy ; so that, as the company will
have in its turning movement to go over more ground than this, and
as its advance will be delayed by having to move forward by succes-
sive rushes, and by at least keeping up some amount of skirmishing
fire, this one operation will not take less than half an hour. Moreover,
the flank attack hardly ever answers. Either it comes too late, that
is to say, after the frontal attack is over, or it is made too soon, or else
one of the attacks, either that in front or that on the flank, is held in
check so long by the enemy's fire that it must surely fail ; for infantry
cannot, like cavalry, make up for loss of time by any considerable in-
crease in speed. Only one form of attack combined with a flanking

31

movement can be shown at peace practice without a great expenditure
of time, which form was indeed ordered by one of our senior generals
in high position. He used to place, from the very first, the skirmishers
of the company intended to make the turning movement at right angles
to the skirmishers attacking in front, and order them to move on the
enemy at once in this formation. This obliged the skirmishers of the
flanking company to file off sideways, with the company column in
support on their outer flank. How the officer in question could flatter
himself that any enemy would submit to be outflanked in this fashion
is the more incomprehensible to me that the real enemies whom I have
seen him attack never gave him any grounds for expecting such mag-
nanimity. I certainly act against the saying " De mortuis nil nisi bonwm v
in telling you this anecdote, but I wished to give you an example of
the excesses to which inventiveness may proceed when Clausewitz's
saying, "In war all is simple, but the simple is difficult," is forgotten.
When 1 commanded a division I did my best to remedy the evils alluded
to (as far as the sphere of my iuflueuce admitted of my doing so) by
the nature of my inspections. After some failures, owing to the zeal
of commanding officers, who, in their anxiety to meet my wishes, went
beyond the mark aimed at, I arrived at a system which approved itself
during a seven years' trial. I am satisfied by the experience then
gained that my commanding officers were perfectly competent to train
their battalions properly, and that nothing but the style of previous
inspections had prevented them from doing so.

Still more, as soon as my views were thoroughly understood I had
the pleasure to see my own tactical ideas improved upon by these
gentlemeu. This was only natural, for they had served longer in the
infautry than I, and had practical war experience either as field officers
or as captains. So I learned a lesson from my subordinates. Now I
will tell you how I carried on ni3T inspections, because I think you will
therein find the solution of the problem before us. * * * My in-
spection of a battalion commenced, according to the usual custom, with
a parade and a march past. I attach great importance to these matters,
because when you see men drawn up on parade you judge by their posi-
tion in the ranks, and when you see them march past by the way in
which they step, of the manner in which they have been individually
drilled. A comparison of the remarks which I made when present at
recruit and company drills, with what I observed when troops marched
past, taught me this. Again, nothing shows eo clearly the sort of treat-
ment which men habitually receive as the expression of their faces
when drawn up on parade for inspection. It is true that appearances
may be deceptive, according to whether or not a battalion has been
standing long on parade beforehand. To guard against unnecessary
fatigue from this cause, I made battalions await my coming with piled
arms, only allowing them to form up after my arrival on the ground.
This gave me, too, an opportunity of seeing how things were done. It

32

took a little more of my time, but it saved the men. Before proceeding
further I will remark tbnt at the end of every inspection I made the
battalions march past in a different formation from that shown at start-
ing. I treated this second march past as a compliment to the battalion,
as a solemn conclusion to the proceedings, taking occasion while it was
going on to speak to the men in an encouraging manner. I should only
have omitted the second march past when I had reason to be thoroughly
dissatisfied with a battalion, but this was never once the case, for I
always found at least zeal and good will. Another advantage of the
parade and march past is that they are good tests of the degree in which
the drill regulations are attended to. After the first march past I
allowed the commanding officer from half to three-quarters of an hour
for movements explained in Part III of the Field Exercise Book, omit-
ting the sixteenth chapter, which was reserved for the last, when the
battalion was thoroughly shaken up by field movements.*

In the course of three-quarters of an hour one could form a pretty
good opinion of the manner in which the orders regulating movements
executed at the commanding officer's word of command were carried
out. After a short interval of repose I proceeded to " battle practice,"
conducting this myself, giving the commanding officer quite simple tasks
to work out, the enemy's position being generally marked by a couple
of flags. All had to be done, as far as regards the communication of
orders and the mode of executing them, as it would be on service. I
allowed no movement nor word of command except those found in the
Field Exercise Book. Captains received no instructions before the
operations commenced, except such as were requisite to make them un-
derstand the supposed situation and the meaning of the flags, or such
as they might receive under similar circumstances in actual warfare.
The commanding officer was bound to remain where he would be in a
real fight. If the troops made a false move after being so completely
in actiou that were the case one of actual service no counter order could
reach them, no such order was allowed to be sent, and the commanding-
officer had to modify his measures to suit the occurrence. All orders as
to mode of tiring (whether group volleys, the combined use of two or
three sights at the long ranges, a limit to the number of rounds fired
consecutively, with intervals of cessation, individual or rapid independ-
ent fire), and, again, as to formation (extended order, line, column,
and what sort of column), together with such details as lying down, doub-
ling up, were left to the company officers and non-commissioned officers,
who were alone responsible for those matters, and whose action naturally
gave rise to critical remarks in some cases. By reserving to myself the
power of assigning the tactical task I was able to banish unnatural at-

*The sixteenth chapter is upon rallying the battalion after it has been broken
up and dispersed in the course of an operation. This is done in the same manner as
with us, only the rule is that, unless otherwise ordered, the battalion forms up in
double column of Zilge at quarter distance. — Tr.

33

tempts at strategy from the operations ; moreover, I could prevent an
undue amount of time being taken up by any one movement; and in
case any operation appeared likely during its progress to last too loug,
for convenience I could cut it short by interposing some afterthought,
such as a cavalry charge, or a change from offensive to defensive, and
such like. In course of time, by thinking the matter well over before-
hand, I arrived, thanks to constant practice, at putting a battalion
through three or four tactical problems in the course of from three-
quarters of an hour to an hour.

Supposing, then, from three to five battalions to be quartered at the
same station, from twelve to twenty battle scenes were represented an-
nually before the same field officers and captains, and I thus had the
opportunity of going through the greater part of Part IV of our book.*

To make the matter clear I will give a number of these tactical prob-
lems by way of example :

1. A single battalion makes a frontal attack upon a certain post. To
shorten the operation, sometimes only the first 500 meters, at others
the last 500 meters, of the attack was represented.

2. A single battalion defends a post (redoubt, shelter-trench, wood).

3. A battalion on the march, acting as advanced guard, surprises
the enemy, and

4. Is surprised by him.

5. A battalion being directed on the enemy's flank succeeds in ap-
proaching to within 300 meters of him, in fighting formation, without
being detected.

6. The battalion is supposed to be fighting in brigade, either in the
center or on a flank, in first or in second line.

7. A battalion which has been kept back as a last reserve in rear of
the center of a brigade is ordered to decide at any cost a skirmishing
fight which has been conducted with varying success for some time,
and to carry forward with it the troops already in the fighting line ta
take part in a general attack.

8. The enemy having received re- enforcements or making flank attacks,
the battalion is forced to change from offensive to defensive, or vice
versa.

These eight cases produce at least twenty different combinations,
which may be varied greatly according to the nature of the ground.
Additional variety may be obtained by supposing a cavalry charge,
either on the part of friend or foe, to take place in the middle of the
operation, or by making the commanding officer non-effective. I intro-
duced the latter supposition either when a commanding officer got un-
der effective fire prematurely, or when one of the senior captains in the
regiment happened to be on parade and I wished to give him a chance

* In Germany all field officers and captains in a garrison off duty are expected to
be present as spectators at inspections of the corps they do not themselves belong
to.— Tr.

2580— No. 18 3

34

<of showing himself competent to command a battalion. Conducted in
this manner the inspection of a battalion in field-work took about two
and a half hours, so that no more than two battalions could be in-
spected daily, as no inspecting officer could keep his atteution fixed on
details for a longer time than five hours. As five of the twelve battal-
ions of my division were quartered at one station, three at a second,
while of the other four two were together and the remaining two at
different places, I was able to see all my battalions in nine days, includ-
ing one intervening Sunday. It was impossible to spend more time
•over details of drill without prolonging the period devoted to inspec-
tions at the expense of the regular training, my afternoons being, be-
sides, taken up with other matters connected with the inspection, and
also with my journeys from station to station. You may, perhaps, be
surprised that all divisional generals should not adopt my system of
inspection, if it is really a practical one. Their reason for not doing
so is because the most of them endeavor to exercise their battalions
and to arrange matters according to the wishes of the general com-
manding the army corps, who, however, cannot spend so much time
over a battalion ; indeed, he cannot devote more than one hour on an
average to each, and must needs allow the commanding officer to show
liim what movements he chooses to select. * * * The system of in-
spection here proposed is quite sufficient to obtain a good idea of a com-
manding officer's capacity, for he, knowing the style of inspection to be
expected, is induced to train his battalion in such a way that his sub-
ordinates will gain the habit of initiative necessary to them in battle,
whilst he himself loses the habit of interfering on all occasions, a course
which is out of place, and, indeed, impracticable on service, but into
which he has been naturally led whilst schooling his men in elementary
tactics. The general should conduct his inspection in a genial manner,
for the uncertainty prevailing as to the movements which an officer
will be required to perform, the feeling of being under probation, and
that the result may affect his future prospects, will often produce an
anxiety and a nervousness which may be fatal to clearness of mind,
and produce the complaint commonly known as '* inspection fever," a
■complaint which must be got rid of before the patient's capacity can be
fairly gauged. A timely joke may often act as a remedy. I remember
the case of a very excitable field officer who was in general quite capa-
ble and steady, but who at the commencement of an inspection was
*o much under the influence of " inspection fever " that he gave the first
^simple words of command for marching past all wrong and with a
shaky voice. I rode up to him and remarked quietly, "Major, I have
so often seen your battalion drill capitally under your command that
if I were in your place I should not suffer from fever." He looked hard
at me, smiled, and from that moment handled his battalion in a fault-
less manner.

35

Flank and frontal attacks.

There is some truth in the assertion that one can no longer make a
frontal attack on a position, a village, and so forth, across an open plain
or up a glacis-like slope. The proper course in such cases is to occupy
an enemy thus posted by artillery lire, and to make your attack on some
other part of the position, where you can approach it undercover, or else
to turn the enemy's flank. This is all very well if it be feasible, which is
not, however, always the case. It may happen that a body of infantry
having other troops on its right and left, with more favorable ground
in front of them, must iu order to get at the enemy cross a perfectly
open plain. Can the commander of this body, when ordered to advance,
say, "I cannot go on; I must disobey my orders"? Not so; the only
question for him is, in what mode should he advance so as to expose
his people as little as possible to tire? The Field Exercise Book gives no
clear prescription for this, particularly when the open space is exposed to
a combination of shell, shrapnel, case, and rifle fire. We must, therefore,
draw upon our war experience if we wish to form a clear conception of
the manner in which we should act under such circumstances. At the
battle of St. Privat the infantry of the Guard Corps left the cover af-
forded by the depression which runs from north to southwestward of
Ste. Marie, and advanced to the attack of the French position. Being
still formed in battaliou columns, it was exposed at once unexpectedly to
a most violent rifle fire, at a range previously thought ineffective. It
nevertheless kept on advancing, but the fearful and increasing losses
which it suffered completely broke up its tactical formation, so that when
brought to a standstill by this tremendous fire, the foremost troops
were merely disjointed groups of men, who lay down at from 500 to
600 paces from the enemy and returned his fire. The advanced infan-
try of the Twelfth Army Corps prolonged the firing line of the Guards to
the left. The enemy's infantry, which had been pushed forwards down
the open slope in front, withdrew upwards into the position, and was
also driven back from the brow of the hill between St. Privat and
Amanvillers. Whilst a part of our artillery now established itself on
the ground thus relinquished, the other batteries moved up closer to
the fighting line of the infantry, and supported it by tremendous fire,
at so short a range that every shell told. When the left wing of the
Twelfth Army Corps advanced from Eoncourt on St. Privat, the assail-
ants formed almost a semicircle round the latter village. One of our
infantry generals, who was directing the operations from the foremost
line of skirmishers, remarked that the fire of the defenders from the
loop-holed walls of the gardens surrounding the village was almost
silenced, and said to one of his aids-de-camp, " Now, then, on we go,
or we shall never get into the place." The aids-de-camp were on the
point of riding off to communicate the general's orders, when the whole
front line of skirmishers, both of the Guards and of the Twelfth Army

36

Corps, sprang up as if seized by one and tbe same impulse, and rushed
into tbe village with cheers. This last rush and this capture of the
extended circuit of outer walls cost but few lives, the defenders having
apparently retired into the interior of the village ; but once among the
houses a protracted hand-to-hand struggle took place, as the French
reserves were then, as was supposed, in the act of moving forward to
replace the former defenders of the garden walls who had retired. As
far as I could judge from my position with the artillery on the right of
St. Privat, this supposition wras correct. The day after the battle,
which lasted till after dark, I found many of our dead and wounded
foot soldiers scattered over the whole space between Ste. Marie and St.
Privat, these symptoms of deadly combat becoming more and more
pronounced the nearer you approached the latter place, till within 500 or
600 paces of it, when the bodies lay close together in rows forming a
complete semicircle round it; but nearer to it there were but few. Some
of my infantry comrades argued from this that the French rifle was
sighted too high, and thus fired over our men's heads at close quarters.
But the real reason was rather that our soldiers suffered most on the
ground where they halted the longest to return the enemy's fire, which
had almost entirely ceased when the assailants chose that favorable
moment to make the last rush. I have before now related to you an
episode of the battle of Sedan, which shows how unattackable infantry
is in front if unshaken, if it fires steadily, and has plenty of ammuni-
tion. It is therefore necessary to shake it before you come within its
effective range, either by threatening a flank or by fire. We profited
at Sedan by our previous experience, showing this by the way in which
we made our attacks. On that day the infantry of the Guard, though
not the same battalions which attacked St. Privat, took the Bois de la
Garonne, a fortnight after the last-named action. I was, with ninety
guns of the Guard artillery, in position to the east of Givoune, along
the brow of the hill, nearly as far as Daigny. The enemy's artillery
fire was completely silenced, and General v. Pape determined to carry
the Bois de la Garonne. He therefore settled with me that after I had
shelled the wood for a certain time he should, at an hour specified (we
compared watches so as to be in agreement), move forward out of Gi-
voune. I was then to cease firing, lest I should endanger his men. We
conformed exactly to this arrangement.

The infantry of the Guard ( Jiiger and Fusiliers) climbed the heights
and occupied the borders of the wood, after my ninety guns had kept
up a murderous fire upon it at short range (1,200 to 1,C00 paces). More
than 10,000 unwounded prisoners were here taken, the regiments en-
gaged in the attack having lost in the whole battle of Sedan only 12
officers and 216 men,* of whom but a small portion can have fallen in

* According to the Prussian Staff History, 11,000 prisoners were secured on this
occasion, a good many others having been taken but having afterwards escaped.
A large proportion of these men had surrendered without firing a shot. A good

37

the affair just described, seeing that the same regiments had already
taken the village of Givonne, and that they afterwards lost many men
when fighting inside the wood.

At St. Privat the infantry of the Guard lost 8,000 men, but the fight-
ing at the Bois de la Garonne cannot be fairly compared with that at
St. Privat, because the deep valley of Givonne enabled the assailants
to arrive witbin a few huudred paces of the wood under cover, whilst
a regular glacis-like slope extended for more than an English mile in
front of St. Privat. Another attack on a village, of which I was also
an eye-witness, bore more resemblance to that on St. Privat, namely,
the storming of Le Bourget, on 30th October, 1870. The left column,
composed of the Alexander Begiment and the Schiilzen Battalion of
the Guard, .advanced from Le Blanc Mesnil on the village, accompanied
by two batteries, which prepared the assault, taking post at last pretty
close to the enemy. Our artillery and infantry fire drove the defenders
from the outskirts, which the skirmishing line reached, particularly at
the southern end, almost without loss. The fighting from house to house,
however, cost many lives. The attack made by the right column from
Daigny, near Le Blanc Mesnil, was still more instructive in respect of
the formation employed, for here the infantry was unsupported by ar-
tillery, the flanking fire kept up by the horse battery on the west end
of the village, from its position north of Pontlblon, having doubtless
but little effect on account of the distance. The battalion of the Franz
regiment had here to cross open around over a space of 2,000 paces.
The commander of this regiment had trained it beforehand for an
attack of this kind, and now made it advance in a formation previously
well practiced. The fighting line was formed of two entire companies,
extended into a dense line of skirmishers, divided into two wings, which
moved forward alternately at a run for 300 paces. After every rush,
each wing halted to lie down for the men to take breath, getting some
cover amongst the high potato plants, whilst the other wing ran on. As
soon as they got near enough for the needle-gun to tell, the halted
wing kept up a heavy fire upon the outskirts of the village. Even
now, whilst writing this description, I can recall the joy with which we
spectators, from our look-out place, witnessed this well-planned and well-
executed attack. The best of it was that these battalions, as I was
assured by their commander, met with hardly any loss till they got
into the village ; it was only in the stubborn fight inside it that they
suffered.*

many guns and an eagle were also captured. The attacking force consisted, how-
ever, of a larger force apparently than stated by Prince Hohenlohe, namely, besides
the battalions mentioned by him, of the Fourth Eegimeut of the Guard and of a good
many detachments from the Twelfth (Saxon) Army Corps. — Tk.

* According to Dr. Engel's official account, the Alexander Regiment had alto-
gether on that day 45 casualties, the Schiitzen of the Guard 36, and the Franz Regi-
ment 56. — Tr.

38

It is only fair, however, to remark tliat the defenders of Le Bourget
were not such well-trained troops as those of St. Privat, that the posi-
tion of the former village was not so commanding as that of the latter,
and that the attack of the Franz Regiment took the French in flank. I
can well realize, if I imagine myself in the position of the defenders,
the trouble which this unwonted form of attack must have caused
them. As soon as the French saw the first skirmishers they naturally
opened fire upon them. All of a sudden, however, these same skir-
mishers disappeared from view amongst the potatoes.

Whether or when they remarked the rush of the other wing is doubt-
ful, for the smoke of their own heavy fire would hang about the loop-
holes through which they aimed. The line of defense being, moreover,
not everywhere directed straight on the assailants, the defenders could
not get their sights at once on the fresh wave of enemies, and by the
time they had done so the latter would have run their course, aud
would, in their turn, have been down amongst the potatoes, the smoke
concealing this fact from the French, and the other wing meanwhile
coming on. Thus the two wings of German skirmishers got near
enough to use their rifles with effect, and from that moment the halted
wing poured its fire into the village, thus drawing upon itself that of
the defenders, and enabling the advancing wing to make a further rush
with comparative impunity. When I put myself in the place of the
Frenchmen it seems to me quite natural that they, under the influence
of the surprise caused by this rush across the open, soon ending with
a cheer and a charge, should have evacuated the outskirts of the village
as they did. Without doubt, the garrison of Le Bourget was on that
day composed of troops of unequal value, consisting as it did of ma-
rines and regular infantry, mixed with moblots and franctireurs de
la presse. All the same, they fought very hard afterwards amongst
the houses. I am unable to say what troops were directly opposed to
the Franz Regiment. With regard to the formation of the assailants,
I must add that the two echelons in rear of the skirmishers, the second
of which was further subdivided into two echelons, marched, as far as
I could see, in quick time and in open line, so as not to expose too dense
a formation to the ravages of uuaimed fire. They looked thus like
thick lines of skirmishers. Now, although the attack on this side of
Le Bourget succeeded without any material assistance from artillery, I
think that, as a matter of principle, it will be conceded that a frontal
attack across open ground should not be attempted without being pre-
ceded by a heavy fire of artillery.

The German official history of the war of 1870-'71 gives, at page 668
of Part II. a brief notice of an attack on a village carried out just as it
should be, and a detailed account of the same occurrence appeared in
the " Jahrbucher fur Armee und Marine," in the number for March,
1872.* According to these authorities, General v. Treskow ordered a

* On the 10th December, 1870.— Tr.

39

heavy artillery fire to be directed on Villejouan during the battle or
Beaugency-Cravant, because that village threatened his right flank, and
he did not choose to leave it in the enemy's possession for the coming
night.

Two batteries unliinbered against the village and shelled it for a whole
hour, and under this fire a part of the defenders appear to have retired
within the place. Our infantry (the Fusilier Battalion, Seventy-sixth?
Begiment) was directed to approach in such a manner as not to mask the?
fire of the batteries, and they crept up to within 200 paces without firing;
a shot, but then came under fire themselves. Upon this they rushed,
with cheers, upon the village. The few defenders still remaining in the
outskirts were overpowered, and, indeed, the greater part of the garri-
son must have fled, as the battalion lost only 4 officers and 88 men, in-
cluding those who fell during the fighting inside the place, which lasted
from noon till evening.

The victory of the fusiliers was due in great measure to surprise.
The battalion was formed in two echelons, the foremost of which was
composed of Nos. 10 and 11 companies, each of which had extended
two Zilge as skirmishers, Nos. 9 and 12 companies following as sec-
ond echelon, at first together in rear of the center, but when the lead-
ing companies broke into the east side of the village taking ground to-
the right, and making their way in on the north side. We shall have-
to act, as a general rule, in a similar manner in future attacks of this
kind, only that, having now as far- ranging a rifle as our enemies, we shall
be able to unite the effective fire of our skirmishers with that of the ar-
tillery from the first, if the latter is not sufficient of itself to frighten?
the defenders from the outskirts of the village, so that our task will be-
more easy of execution.

When once the enemy is epiite driven away from the outskirts, it does?
not matter in what formation infantry advances ; but if the artillery fire
has not succeeded either in annihilating or in frightening away the de-
fenders, the co operation of the infantry will be necessary. The success
of the Franz Begiment at Le Bourget teaches us in what formation in-
fantry can and must advance up to the point whence it will itself open
fire, namely, in a strong line of skirmishers. Supports had best follow
deployed, and there is nothing in our Field Exercise Book which for-
bids the use of the open line, that is, with intervals of a man's breadth
between files, a formation which should be adopted if the enemy's in-
fantry fire is still effective, in order not to present too good a target for
chance shots. The second echelon may well move in close line until
pushed forward to join in the assault. I only propose this formation:
for open and level ground. When the least cover is to be found, each
unit will of course form a column the best adapted to take advantage
of it. The inclination for flanking movements leads to a great exten-
sion of the front line of battle. This inclination is fully justified. The
first combat in the open field of which I was witness, and which took

40

place before Schleswig, on February 3, 1864, gave striking proof of this
fact. The Austrian brigade Gondrecourt attacked the enemy in front
with unsurpassable valor, carrying by assault Ober-Selk and the Konigs-
berg, but having a fearful number of men killed and wounded in doing
so. Two battalions were directed on the village of Jagel, and engaged
in front of it in a serious action, making but little progress, particularly
after Colonel Benedek was carried to the rear badly wounded. The
assailants had just found their way into Jagel, when a company of the
Augusta Eegiment (Prussian), marching up by another road, appeared
upon the defenders' right flank. This had quite a magical effect upon
the enemy, who, fearing to be surrounded, evacuated the whole village
and the neighboring inclosures, with great loss in killed, wounded, and
prisoners, for the Prussian company had suddenly opened a rapid in-
dependent fire upon his right flank, and, profiting by his confusion, had
rushed into the village. Only one man of this company was wounded.
A few days afterward the Belgium Regiment, belonging to the other
Austrian brigade, together with the Ninth Jager Battalion, attacked
the position of Oversee, which was strong in front. Again the Aus-
trians suffered terrible loss, particularly in crossing the frozen lake and
in advancing against the place. It is doubtful whether, notwithstand-
ing their wonderful bravery, they would have carried the position had
not two Jager companies turned the right flank, whilst two battalions
of the Hessen Regiment came up afterward, threatening the left flank,
upon which the Danes evacuated the position and retired. But there
must be no mistake about this, that a flanking movement such as that
referred to can in general only be made successfully by altering the di-
rection of your march, or by detaching a part of your force, when out
of range and out of sight of the enemy. For if the movement is not
a surprise, its effect will not be so great. Should such a course not be
possible, we must at least try, by extending our front, to prolong it be-
yond that of the enemy, and thus to outflank him, after which the outer
wing must wheel inwards and fall upon him. If, however, you attempt
this sort of operation within sight and range of the enemy you will be
exposing yourself to a flank attack whilst doing so, and will probably
suffer severely. It would appear to be a comparatively easy matter to
strike the enemy's flank when you are yourself occupying a good defen-
sive position, with reserves echeloned behind your wings, thus favor-
ably placed either to surprise a hostile detachment bent on turning your
flank by taking it in flank, or, should the enemy only make a frontal
attack, to advance and to wheel inwards, thus falling upon the flank of
their assailants while they are already engaged with the troops in front
of them.

Surprise, which is a necessary accompaniment of a flank attack, is facil-
itated by the fact that a defensive position is generally taken up on a
ridge which conceals everything in rear of it. The attack and defense of
positions in front of Metz and Paris furnish numerous examples of

41

sudden flank attacks of this kind being made by the defenders, that on
the largest scale being the sally of the French infantry from Araan-
villers against the artillery of our Ninth Army Corps, on the 18th
August, 1870. ("Prussian Staff History," pp. 712-713.)*

To make the counter- stroke really effective, one should^ when occupy-
ing a position, place as few infantry as possible along its front, and
concentrate as powerful a force as you can in reserve behind both flanks.
Since infantry have acquired the power of digging shelter-trenches in
a very short time, we can now spare more men from the front attacked
and place them in reserve. But when I speak of shelter-trenches I am
reminded of a circumstance which has often roused my wrath at peace
maneuvers. I don't know how it is, but notwithstanding the great dis-
like of the German soldier for burrowing in the ground and for throw-
ing up defensive works, notwithstanding his great preference for offen-
sive operations in war, if once the shelter-trench is there it seems to
have a wonderful attraction for him. How often do we observe at a
peace maueuver that far too many men rush at a trench to occupy it, and
that at last they are packed up as close as possible together, sometimes
even on the top of one another, so as to be much hindered in shooting.
Besides which the trench is generally so narrow and shallow that the
cover obtained from it is a complete illusion and the men's feet, to say
the least, are completely exposed, being cocked up in the air behind
them. If care is not taken to insist upon the trench being dug to a
sufficient depth and width, the men will get a totally false idea of its
defensive value. The same remark applies to the manner in which the
men are allowed to crowd into it. I must, however, admit that many
erroneous notions are nurtured at peace maneuvers in consequence of
the absence of casualties, and we gain the habit of cramming too great
a number of men into our fighting line when we bring up the supports,
whereas in battle these same supports are only brought up to make
good losses, and to provide against any reduction of fire, the enemy's
bullets only too effectually preventing any excessive accumulation of
men in our trenches. All the same, we should never allow them to
be overcrowded even in sham fights, and when we wish to represent
the operation of bringing up supports we should make them march up,
fire a volley, and then go to the rear.

In order to keep up a proper fire from a shelter-trench, I reckon that
each soldier, taking off his knapsack and placing it by his side, as he
must do in order to get as his reserve ammunition at need, should have
a clear front of two paces so as to be able to fire at his ease, that is to

* This took place at about 2 p. m. A battery of mitrailleuses had approached close
to the left flank of the Prussiau line of artillery, and had in a few minutes completely
silenced the heavy field battery, killing or wounding forty-five of the men and a quan-
tity of horses belonging to it. Suddenly a large body of infantry threw themselves
upon the defenseless guns, four of which they captured, only, however, succeeding
in carrying off two, which the Germans retook when Metz capitulated. — Tr.

42

say, with as good an aim as possible; therefore no trench should con-
tain more than one man to each two paces of front. Consequently, 500
men would suffice for a length of 1,000 paces, aud a battalion on the
war strength of from 800 to 1,000 men would be sufficient to supply the
garrison of a line of this extent, including the immediate supports
placed close in rear. Suppose, then, a brigade to occupy a shelter-trench
from 1,600 to 2,000 paces in length (nearly an English mile), I would
divide the front into two sections, each of which would be assigned to
one of the two regiments, one of its battalions forming the guard aud
support of its part of the trench, whilst the remaining two battalions are
echeloned in reserve behind and overlapping the outer Hank.

A flank attack tells with tenfold effect. I have often remarked this
in war, not only on a large scale, as at KoniggrJitz, when we of the sec-
ond army fell upon the flank of the Austrian fighting line, but also in
the case of small bodies. For instance, at St. Privat, where we main-
tained for hours a heavy artillery fire against the troops occupying the
positions of St. Privat-Amanvillers. The enemy had pushed forward
some battalions, extended as skirmishers down the opposite slope.
They inflicted such severe loss on my batteries that the commander of
the army corps sent six companies in succession, which were mostly
distributed by Zilge in the intervals of. the batteries, so as to prevent
the enemy's skirmishers from running in upon the guns, as our men had
done upon the Austrian line of artillery at Chluin-iSedelitz on the day
of Kouiggratz. But the French skirmishers remained at a distance of
from 900 to 1,000 paces and continued to do us hurt, whilst our needle-
gun could do but little agaiust these scattered men at so long a range.
Over and over again had the brave men of the Augusta Regiment
wished to rush forward and free us from this annoyance ; but as my
orders were only to hold the enemy for the time, as, too, the infantry
at the moment available was far inferior to the enemy in numbers, and
would, had it advanced, have masked my batteries, which must, there-
fore, have ceased firing, I prevented this advance several times. Ma-
jor v. R then suggested pushing forward a company to a hollow on

the enemy's left. As this movement would not mask my fire, 1 sanc-
tioned it. Hardly had the company commanded by Captain v. R

opened fire from a point in prolongation of the enemy's line of skirmishers
before they all jumped up and rushed right away up the slope. Then
we discovered for the first time what large masses of infantry were hid-
den in the furrows, ready to pounce upon us. We estimated them at
nine battalions in three lines, one behind the other. Our shells created
great havoc amongst them as they ran up the slopes. As the general
advance on St. Privat luckily took place directly after this episode, my
batteries found the way clear before them, and were able to gallop for-
ward to the height to our right of that village. Thus, the sudden
flanking fire of one company caused the retreat of nine battalions.

43

Such flanking fire lias a magical effect, principally because troops when
suddenly assailed by it cannot help fearing that their retreat is threat-
ened. But this effect will only be produced if the line of march leads
directly upon the enemy's flank, or if the movement be favored by
features of the ground unnoticed by the enemy. A body smaller than
a company will rarely be able to execute an operation of this sort with

good effect.

Infantry against cavalry.

A few words upon the action of infantry against cavalry. I might
simply point to the events of 1866 and of 1870-'71, for our infantry was
always victorious in those wars. It then gained the conviction that in-
fantry cannot be beaten by cavalry as long as it is fearless, and this
was proved, no matter in what formation it received the attack. Num-
berless episodes in the battles of Gitschiu, Kouiggratz, Worth, Sedan,
clearly demonstrate this, aud need hardly be recalled to your memory.
Should you indulge in a quiet laugh at my expense, and remind me that
when writing about cavalry I asserted that it might even in these days
gain advantages over infantry, and that it could not fnirly be censured
even for charging infantry still unbroken, remember, my good friend,
that Prussian (German) cavalry will not have occasion to charge Prus-
sian (German) infantry.*

Since the war of 1866 our infantry has quite given up forming square
to receive cavalry.t Immediately after the first victory of the battal-
ions of the Body Guard Regiment at Gitschin, which when deployed in
line beat off the most energetic cavalry charges, the order to give up
forming square was issued to the whole army, and during the entire
war of 1870-'71 I do not think that there was a single instance of our
infantry assuming that formation except in the case of the band of the
Fifth Jager Battalion at the battle of Sedan. From the material point
of view I believe this to be accounted for by the fact that, in consequence
of the long range of the infantry rifle, cavalry has to go a much longer
way round than formerly if it wishes to attack infantry in flank, so that
a line of infantry has plenty of time to change its front for the purpose
of meeting the attack. Lines of skirmishers have remained quietly
lying down, keeping up their fire, and even if the horsemen went clean
over them they never got annihilated ; indeed, their losses were not
very great, for horses generally avoid treading on a living creature,
doing their best to clear it, so that the skirmishers would jump up and
fire on the rear of the horsemen, whose attack utterly collapsed when
a little further on they encountered the supporting companies drawn up

* In this passage reference is made to the author's letters upon cavalry, published
in 1884, and forming the first volume of the series to which that now before us be-
longs.— Tr.

tThe fifteenth chapter of the latest edition of the Gerinau Field Exercise Book is,
however, devoted to a description of the formation of square from double column
and from line. — Tr.

44

in line.* Even in 1866 lines of skirmishers often remained quietly lying
down to resist cavalry. Thus, I have been told that when the second and
third companies beat off the cavalry in front of the wood of Sadowa
("Prussian Staff History," p. 353), the skirmishers never stirred from
their places, except one man, who tried to rally on the support, and was
the only one amongst them wounded. But for infantry to act in this
manner in the fighting line it must be thoroughly trained, must keep
perfectly steady, and must have complete confidence in its fire-arms.
We remark that, in order to carry out these principles, whenever the
u alarm " is sounded at field exercise it is now the practice for infantry
lines and skirmishers to change front in the direction of the supposed
approach of the cavalry, and to commence volleys or a rapid independ-
ent fire with the 400-meter sight. I have noted on occasions of this
sort that a part of the line would wheel back in order to be on the
same front with the remainder of it. I consider this to be a very doubt-
ful proceeding, particularly in the case of skirmishers, because the men
who thus change their front must do so with their backs to the enemy;
in fact, they must, to a certain extent, run away. Now there is nothing
so depressing as running away from an enemy, particularly when that
enemy consists of horsemen galloping after you, for the human heart
is so constituted as to be shaken by certain things. One of the most
doubtful points about the square is that in order to form it you must
run away from the cavalry, and men are apt to think that it is all up
with them if they can't run fast enough. We have all read how, quite
of late years, the Egyptian troops near Suakin, although armed with
the best rifles, allowed themselves to be butchered in the most lament-
able manner by savages armed only with spears, after having got away
from them by running into square. Another objection to this proceed-
ing is that whilst running away you do not see what your enemy is
about. The whole conditions are reversed if you run towards him. The
very fact of your doing so imposes upon cavalry and frightens the

* The affair near Mouzoii, on the Meuse, on the 30th August, 1870, was a case in point,
and one well worth studying, though but little noticed by military writers. It is de-
scribed in pages 1089-1090 of tbe Prussian Staff History. After their defeat at Beau-
rnout, the greater-part of the troops engaged crossed the Meuse at Mouzon, the Fifth
Cuirassier Regiment remaining on the left bauk to cover the retreat. The Prussian
Fusilier Battalion of the Twenty-seventh Regiment, forming part of the pursuing force,
was formed with one company extended, its right Zug being thrown forward, whilst
the other three companies were in rear of it, in line of company columns. The cuiras-
siers charged the right Zug of the skirmishers in rear. The captain of the company
made this Zug face about towards the horsemen, and ordered the whole company on no
account to close, but to receive the cuirassiers as they stood, and only to fire when or-
dered. The Frenchmen charged home, but beiug received with a rapid independent
fire at close quarters, were repulsed with fearful loss, their colonel, 10 other officers,
and 100 men being killed or wounded. The Prussian company did not lose a man, a
few being slightly bruised by coming into collision with the horses. The remnant of
the cuirassier regiment galloped away as hard as they could to the river which, in
consequence of the bridges and fords being blocked by other troops, they attempted
to swim, many men and horses being drowned in doing so. — Tr.

45

horses; therefore, I always insisted that changes of front made under
the circumstances alluded to should be executed only by wheeling for-
ward towards the advancing cavalry, even though the new front might
in consequence not be quite continuous, but broken somewhat into eche-
lons. It seems to me that our infantry, constituted as it is at present, may
entirely relinquish the formation of square, but that an infantry inferior
to ours, either from being newly raised and therefore without sufficient
cohesion, or for the same reason not well trained in shooting and there-
fore without due confidence in its arm, may still be forced to resort to
the formation of squares. English troops have, indeed, within the last
few weeks, moved in large squares against the wretchedly armed sav-
ages near Suakin. We can hardly judge from mere newspaper corre-
spondence what were the grounds for this action on their part, nor are
we yet able to express an opinion as to whether the proceeding was
justified. I will now mention something which has often struck me at
peace maneuvers as well as in war. I have already noticed to you,
"when writing upon cavalry, how commonly one remarks that when it in-
tervenes in an infantry engagement and charges, the infantry, on its
own side, as soon as the cavalry masks its fire, looks on perfectly inac-
tive, though full of sympathy and of interest in its proceedings, instead
of utilizing the moment when the enemy's fire is diverted from it to rush
on and gain as much ground as possible, or to assist the task of the
friendly horsemen by its fire at close quarters. As a general rule, in-
fantry at such times give way to a certain feeling of apathy and indo-
lence, looking on with astonishment and curiosity at the spectacle before
them. I have frequently represented such situations when directing
maneuvers against a masked enemy, and although I have on such occa-
sions made known beforehand my intention of giving the infantry an
opportunity of co-operating with cavalry in an attack of the sort above
alluded to, I have always found it necessary to ride up myself or to send
some one for the purpose of urging the infantry to go forward. The
reason assigned for this unwonted inactivity on their part is this : " They
were not accustomed to do this ; they had never done so." They had,
in short, too little practice in combined action with cavalry. The action
of infantry suddenly aiding the attack of cavalry by opening a rapid
independent fire at close quarters is, however, most telling, aud espe-
cially against hostile cavalry, because it comes so much as a surprise.
With reference to this we need only read the account of cavalry com-
bats during the battle of Koniggriitz to be convinced how much the
result of the great cavalry engagement was affected by the rapid ad-
vance of Prussian infantry detachments, which mostly pushed forward
independently ("Prussian Staff History," pp. 404-416). Wherever the
masses of gallant Austrian horsemen were getting the best of it their
onset was arrested by the unexpected fire which assailed them from
Stresetitz and Langenhof, and even the isolated skirmishing Zllge of
Lieutenants Daum and Oldenburg, which had pushed forward beyond

46

the sheep farm of Langenhof, threw a heavy weight iuto the scales,
until the Prussian cavalry regiments coming up in succession became
sufficiently numerous to drive the Austrian horsemen from the field. I
can well imagine your smile and your remark that in the case just de-
scribed the fault of inaction, of which I have accused our infantry
under similar circumstances, was not committed. I admit that in this
one case it was so, but has this been always and everywhere the same?
I pray you to excuse me from quoting the cases which have occurred in
actual warfare where blame has on this account been deserved. I do
not feel myself justified in doing so. A cavalry duel is full of changes
and chances, and the result is always uncertain. First one side, then
the other, will be in the ascendant. You require iufantry to come up
in order to give the first support to the successful cavalry, enabling it
to hold its own until the batteries can unlimber on the ground which
has thus been won, and the " cannon's opening roar" gives conclusive
evidence of victory. Therefore, both the sister arms— infantry first, ar-
tillery next — must hurry up to confirm the success of the cavalry.

Fire discipline.

I have often remarked how much fire discipline is weakened in action
when the element of danger makes itself sensible. Troops imperfectly
trained do not aim, they do not even fire, they only let off their pieces.
Even before I ever saw a shot fired I was told by men experienced in
war that infantry soldiers must have attained to a certain degree of
proficiency if they could be got to put their rifles to the shoulder when
firing. At the battle of Koniggratz I had a very near view of troops
keeping up a wild fire with their rifles pointed straight up into the air.
I was galloping in advance of my batteries to choose the next posi-
tion for them, accompanied by my major, some adjutants, orderlies, and
trumpeters., when in ascending a hill I found myself within twenty or
thirty paces of a body of the enemy's infantry, about half a battalion
strong, which had just evacuated Chlum, was making for Nedelist,
which lay on their left, and found themselves between some of our more
advanced infantry and my line of artillery. They were as much sur-
prised at seeing us as we were at seeing them, and took a group of ten
or twelve horsemen for the staff of a body of cavalry advancing to at-
tack. At all events, they began firing wildly, and I saw most of their
rifles pointed straight up into the air. Only one of these men took aim,
and he shot the major's horse in the body just as the rider was turning
him round to retire, for a small party of horsemen such as we were could
do nothing against some 500 foot soldiers, so that we rejoined the bat-
teries as fast as we could, in order to make them open fire upon these
troops. But how much more trouble is required before we can train
the infantry soldier to pay attention to orders and signals during all
the excitement of battle, to observe the object to be aimed at, the sight
and mode of firing to be used, and to cease firing when the specified

47

number of rounds has been expended. Every one knows, even those
whose experience does not extend beyond field firing- practice on the
ranges, that without strict attention to orders and signals the effect pro-
duced by our costly breech-loader is simply nothing. Yet much has
been done to simplify the use of the rifle. First and foremost we must
note the low trajectory, thanks to which a single sight may be used (as
long as you aim at your adversary's feet) from the time he comes with-
in the range, where, owing to intensity of excitement, independent fire
is alone practicable. But if, as we have remarked, soldiers must al-
ready attain to a certain pitch of fire discipline before you can be sure
of getting them even to bring their rifles to the shoulder in battle, how
much greater pains must be taken before you can get them to take aim.
In other respects, also, the excellent instructions which proceed from
our school of musketry make very great demands upon the self-control
of the soldier when under the powerful excitement of battle. I allude
particularly to the limiting of the number of rounds expended, and to
the periodical interruption of the fire when engaged in rapid independ-
ent firing, that is to say, in the immediate neighborhood of the enemy.
You are asking a great deal of a man who is being shot at when you
tell him to cease firing for a while. I have often remarked how difficult
it is with artillery to stop the firing when advisable, in order to let the
smoke clear off so as to see what is going on. When firing once be-
gins, men get easily out of hand unless restrained by an iron discipline.
If this is true with regard to artillery, how much stronger must the case
be with regard to infantry, in which the number of firers is so much
greater. It is but human nature that a soldier should derive some
comfort from the noise made by his own gun when it goes off. The
more raw the soldier the more will he be inclined to " shoot himself into
courage." During the first campaign in which I took part, I was pres-
ent at a little outpost skirmish, after which a lieutenant inspected the
men's pouches. The older hands had only fired from three to five rounds
each, whilst every recruit had got rid of over twenty. Taking such
facts into consideration we cannot help doubting whether the order
"Five rounds rapid fire," when given at close quarters, say under 300
yards, will be attended to. This order or caution was only introduced
into our service after the last campaign, and has not yet been tested in
action. The group volley (Schwarm- Salve) is another aid to fire dis-
cipline introduced since the last war.

It appears to me (artilleryman as I am) a very good means of restrain-
ing infantry fire, so that it should tell with concentrated force, as does
a salvo from well-commanded batteries. This system answered very
well at peace maneuvers when the total daily expenditure of ammuni-
tion was limited to from ten to thirteen rounds a man, and where the
comparatively small charge of the blank cartridge made less noise ; but
when it came to heavy firing of ball cartridge at field practice, the case
was very different. Officers found it necessary, on account of the greater

48

noise, to tax the strength of their voices much more in order to make
themselves heard and obeyed, in consequence of which most of them
were so hoarse before the end of the drill that no one could understand
what they said. This is not astonishing when one reflects that a single
Zug, when extended, occupies a wider front thau a whole company
in close order, and that the lieutenants are on foot ; therefore, at a dis-
advantage in comparison to the captains and field officers, who can shout
over the heads of the whole line from their exalted positions. The em-
ployment of two or three different sights at the same time by different
portions of a body of troops, as enjoined under certain circumstances,
seems to me of even more doubtful application, in consequence of the
difficulty of defining what you want, hence of your wishes being at-
tended to, and there will rarely be time enough to ascertain that direc-
tions are properly carried out. However, this is a matter of less impor-
tance, because the use of different sights at the same time is only recom-
mended for long ranges, at which firing is but seldom carried on. It is
only when particularly compact and deep bodies offer themselves as
marks (for instance, masses of men defiling over a bridge, or such like)
that such means are resorted to. These are merely exceptional cases,
which produce no decisive results. However just in theory all these
ideas may be which emanate from our school of musketry, however use-
ful too they may have proved in directing attention to the study of our
rifle aud of infantry fire, there still lurks behind them the danger of
being betrayed by them in time of peace into illusions which would
prove deceptive, and therefore discouraging, in time of war. It appears
to me, then, that a Hue of skirmishers in which during the heat of ac-
tion every man still pays sufficient attention to the lieutenant's whistle
to cease firing when ordered, to look to him for an example, to jump up
and run forward at his signal, or at his call to change his aim or the
sight which he is using, gives evidence of a high standard of fire disci-
pline. Therefore, one should not attempt too artificial combinations,
but rather spend the time in repeating the simple routine hundreds and
thousands of times, until it has become a second nature to the man.
Thus and only thus can you feel sure that what you require will be done
before the enemy. For " in warfare all is simple, but the simple is also
difficult," says Clausewitz. My wish that the exercises of the company
should be confined to the simplest and most elementary subjects, avoid-
ing all complicated tactical movements and every kind of strategical
combination, does not, however, prevent their being conducted in accord-
ance with a tactical idea as we say, smelling of powder and ball. On
the contrary, I should like the captain, as soon as he has got his com-
pany well in hand, to begin at once to handle it, and to make a practice
of doing so as long and as often as possible, just as he thinks he would
handle it in presence of the enemy. He may, for instance, always re-
lieve the monotony of the march to and from the place of exercise by
moving in a fighting formation suitable for attacking an enemy supposed

49

to be in front of him. When on the line of march, too, an opportunity
may often present itself for representing a short skirmish or an attack,
whilst the rest of the time may be employed in thoroughly imbuing the
men with the elementary principles of reconnoitering duties whilst on
the march. Thus may we gain time, aud time is money. When in
command of a division I contributed to its increased efficiency in field
duties by issuing an order that no body of troops should move either to
the field of exercise or in route marching except in order of battle and
with a tactical object in view.

Supply of ammunition to troops under fire.

The timely supply of ammunition to troops in action is one of the
most difficult services in war. Of what use is the most scientific strat-
egy ou the part of the general, or the most heroic conduct on the part
of the troops, if at the most critical moment the latter are exposed with-
out defense to the attacks of the enemy % During the war of 1866 I
once experienced the bitter feeling of being without a sufficient supply
of ammunition at such a time. During that war there were other corps
of artillery worse off than mine in this respect. This led me to give
much attention to the question of keeping up a constant supply of am-
munition to troops in action.* My position during the war of 1870-'71
made it my duty to provide for the wants of an army corps in this re-
spect, and I then brought my ideas upon the subject to the test of prac-
tice. Assisted as I was by the indefatigable zeal of my subordinates,
I succeeded, notwithstanding the great exertions required of us and the
great difficulties to which we were exposed, in making such arrange-
ments that there was no instance of any body of troops in the army corps
being in want of ammunition. In both wars our infantry expended but
little — during the whole campaign of 1866 only from five to eleven
rounds a man. In the war of 1870-71, whenever I had occasion to send
to the rear all the five artillery ammunition columns empty, two infan-
try ammunition columns, at the outside, would have to accompany them
to be replenished.

My experience has been hitherto limited to the supply of artillery am-
munition, but the principles for both arms are the same, and it will be
well to make up our minds betimes as to the proper course to pursue,
for our infantry will expend a great deal more ammunition in future, as
it can fire now at longer ranges than before. The superiority of our
small- arm was the cause of our small expenditure in 1866, for in con-
sequence of it infantry engagements were not protracted. In 1870-'71
our rifle did not carry half so far as that of the French, and our artillery
had consequently to share in doing a good deal of work which with the
French devolved entirely upon the iufautry. In future wars our in-

* Prince Hohenlohe commanded the " reserve artillery " of the Guard Corps in the
war of 1866, and the whole artillery of the same army corps in the war of 1870-71.
— Tr.

2580— No. 18 1

50

fantry will be able to shoot at as long- ranges as that of the enemy, and
our expenditure in small-arm ammunition, supposing conditions to be
otherwise identical, will be at least doubled. But the conditions will
differ in this respect, that a protracted fire will often be maintained at
the longer ranges, and when you come to the shorter distances, supposing
both lines to be under cover, resort to the bayonet will be deferred
longer than formerly, whilst the assailants endeavor meanwhile to break
the enemy's resistance by weight of fire, and victory will often fall to
the side which has the last round left. If our infantry never experi-
enced a want of ammunition in 1870-'71, the same cannot be said of our
opponents, who could even then fire as far as we can at this moment.
When I took post with my batteries on the heights to the right of St.
Privat, the enemy gave me time to establish myself there thoroughly
before he took the offensive against me from Amanvillers. An aid-de-
camp of General Ladmirault told me, some years after, that, as soon as I
appeared on the heights, he was sent by his general to two infantry
regiments with the order for them to take my batteries at once. But
neither regiment had any cartridges left. The aid-decamp had to ride
back for other troops, and before they arrived we had taken our bear-
ings, had ascertained the ranges of certain objects by trial shots, and
had streugthened our line of guns, so that when the infantry at length
assailed us they melted away under our shell fire. We have no authentic
information as to how often the French may have been out of ammunition,
but we know that Bazaine excused himself for not attacking us on the
17th August by his deficiency in this respect. Many other instances of
indecision on the part of an army which had always hitherto been con-
sidered the representative of the offensive element in war may perhaps
be attributed to this cause. Many believe the excessive expenditure of
ammunition on the part of the French, and the occasional deficiency
thereof which ensued, to have been caused, by want of fire discipline,
which certainly does contribute to waste, and it cannot be denied that
this was frequently the case; for the French, in consequence of experi-
ments made on the rifle-ranges and at the camp of Chalons, before the
war, expected great results from fire at 1,000 meters, and made men fire
while running with the rifle held horizontally to the hip, a practice which
proved almost useless at Sedan. Good fire discipline will to a certain
extent limit the expenditure of ammunition, but wemust not expect too
much from it. It will, indeed, prevent fire from being opened at too
long ranges. It will also enable officers to control the amount of shoot-
ing at the extreme ranges at which any at all is permitted. This will
be especially the case as long as it is possible to fire group volleys, and
thus in a way to watch each cartridge. But when the two fighting lines
get near enough to one another for each skirmisher to see clearly the
very man who is aiming at him, when casualties are becoming numer-
ous, when the skirmishing sections are losing their leaders, whose suc-
cessors have not yet established their authority, at such moments as

51

these a furious fire begins to "roll" (as the saying is amongst those wlio
have experienced it) first of all along the ranks of the leaderless sec-
tions and soon along the whole line. Then all control over the expend-
iture of ammunition ceases, for the voices of the officers are no longer
audible above the din of battle. From that moment individual tire
reigns supreme. I do not intend to question in the very least the self-
sacrificing valor of our excellent infantry soldiers, but still there are
amongst them some who can only keep themselves up to the scratch by
much shooting, for no one likes being killed, and most of them feel the
need of keeping down the fear of death by great noise, which acts as a
counter-irritant; so that the crack of the rifle must be pretty constant
to counteract the numbing effects of fear until you reach the point
where the cheer and the charge are allowable. To this feeling are
added those of anger and revenge, inspired by strife when friends and
comrades are falling around one, or when, perhaps, one feels the smart
of a wound. I could name a certain colonel who got a slight hurt and
became so infuriated that he took up the rifle and ammunition of a
wounded man, and would not go to the rear to have his wound dressed
till he had " knocked over three of those rascals" who had laid their heads
together to do him harm ; he accomplished this, but at the cost of three
more wounds to himself. Therefore, when the fire fight is in full swing,
when independent firing can be no longer checked, you must just put
up with it; you can no longer do anything to save your cartridges.
This is a factor with which you have to reckon, for it makes itself felt
irresistibly without, and even notwithstanding, any interference of yours.
Even with artillery it is very difficult to keep fire fairly within bounds
after it has once got hot ; yet it is much easier to watch every shot,
for no single man can fire a gun at pleasure. With infantry, on the
other hand, it is utterly impossible to exercise any check when the stage
of hard fighting, man to man, has been reached.

At the same time this is the very stage of offensive action, particu-
larly on open ground, when it is impossible to bring up a supply of
cartridges. If, therefore, you do not wish to be exposed to the risk of
your attack failing from want of ammunition, you must try to provide
some other remedy for the excessive expenditure, and the only remedy
is this : not to commence your attack until it is evident that the enemy's
defensive power has been shaken by your artillery fire, and, further, when
you do attack, to carry it out with such energy and with so thorough
an employment of your supports, and, if necessary, of your second line,
as to shorten to the utmost the duration of rifle fire. This will, how-
ever, only be possible if the plan of the attack has been well considered
and the combined action of the two arms has been prearranged, as
was the case at Villejouan.

Bodies of troops, however, which have in exceptional cases been
obliged to fire at long ranges (1,000 to 1,100 meters) should at once re-
ceive a fresh supply before advancing, however small may have been

52

the expenditure. Further, every interval of repose should be utilized
in completing the ammunition, the principle of, as far as possible, keep-
ing every man constantly fully supplied being rigidly adhered to, as
you can never tell what demands may be made upon you at each suc-
ceeding moment. And you must not wait for an actual cessation of
hostilities, but you must also make the most of occasions when the
-enemy is only keeping up a distant fire upon you. The combat of Ville-
jouan furnishes a good example of this. After our fusiliers had carried
the place, great masses of the enemy advanced to retake it. The fusil-
iers had meanwhile completed their ammunition, the wagon-horses
being, however, shot in bringing it up, which proves that there was no
positive cessation of fire at the moment. In my opinion, our ammuni-
tion wagons are, according to established custom, kept too far back. I
am not aware of any positive regulations on this subject. There is a
great dread of exposing them to fire, just as formerly artillery wagons
were kept too much in the background. What does it signify if one of
rthem is occasionally blown up % Much better this than that troops
should be exposed to the risk of annihilation owing to want of cartridges.
And if now and then a pair of horses comes to grief the misfortune is
not very great. You will take measures to replace them at the end of
the action, and meanwhile you will rejoice at being well supplied with
ammunition.

The wagon -horses of the fusiliers of the Seventy-sixth were well ex-
pended at Villejouan. One often reads fearful stories of the horrors wit-
messed when a powder wagon blows up, and how one should therefore
:avoid exposing both small-arm and gun ammunition wagons to fire, but
1 know by experience that the risk is not so great as might be expected
and that an explosion of this kind is not so very horrible. At St. Pri-
•vat all my batteries placed their first line of wagons near the guns, by
order of Colonel Scherbening, so as to be able to make good at once
<each round expended. There they remained the whole afternoon, till
might-fall, under artillery fire, and from 2 till 5.30 under rifle fire at from
'4)00 to 1,000 paces distance. Not one of them blew up that day, though
now and then a gun-limber exploded. One such explosion occurred just
.as an officer was looking into the limber for some purpose. He tum-
bled down, and was hard of hearing, besides having a headache,
for three days after, but he is all right now and employed on tbe gen-
eral staff. So that when I read that during the cannonade of Valmy,
in 1792, the whole of Dumouriez's army was thrown into disorder be-
cause two powder wagons blew up, I simply don't believe it. A round
of shrapnel or a common shell falling into a column does three times
as much mischief as the explosion of a powder wagon. A suggestion
has been made to me as to a mode of providing against a premature
want of cartridges when infantry is taking the offensive, which is that,
before the action commences, each man should be supplied with some
twenty extra rounds, to be placed in his coat pockets. This idea is no

53

doubt good and practicable whenever there is time enough to carry it
out, as, for instance, on the occasion of an attack, such as that on St..
Privat, long prearranged; but in encounters such as those at Spichereui
and Worth time will be wanting for the purpose, or else you may lose
some good opportunities of injuring the enemy by employing your leisure
in this way.

There is one thing more to be noticed which stands in the way of a
proper economy of ammunition, namely, that the men are not accustomed
in peace time, as they should be, to attend to it. An ammunition wagoiij
is rarely attached to infantry at peace maneuvers, for the soldier caui
easily carry on his own person the stock of cartridges required for the-
whole time.

In the Sixth Army Corps military train horses have been sometimes;
supplied, so as to practice bringing up ammunition in action. This gave-
an opportunity of observing how rarely these vehicles are thought of in.
peace time. 1 had constantly to call attention to this, for the empty, help-
less carts were always getting in the way of the troops, and were looked
upon as mere useless impediments. Those in charge of them never re-
ceived any timely orders, so that one might be sure that if any battal-
ion burdened with an ammunition wagon had to retire before the enemy1
in action, the wagon was certain to follow in rear of it, and thus to get
between it and the enemy. I therefore hit upon the idea of filling the bat-
talion wagons with the men's breakfasts at peace maneuvers, and of rep-
resenting the supply of fresh cartridges by bringing up the, rations, for
I felt sure that the whole battaliou would then be thinking of its wagon,
particularly if I made a rule that should the enemy capture it he should
have the right to devour its contents. Unfortunately, this idea of mine-
could not be made to fit in with the commissariat arrangements for
supply.

It is, however, very desirable that ammunition wagons be allotted to>
battalions at all maneuvers, so that those who direct the operations,
may accustom themselves to give timely orders for their disposal, and
may constantly bear in mind the question of ammunition supply.
There is no other method of giving this important training than that of"
obliging officers to think daily and hourly about it. General instructions-
on the matter are of no avail. The special situation varies in each
individual case. Every battalion commander should, however, be-
thoroughly determined to take all possible opportunities of making
good even the smallest expenditure of cartridges, so that the supply,,
both in pouch and knapsack, be kept always complete, and, in fact, that
the wagon supply be consumed before the store in possession of the
men is expended. It was only by acting on this principle that I pre-
vented a deficiency of gun ammunition inl870-'71, making a rule that
the wagon supply should be used up before that in the gnndimbers was-
touched, by which means the latter was always available for any sud-
den emergency. I said just now that general directions were of no

54

avail ; I will go further and maintain that even general orders are of
no use unless all those whose duty it is to have them carried out take
great pains to make people think of them. I can hear you say, u The
devil must have his hand in it if this is not the case." But I assure
you that the devjl does have his hand in it, for it suits his little game.
It is of no use afterwards to say, " Oh ! but the most positive instruc-
tions were given; why did the battalions not follow them % " The bat-
talions are the sufferers ; the commanding officers who received the
special instructions are no more, and that is why the sin of omission
was committed. Give heed to this anecdote : Before our departure
from Berlin, in 1870, an order was issued from the general headquarters,
at my suggestion (as I had to arrange for the dispatch of the reserve
ammunition), that in every action the commander of the army corps
artillery should make known to the different divisions the situation of
the ammunition column, and that the division commander should, after
each battle, report to headquarters that his battalions were complete
with cartridges, or if not, should account for any deficiency. On the
day of St. Privat I made it known to the divisions that the infantry
ammunition columns were at Batilly, where battalion wagons might be
filled. Next morning, however, no reports came in. I rode all round
the bivouacs and ascertained that very few of the majors or adjutants
who had read the order in question were to the fore, most of them be-
ing killed or wounded. No one was to blame. I rode from battalion
to battalion and saw to the matter myself, for I could not hold the
ensigns and young lieutenants whom I found on that day in command
of some of the battalions responsible for the want of obedience to
orders, and on that account I made no report of the irregularity to the
higher authorities.

There is one thiug which I wish to call attention to and which I have
learned by experience. Care must betaken in regulating the supply of
ammunition to steer clear of all pedantic adherence to form and red-
tapeism. When troops are fighting they don't like having to furnish
requisitions and estimates. Forms A and B are held in horror.

When a man is readily venturing his life from moment to moment at
the call of honor and duty, he thinks it hard to be required to render
an account of expenditure, when perhaps he may within the next half
hour make a settlement in full with his life's blood. And even if a corps
should render a false return to the amount, say, of 10,000 rounds, it
could be done without detection merely by showing 10,000 extra car-
tridges expended. But who would ever dream of embezzling cartridges
in time of war? What would he do with them? Therefore, you must,
when in the field, give up controlling your expenditure of ammunition
by double entry. Haviug myself, in former campaigns, experienced the
useless annoyance and inconvenience to which troops are exposed by
the demand for periodical ammunition returns, and having come to the
conclusion that it only delays the issue, without being any real check

55

upon consumption, if ammunition is refused except upon the production
of a requisition accompanied by a return of amount issued, I inserted
in the order above quoted, that every soldier belonging to the army
corps who came during an action to an ammunition column with cart
or wagon for cartridges was to have them, forms of receipt being kept
ready on which were to be entered, from the information given by the
applicant, the company, battalion, and regiment for which the ammuni-
tion was required, the soldier signing or putting his mark to the docu-
ment. I met the objection that such munificence would cause loss of
ammunition by replying that it was better to lose 10,000 rounds at once
by errors of reckoning than to let a single company be in want of am-
munition when in action through pedantic adherence to form.

But even this process did not answer in all cases with the artillery
during the last war, and in future the demands of infantry will be
equally great. It will then doubtless be necessary for ammunition
columns to detach wagons to different parts of the fighting line, and we
must make up our minds to this. Troops actually engaged must make
a point of completing their ammunition at all times, without waiting for
orders, whenever they get a chance of doing so, whilst the leaders of
ammunition columns following out of fire must consider it a sacred duty
to meet the troops to which they are attached half-way, and to furnish
them with supplies, also without awaiting orders, which the general
might have neither time nor means to send in the heat of battle.

Most especially must this be attended to at the end of every serious
engagement and after every assault, when the din of battle, which has
been for some time waging louder and louder, ceases all at once as if
by a sudden blow. Then every one in charge of ammunition must
hurry to the front, and do his utmost to reach the troops which he has
to supply.

Attack across open ground.

Having been asked to give a detailed account of the mode in which
I think infantry combined with artillery should conduct an attack on a
village across open ground, I will endeaver to do so, although it is al-
ways somewhat unsatisfactory to attempt laying down rules as to de-
tails which must needs be modified in each special case, and may, in-
deed, exceptionally be quite set aside. In order to perform my task I
must begin by comparing the material effect of infantry with that of
artillery, in doing which I must first of all observe that the results of
target practice in peace time may lead to very false conclusions, for the
conditions of war are very different. In the first place, the uncertainty
as to the range naturally reduces the effect of fire, especially that of in-
fantry, at distances where the trajectory rises above man's height. It is
true that trial shots may be fired, but it is very difficult at certain dis-
tances, even at practice in peace time, to observe where rifle bullets
strike, and in war perfectly impossible if the enemy is firing, on account

56

of the smoke. The assailants of a position are as a rule unacquainted
with the distances, unless, as in the case of Le Bourget, the place is
well known. But even then you cannot be sure of the effect of your
fire, the strength of powder differing so much according to the degree
of moisture in the air. I have known instances which I have myself
verified of the difference amounting to as much as one-tenth of the
range. This does not affect artillery as much as infantry, because the
bursting shells are much easier to see, and give the best indication of
how one should aim, the question of distance and of the variation of
powder strength being equally cleared up by observation of their flight.
I once had an opportunity, by assembling the artillery under my com-
mand for target practice, of giving both arms an idea of how much in-
fluence want of acquaintance with the distance of the objects fired atr
when that distance is considerable, has upon infantry shooting, for I
made both arms fire from the same base at similar marks. A battery
of six guns first fired on an infantry target, representing a company in
extended order, then against an artillery target, representing six guns.
A company of infantry made up to the war strength went through the
same practice at the same time, only reversing the order. Distances
were unknown to the firers, being between 1,000 and 1,100 meters.
Sighting, nature of fire, and with the artillery choice of projectiles were
left to the captains. The result was very striking. The battery made
thirty times as many hits on the infantry target, and a hundred times
as many on the artillery target, as the company ; moreover, and this is
of material consequence, the time taken, the total cost aud weight of
ammunition expended were the same in both cases. The conclusion to
which I came is that we are guilty of a gross waste of ammunition if
we allow infantry to fire up to 1,000 or 1,100 meters when artillery is
available. If you next picture to yourself a duel between infantry and
artillery, the result will be still more decidedly in favor of the latter
arm, because as the fight goes on the fire of the former is being con-
stantly reduced by casualties, whilst the six guns will remain in action
to the end, although a certain number of men and horses have fallen.
But the case is much altered at the shorter ranges, for the effects of
artillery fire do not increase below a range of 1,000 to 1,100 meters, these
being the distances at which gunshots tell with crushing effect, whilst
infantry fire becomes more and more effective the nearer you get. Our
experiments proved that it was only when you get within 500 meters
that the effect of infantry fire approaches that of artillery, and that
within from 200 to 300 meters the two arms are on equal terms. When
you take into consideration the excitement of battle, the comparison
will be still more to the disadvantage of infantry, for when the soldier's
blood is heated the weapon will shake in his hand, whereas the cannon
has no nerves. It will also sometimes happen, on the other hand, that
excitement will trouble the vision of him who lays the gun, or otherwise
disturb the service of the piece. Some batteries which had fought very

57

long aud gallantly at Koniggriitz reported that as the firing went on
their shell fell from 300 to 400 paces short, and they attributed this cir-
cumstance to fouling. Our experts racked their brains over this, for
no such thing had ever been noticed in peace time during the experi-
mental trials of the durability of guns, at least at all to the same extent.
My belief is that the gunners omitted, through excitement, to examine
the tangent scale after every shot, and that it gradually fell lower and
lower, owing to the shock of each discharge. The fouling of the guns
was not observed to produce a similar effect in my batteries, but I have
noticed that their practice was at times affected by the enemy's fire,
and that when this was very telling, some shots were badly aimed on
our side, some indeed being fired without aim, so that I had to take
strong measures to get the gunners to resume a steady and orderly serv-
ice. This is possible with artillery, but it is utterly impossible to ex-
ercise the least control over the aim of the infantry soldier, particularly
when under hot fire. These considerations suggest to me the reason
why the Field Exercise Book of March 1, 1876, only permits rifle fire
beyond 500 meters when directed on large objects. If an alteration was
afterwards introduced making the distance fired at aud the nature of
fire dependent upon the rules laid down in the musketry instructions, the
reason for this alteration was probably the desire to keep our system
of field exercise in harmony with any fresh regulations as to distance
rendered necessary by fresh improvements in fire arms. Up to this time
the increase since given to the range and accuracy of the rifle is not so
remarkable as to render any fundamental change in the regulations
requisite. I think, then , that I do not err in fixing the distance at which
one may, as a rule, allow infantry attacking a village in combination
with artillery to open fire upon its outskirts at 500 meters. It is very
important that infantry should not commence firing too early, lest it run
the risk of being left without ammunition just at the most critical mo-
ment. It is taken for granted that on all such occasions the defender is
also provided with guns, so that an artillery duel will be the prelude
to the infantry attack. Only when the batteries of the assailant have
succeeded in mastering those of the defender, which must be accom-
plished at long range, only then will they be at liberty to turn their
attention to the outskirts of the village, approaching it as close as can
be, so that their fire may produce the utmost possible effect upon the
garrison ; that is to say, as close as the range of the infantry rifle will
permit, or something over 1,000 meters. The artillery will therefore
unlimber at from L,600 to 2,000 meters from the village, and open fire
upon its border. The infantry will meanwhile approach to within 500
meters of it, taking care not to mask the fire of the guns, thereby losing
the advantage of their support. The line of skirmishers will then add
their fire to that of the artillery, which will next move on, under cover
of the infantry, to the decisive range of from 1,000 to 1,100 meters,
whence its effect will be crushing. If there be more than one battery

58

in action, the guns will advance in echelon, accompanying the infantry
up to its last position before the assault, half of tbem keeping up their
fire while the other half move forward. There will thus be no inter-
mission to the cannonade. Are you surprised because I, who am an
artilleryman, require batteries to move up to within 1,000 or 1,100 paces
of a village occupied by infantry, in days when shrapnel ranges beyond
3,000 meters, and when its effect at 2,000 meters is murderous? Well,
I require this not only from the gunner's standpoint, but also from that
of the foot soldier. Firstly, because at 2,000 meters it is difficult to ob-
serve where your shots strike; hence at this range the effect of your fire
is questionable. So much for the artillerist.

Again, the infantryman will be apt to expect the guns to support his
advance until he makes his last rush, but this canuot be done with safety
to him if they remain at 2,000 paces from the enemy, for at this distance
it is not easy to distinguish friend from foe when the two sides are ap-
proaching close to one another. Badly aimed shell or shrapnel bursting
.prematurely may endanger your own infantry. Artillery should, there-
fore, if kept back, cease fire when the infantry gets within 500 meters
of the point attacked ; but if it approaches to within 1,000 or 1,100 me-
ters, it may continue its fire in security until the infantry has entered
upon the last hundred paces of its final rush, for at this close range the
aim of the gunners will be so certain that no accident will be likely
to happen. Moreover, it is not encouraging to infantry, when at very
close quarters with the enemy, to see their own guns kept back a mile
to the rear, whereas it is enlivening and comforting to hear them
thundering away close at hand at such critical moments. Those only
who have heard the cheers which infantry give the batteries which have
stood by them in the fight can form a full idea of the moral effect pro-
duced upon the former by the support of the latter.

You will perhaps object that artillery will no longer be able to ap-
proach within 1,000 or 1,100 meters of a village occupied by the enemy,
for infantrymen, firm believers as they are in the powers of their arm,
feel confident that at such a distance they can annihilate batteries, and
1 1113 self recommended a few lines back that the first position for the guns
should be chosen beyond rifle range. But I can state from experience
that infantry fire is not annihilating at the distance named. The well-
known soldier's song is in the right when it says, " It is not every ball
that hits," and this assertion is corroborated by a comparison of the
number of casualties with that of rounds expended. I remained with
my batteries in position before St. Privat from 2 to 5 p. in., during
which time three battalions of French infantry were extended in the
furrows of the arable laud in front of us, at from 900 to 1,000 paces dis-
tance, keeping up a constant fire upon my guns and upon nothing else
(not to mention six other battalions in second and third line). We suf-
fered very considerable loss, but no gun was for a moment silenced
■during those three hours in consequence of rifle fire. Whenever one

59

of the guns was silenced for a few minutes it was in consequence of the
enemy's artillery fire, which occasionally smashed a wheel or something
else. When the batteries Were required to advance with the infantry,
between 5 and 6 p. m., only three out of eighty-four guns remained be-
hind for a lime, being at the moment under repair. All other damage
had been made good in position under the enemy's rifle fire.* The loss
inflicted by the latter will be sensibly diminished if the enemy's infantry
are vigorously opposed by your own skirmishers, against whom in that
case their fire must be principally directed. On that account I recom-
mend that the guns be kept out of effective rifle range till your owu
battalions are able to support them with a heavy fire. The war of
1870-'71 completely dispelled the old prejudice against allowing artillery
to enter within the limits of rifle fire. I do not see why the gunner
should be exposed to less danger than the foot soldier. Moreover, the
former does not, under similar conditions, run the same risk as the latter.
If you count the men who stand on thefront of 120 paces which a battery
occupies, you will see that those in a strong line of skirmishers of equal
extent are much more closely packed, and may therefore naturally be
expected to suffer more loss. Moreover, the bullets which at field firing
in peace time strike guns, limbers, horses, &c, count amongst the hits,
whilst on service they make but little impression upon the men, and do
them no harm. Artillery may therefore when needful expose itself to
infantry fire. Why do E not then require batteries to accompany in-
fantry to close quarters, even up to 500 meters of the enemy ? My rea-
son is that you cannot always avoid making guns fire over the heads
of friendly infantry, and this may be done without risk when the latter
are below the highest point of the shell's trajectory, but not when im-
mediately in front of or 100 paces in advance of the guns. Besides,
notwithstanding all technical improvements, there will still be now and
then a case of a shell bursting in the gun and spreading at once, like
shrapnel. At the bombardment of Montmedy I was standing some 800
or 900 paces from my field batteries, and straight in front of them.
Many defective shell were fired, the splinters of which hopped along to
within 200 paces of us, so that at 600 paces one would not have been
safe from them. It is therefore advisable, for the sake of the infantry,
that the batteries should keep some 600 meters behind the point at
which the former makes a halt of considerable duration to open fi»e.
When arrived at its advanced positions of 1,000 or 1,100 meters from

* On the same afternoon four batteries of the Seventh Army Corps crossed the cause-
way leading from Gravelotte over the valley of the Mance uuder a fearful fire of artil
lery and infantry. Two of these batteries had to retire with great loss and without
unlinibering, but the other two came into action after crossing the causeway, finding
some cover within 700 yards of the French positions and in the foremost ranks of the
Prussian infantry. Here they maintained their ground and kept up their fire for
some hours, till the end of the battle, under a heavy fire of gnus, mitrailleuses, and
rifles, one of these two batteries losing altogether 37 men and 75 horses. (See Start"
History, p. 813.)— Tr.

60

the enemy, the guns need not at once cease firing when the last rush
commences, lest they should draw the attention of the enemy's reserves
within the village to the fact that a fresh stage of the combat is begin-
ning; but they may, after the cheer of the foremost line of assailants
when about to charge, throw a few rounds of shrapnel into the interior
of the place, so as to disquiet the reserves, without any fear of endan-
gering their own friends, since it will require some time for the latter
to get far enough forward to come under their fire. It is really of the
greatest importance that artillery should keep up its fire until the in-
fantry has broken into the place, otherwise the whole advantage of
your preparatory fire may be lost. The opposite practice, however,
answered very well on the day of Sedan, when we carried the Bois de
la Garonne, although our guns ceased firing before the infantry com-
menced their attack ; but, on the other hand, I witnessed the failure cf
an attempt on a village, the border of which had been previously so
fiercely cannonaded that the defenders ran out to the flanks and hid
themselves. Our artillery was then ordered to cease firing, because the
general in command did not like the guns to fire over the heads of our
own troops, and after this only the infantry advanced. Meanwhile all
the defenders had returned to their posts, and the attack failed in the
same manner three times in succession. You must excuse me from
naming time and place, for I should be sorry to impute blame to an of-
ficer whom, on the whole, I esteem greatly. So much for the support
which infantry has a right to expect from artillery in attacking a vil-
lage. It must at the same time take care not to obstruct the fire of the
latter when getting to close quarters. How should infantry act in the
special case before us ? I think, when the nature of the ground admits
of it (and we are assuming that the attack has to he made across open
country), that the battalions should be formed in order of attack be-
fore passing the position occupied by the guns at 1,600 or 2,000 meters
from the village; that is to say, a strong line of skirmishers (not less than
two Ziige per company) should be extended, with supports in open line.
The whole of the second echelon would be in open line, as I take it for
granted that the enemy's guns are already silenced. It stands to rea-
son that the touch will not be given up, either by supports in the first
echelon or by the companies in the second, until within range of mi-
aimed rifle fire. The companies of the second echelon may with ad-
vantage be made to overlap the flanks of the first echelon. * * *
If the batteries have found room for a position on one flank of the
infantry, which I will call the inner flank, it will be found advisable,
and it will be at the same time quite in keeping with our regulations,
to Echelon the supports of the skirmishers and the companies in second
line chiefly on the outer flank, for the guns will protect the inner flank
from surprise, at the same time having the most powerful effect upon
the portion of the enemy's position in front of that flank ; so that it is
well on all accounts for the assailant to concentrate a strong force upon

61

the other flank. As for the distance of the supports and of the second
Echelon from the skirmishers, the regulations recommend this to be
modified according to the nature of the ground, being greater in open
country but reduced as much as possible when cover can be obtained.
As I am now treating of an advance across open ground, we must as-
sume in this case the greatest allowable distance. At 200 meters sup-
ports can exert some effect on the flank of the skirmishers b}~ firing
volleys at need, if placed so as to overlap the outer wing. If this dis-
tance is preserved, when the skirmishers, having arrived within 500
meters of the enemy, commence their attack by opening fire, supports
will be at 700 meters, the companies of the second echelon at 900 meters,
where they will not suffer seriously if they lie down.

The following measure cannot be sufficiently recommended, although
rarely practiced in peace time, and, therefore, from want of habit, gen-
erally ignored in war, namely, that when infantry are passing near guns
in action they should always get the range from the gunners, who will
already have made it out. For, however much practice you may have
had in judging distance, you will be much deceived by effects of light
and by the state of the atmosphere, and it is only natural that you
should think an enemy who is shooting at you to be nearer than he
really is. I must acknowledge errors into which I, but not I alone,
have fallen. When leading my batteries, on the day of Koniggratz,
through Jeciceck up to the first position, after crossing the Trotinka
Eiver, 1 rode forward to choose my ground. Arriving on the flat pla-
teau with the division and battery commanders, we all agreed in esti-
mating the distance of the Austrian artillery from ourselves at 2,500
paces.

It was in action on the now historical hill of Horeuowes. Our first
shell proved the range to be much longer than this, and as it was only
after our fourth shot, with 4,000 meters elevation, that we just reached
the enemy, I limbered up and moved to the next swell of ground, 2,000
paces in advance. This shows how artillery can correct its aim, whilst
for infantry it is almost impossible to do so at the longer ranges if the
enemy is firing, as they cannot see where their own bullets fall. Mis-
takes are also made in the other way, particularly if snow-flakes fall-
ing between yourself and the enemy obscure your vision.

During a small reconnoitering skirmish near Mibel on the morning of
February 10, 1864, I was one of a group of ten or twelve horsemen for
some time near a house against whose walls the bullets struck, flying
over our heads. These were fired by a Danish flank patrol, consisting
of three men posted in a clump of trees. We were astonished at the
long range of the enemy's rifles, as after a good deal of discussion we
put the distance at 800 paces. When the Danes had been driven away
we had the distance paced and found it to be only 240 paces. The
enemy must have made the same mistake as ourselves, for all their
shots were aimed too high. It stands to reason that errors of this de-

62

scriptiou render all your fire of no effect, the only result being1 that you
give the enemy confidence. * * * All attempts to prevent error by
the use of range-finders have hitherto failed in action, owing to excite-
ment and to frequent change of position.

Artillery fire still continues to be the best and quickest range-finder,
all the more so because, as before noticed, the trial shots not only serve
to find the range, but also at the same time to show what allowance
should be made for the effect of the weather upon the powder. I think
that if the artillery fire directed on the borders of the village has had
due effect, it will not be necessary for the skirmishers in going up to>
their first offensive position, whence they will open fire at 500 meters
from the enemy, to do so at the double, for the defenders will probably
be so fully occupied in getting shelter from the shell and shrapnel
which will be falling amongst them as not even to notice the advance
of the skirmishers, and if they do remark it, how many of them will be
bold enough to put their heads out of cover so as to take aim? It is
indeed quite on the cards (and this really happened at Villejouan) that
the assailants will get much farther forward without firing a shot.
This will be their proper course if it can possibly be done, and if they
receive instructions to do so before advancing, for the movements of
skirmishers once in contact with the enemy can no longer be directed
by the higher authorities, all command then devolving upon the com-
pany officers. Skirmishers must be made to thoroughly understand
that it is only allowable to run in moments of extreme urgency, as run-
ning heats the blood and makes the hand unsteady. I am not making
any undue demand upon skirmishers when I require them to move
steadily and calmly forward under fire, always, of course, supposing its
effects not to be too deadly. In the combat before Fredericia, on March 8,
1864, 1 saw our skirmishers advance across a country heavy from the ef-
fects of rain. The enemy's bullets began dropping in amongst them from
a great distance. They looked about them with surprise, formed a good
estimate of the range, shook their heads with a merry laugh, and kept
on advancing slowly over the difficult ground, where to run was out of
the question. Whenever practicable, therefore, troops will be prevented
from running until they proceed to make their final rush with the bay-
onet. Whenever the attack is supported by artillery, the infantry
should be strictly forbidden to commence firing till within 500 meters
of the enemy, lest they should expend their ammunition before getting
to close quarters, for it is surprising how quickly men will get rid of
their cartridges, and you cannot under any circumstances safely reckon
upon providing them with a fresh supply, when attacking across the
open, from the time they get within 500 meters of the enemy to the
moment of closing with him. All suggestions which have been made
with this object must be considered inapplicable to this stage of battle,
however practicable at long range, during intervals of inaction or when
on the defensive. Thus, during the fight at Villejouan it was possible to

63

bring up the ammunition wagons and to complete the men's supply after
the village was carried, and while the companies then on the defensive
repelled the counter-stroke of the enemy's masses. Thus, also, at Beaune
la llolande men carried fresh cartridges in their helmets to the defend-
ers. But when a line of skirmishers advancing to attack across an open
plain has arrived within 100 or 200 paces of the enemy, and finds itself
short of cartridges, no fresh supply can be obtained. No wagons, not
even a man carrying a bag of ammunition, can reach the fighters, and
should for a wonder fortune favor some brave fellow in doing so, of
what use would his 500 rounds be to the company ? There would be
some two or three rounds a man, and how are they to be distributed t
If the skirmishers on reaching their first offensive position observe that
some advantage has been gained over the enemy, the proof of which
will be partial or complete cessation of fire, they will at once approach
the village, whether in one general line, at charging pace for the whole
or only for the last part of the way, or by successive rushes of fractions
of the line, the firing being taken up by each fraction at the halt, to
cover those advancing ; all such details will depend upon the amount
of persistency with which the defenders keep up their fire, which must,,
if not completely silenced, at all events be kept down very much for
the attack to succeed.

How to train officers of the lower grades at field exercise.

[From the supplement to the " Militiir-Wochenblatt," 1884.]

SIXTH PART.

The necessity of giving careful training to our officers is certainly rec-
ognized throughout the army. Maneuvers, instruction in field duties,,
the war game, and staff journeys, as well as exercises similar to those-
just mentioned carried on in various corps, give ample evidence of the
zeal and energy with which this necessary work is performed. But all
these exercises serve rather to fit officers for the command of the larger
bodies and detachments and too little is done for the instruction of lead-
ers in the lower ranks. Yet it is upon the latter that devolves the duty
of carrying out the orders of their superiors ; it is they whose incom-
petence may cause the best plans to fail owing to want of proper initia-
tive, or, on the other hand, whose able and energetic conduct may lead
to victory in spite of want of ability on the part of their chiefs, or, again,,
who by losing their heads at critical moments may produce disaster-
At field exercises and autumn maneuvers the part played by these
subordinates becomes a subject of criticism, the umpires being indeed
specially bound to observe their conduct and to weigh the consequences
resulting from it ; but the very object of these exercises and their short
duration prevent the performances of those officers from being so judged
as to lead them to realize the limits of their power of independent action
(limits elastic indeed, but not always to be overstepped with impunity),

64

and to teach them how to act in accordance with true principles. Their
conduct on these occasions is briefly praised or sharply blamed, but
cannot be criticised in an instructive manner. They are expected to do
certain things, but they have no practice in what would prepare them
for their duties. Yet where should this necessary preparation be given
if not in the field of exercise? This is not too much to ask, since it is
enjoined in our book of regulations, in which there are numberless pas-
sages describing situations in which leaders and commanders of all
ranks, both commissioned and non-commissioned officers, indeed indi-
vidual skirmishers, are called upon to act upon their own responsibil-
ity.

If now, notwithstanding these unmistakable indications of the Field
Exercise Book, we do not seem to act up to their spirit on the practice
ground, this may be accounted for by the fact that exercises of this
nature are never or very rarely called for at inspections, the omission
on the part of inspecting officers being to a certain extent due to a sense
of justice; for many of them say to themselves, "If I expect troops to
be tossed about in this way on the practice ground, I must give my
subordinates credit for an amount of imagination which does not fall to
the share of all, so that very unfair ideas may be formed as to the
capacity of men defective in point of imagination but otherwise capable."
This assumption, according to my experience, rests upon false premises,
for the omission due to it is not justifiable, because the requirements of
the field-exercise regulations necessitate, as I have shown, a kind of
tactical training calculated to develop initiative in subordinate leaders,
to make demands upon their intelligence, and to stimulate their spirit.
1 hold it, then, to be the duty of every superior officer to school the
imagination of his subordinates, and that of every officer to school his
own imagination. In this nothing will be required except what is most
natural and most desirable for the soldier, namely, that in training the
troops under his command he should always imagine himself to be act-
ually engaged in warfare, keeping constantly in view the tasks which
he and his men would be required to perform in the field. But in what
manner can we give play to and educate the imagination at field ex-
ercise ? The main point is for the instructor to place three considera-
tions before himself and those under him :

1. Of what larger unit is my force a part, and what position within
the same unit does it occupy ? What tasks has that unit to perform ?
What special part has my force to play 1

2. Where is the enemy ? How does he act at different stages of the
maneuver ? What is the effect of his arms upon us, and what of ours
upon him *?

3. What is the character of the ground upon which we are to ma-
neuver?

65

It will not be difficult to communicate information from the points
under the first heading briefly and concisely. With regard to the
second heading, we shall find it more difficult to represent and to make
intelligible the position and movements of the enemy and the effect of
his arms, but still we may well succeed in indicating him by means of
men, of targets, and of flags; whilst his supposed appearance and dis-
appearance from certain points outside the boundaries of the practice
ground may be denoted by setting up marks upon its confines. The
effect of the enemy's arms and of your own may also, to a certain ex-
tent, be realized by occasionally communicating certain suppositions to
officers whose action will be thereby influenced. The consideration of
the nature of the country, referred to under the third heading, is a serious,
matter, seeing that supposititious features of ground are inadmissible
and strictly forbidden at field maneuvers. But the exercise ground is
not the field {Terrain) in the military acceptation of the term; at the
same time it is not an open, smooth, unplanted piece of ground, as it
is too often erroneously considered, in contradistinction to the field of
maneuver. In the words of the Field Exercise Book, page 163, it should
be " a pretty open space, upon which troops can freely circulate, and
on which all fighting formations can be represented as they should be
practiced with a view to different suppositions respecting the enemy and
respecting the nature of the ground, level, broken, or wooded, that is to
say, without regard to the character of the practice ground itself."

A tactical example.
[See Plate No. I.]

The exercise ground is 1,500 meters (1,640 yards) square. The sides
are directed on the four cardinal points. Access to the ground is gained
by a broad road leading to the southern side. The brigade is assembled
on this road in column of route, the head of which is about 500 meters
(546 yards) from the entrance. The brigadier assembles mounted officers
in a field on one side of the road, at the head of regiment B, which is
leading. He makes the following communication :

"I assume that the brigade is followed by a division (Abtheilung) of
the divisional artillery (three or four batteries), and then by the other
brigade of the division ; the remaining divisions of the army corps be-
ing drawn up in a similar formation 1,200 meters (1,308 yards) to the
west. The exercise ground is bounded to the south by a river, only
passable by means of a bridge which the road crosses. The black flags
mark a low line of heights on the other side of the valley, which rise
so much eastwards that the ground about the northeastern angle of the
square is not visible from our present post. The enemy whom our
army corps is advancing to attack is reported to be over 3,000 meters
(3,279 yards) beyond the river. A squadron of our divisional cavalry
2580— No. 18 5

66

regiment is in advance on each road, whilst the remaining two squadrons
have crossed a bridge to the east, so as to cover our right flank. When
we advance, regiment B will throw out an advance guard, under cover
of which the brigade will form up at the foot of the heights in line of
battalion columns — regiment B on the left, regiment A on the right."

The brigadier now dismisses the mounted officers, and having allowed
them time enough to impart to the troops all uecessary information
about the situation, gives orders for the advance. He betakes him-
self to the bridge, where he superintends the passage of the brigade
over the river. As soon as Nos. 1 and 2 companies of the leading bat-
talion (the first) of the second regiment (A) have crossed over, he orders
the call "attention" to be sounded, points to the right with his sword,
-and gives the following notice : "A cavalry brigade of the enemy is
-dashing forward from several points out of a hollow to the east of the
black flags and is charging."* The aid-de-camp, having received his in-
structions beforehand, makes a similar communication at the same mo-
ment to the commander of regiment B, who has already gone to the
front. Both regimental commanders repeat the caution, dispatching
their adjutants to pass the word to all portions of their command out of
hearing. If the troops have been trained in the way supposed, the fol-
lowing measures, or something like them, will be carried out: The first
battalion of regiment B, which had been thrown forward as an advance
guard, opens out into a line of company columns at deploying intervals
and occupies the line of heights with skirmi shers.

The second battalion of the same regiment is drawn up also in line of
company columns at deploying intervals in rear of the first battalion.
The fusilier battalion of the same regiment forms double column in rear
of the second battalion. No. 1 company of regiment A wheels up by Z'dge
the eighth or sixteenth of a circle to the right. No. 2 company is still
in column of sections; Nos. 3 and 4 are crossing the bridge. As soon
as the signal " attention" has been taken in by all, the action goes on
pretty much as follows: The right wing of the extended skirmishers
wheels up and opens fire upon the attacking cavalry. All companies of
the first and second battalions of regiment B whose front is clear deploy
with the necessary change of front towards the cavalry, and fire volleys
by two or by four ranks. Nos. 1 and 2 companies of regiment A do the
:same. Nos. 3 and 4 complete the passage of the river as quickly as
possible, and fill up gaps wherever foujhd to join in the firing. The fu-
silier battalion of regiment B, which is in double column, forms square,
^and also fires on the cavalry if its front is clear. The second battalion of
regiment A deploys along the river bank to the right of the bridge, so
as to take part in the affair by firing on the enemy's cavalry across the
supposed river. The fusilier battalion of regiment A is stdl marching
towards the bridge.

* Should not the advanced cavalry squadron have detected and rerjorted the pres-
ence of this brigade ? — Tr.

Figure I

Poplar

PLATE I.

THerul&z - vous .

dbQ Before the Signed.
I I [AttenttoTv.

\After the Signal .

r
k

o>

tbeTvbicm.

JIlllB
F

I

TL||
F

67

The brigadier has the " bait" and " cease action" (Stop/en) sounded,
and again assembles the mounted officers. He will then, should the
exercise have taken the turn just represented, give a picture of what
captains might have done on their own responsibility, and will explain
the advantages of such a course. Should, however, this have noc been
rendered necessary, there will still doubtless be some particular details
of execution deserving of comment. I will assume that they are con-
nected with the occurrences which I am going to notice. The first bat-
talion of regiment B, which by occupying the heights marked by the
flags is to cover the formation of the brigade after the latter has crossed
the bridge, has extended one whole company (No. 1), two companies
(Nos. 2 and 3) being posted each behind a flank of the skirmishers, and
No. 4 being placed on the right rear. The brigadier asks why this
particular disposition has been made. The battalion commander re-
plies that as when he moved out there was no questiou of a fight, but
only of taking up a position, he did not wish to break up more than one
company, and as for the rest, that his object was to secure his right flank,
the outer one. The company in rear of the left flank of the skirmishers
(No. 3) has been drawn up in line, that in rear of the right (No. 2) in col-
umn. The brigadier, to whose inquiries the captain of No. 2 alone gives a
definite answer, namely, that, appreciating the wish of his commanding
officer to secure his right flank, he had desired to contribute to this end
by a solid and compact formation — the brigadier, I say, restricts himself
to approval of the manner in which the commander of regiment B had
allowed battalion and company commanders to exercise their own dis-
cretion as to the distribution and formatiou'of their several commands
even in a situation which did not apparently require any departure
from ordinary routine and uniformity. For a constant adhesion to fixed
method may, under certain circumstances, produce more disastrous re-
sults than the sanction of a departure from uniformity as long as co-
hesion and control are not thereby endangered, and there is no fear of
this when the want of uniformity merely consists in the formation and
distribution of companies and battalions within their own field of opera-
tion, being varied, at the discretion of the several commanders, to suit
the exigencies of each particular situation. In the case before us the
strengthening of the right flank was fully justified. Even should in-
fantry be aware that both its front and flank are covered by detach-
ments of cavalry, it is not thereby released from the duty of being pre-
pared for all emergencies. ''All the same," remarks the brigadier, " as
things have turned out it was hardly necessary for the company on the
left of the skirmishers to deploy, or for the second battalion of regiment
B to form line of company columns, as the latter would soon have had
to join the main body of the brigade." The battalion commander takes
the liberty of defending the course which he had taken, saying that
he thought it his duty to place his battalion in readiness to support the
first battalion. The brigadier accepts this explanation, particularly as

6S

circumstances bad shown caution to be necessary. He tben proceeds
to remark tbat be bad noticed tbat, as a rule, too great elevation bad
been given to tbe rifles. One captain, for instance, bad gone through
the whole scale of his sights from 1,200 meters to 400 and back again.
Moreover, no captain appears to have ceased firing without being or-
dered to do so. Waste of ammunition must be carefully avoided. A
few volleys with the 400-meter sight, fired from all sides on cavalry al-
lowed to approach within that distance, would certainly have sufficed
to frighten them away with great loss. The necessity of husbanding the
ammunition was all the greater because tbe enemy's infantry would soon
have to be encountered. " The fusilier battalion of regiment B got
rather out of band in moving up," adds the brigadier, with the further
remark tbat it might, when in square, have strengtbened the fire from
its right face by firing volleys from all four ranks. "Lastly," be says in
conclusion, "the fusilier battalion of regiment A should have cleared
the road, foreseeing, as it ought, that the general commanding the divis-
ion would make no delay in sending forward the batteries."* Tbe briga-
dier thinks tbat a repetition of the exercise just performed will be ad-
visable, if only to show that he does not wish to recommend a cut-and-
dried system of repulsing cavalry. He defers this repetition, however,
to the next day, and confines himself for the remainder of tbe present
one to parade formations and marching past, to movement in column,
and to deployments. The orders given out for the morrow are as fol-
lows: "The brigade will be formed up in the same order of march as
to-day, only that regiment A will lead, fusilier battalions being at the
bead of regiments." No instructions are given by the brigadier as to
tbe order in which the other battalions are to follow. The commander of
regiment A places his second battalion, tbat of regiment B bis first bat-
talion, in the center. Next morning the brigadier supplements his re-
marks upon the configuration of the ground by stating, "1 assume that
the poplar in the middle of the north side of the practice ground stands
on a slight elevation ; with this exception all previous notices about the
military situation remain in force." He then dismisses the mounted offi-
cers (see Plate II). On tbe signal "advance" the operations commence.
All commanding officers do their best to act upon the brigadier's remarks
of the previous day. This is generally clone with so much zeal that mis-
apprehensions soon come to light. For instance, it was hard for some
to believe that the brigadier was in sober earnest when he approved of
the conduct of the commander of regiment B in allowing bis company
and battalion commanders full liberty as to the distribution and forma-
tion of the units under their command. The commander of regiment A
might, perhaps, think that under the brigadier's seeming praise there
lurked a sneer, to which he would take care not to expose his regiment.
You may then be pretty sure that he will give his subordinates formal and

* Should not half a battery at least have followed immediately in rear of the lead-
ing battalion of the brigade ? — Tr.

FIGURE II.
Poplar

PLATE II.

TTietreS
WOO

WW

KOI

fiendez - vovus .

n . . {Before the Sianal.

I I ) Attention.

grfeir, ' [After the Signal.

P

12 11

w

IT,

%

tiaiiiiHi!Hiii"F/,

!%

A

cfc

.T7i-# Brigadiers

Scheme.

7A

*SReU.

1J^'Enemy's Battery.

69

precise directions, and I assume from previous experience of such cases
that he will order the supporting companies of the fusilier battalion not
to deploy, and the other two battalions to fire volleys from all four ranks.
The commander of regiment B also tbinks it necessary to remind his
rear battalion that it must take particular care to keep the right side of
the road clear. In accordance with these instructions regiment A opens
out into order of battle after crossing the bridge, when, whilst the fusil-
ier battalion of regiment B is only half over, the brigadier orders the
call " attention " to be sounded, adding to the notice given on the previ-
ous day : " A horse battery of the enemy has unlimbered on Poplar Hill.
A shell from it has just fallen in amongst the second battalion of regi-
ment A, another more to the west near the first battalion, and a third
close to and westward of the bridge." The course of events is now sup-
posed to be as follows : The second battalion of regiment A, into the midst
of which a shell had fallen, and which had already completed its forma-
tion in double column, at once opens out by order into line of company
columns. No. 10 company of the fusilier battalion of regiment A, which
is facing the same way, deploys in the rear of the left of No. 9 company,
which has extended. No. 11 company comes up in line close behind
the right flank of the same skirmishers and fires volleys upon the bat-
tery, upon which all the skirmishers also fire. No 12 company, in eche-
lon on the right rear, wheels outwards, deploys, and fires volleys on
the attacking cavalry with the 400-meter sight. The first battalion of
regiment A forms square, the right face of which fires volleys from all
four ranks. Nos. 9 and 10 companies of regiment B, which have al-
ready crossed the bridge, double back, by order of the battalion com-
mander, to the south bank, and deploy to the right of the bridge, in
line with Nos. 11 and 12 companies, the whole four companies from
thence joining their fire on the cavalry to that of the more advanced
troops. The first battalion of regiment B lies down on the slope of the
road embankment, the second battalion of the same regiment forming
double column and taking cover behind some farm buildings. Regimen-
tal commanders ride to the battalions and companies, making here and
there some change iu the dispositions. The brigadier sounds " Cease
action " and the " Officers' call." He will have good reason to represent
the situation of the brigade as critical,* and as one which will make
great demands upon the wariness, determination, and resolution of com-
manding officers and captains. He expresses his fear that as things
have gone the troops which have crossed the river have got into a posit-
ion of great difficulty, and in order to make things clear he begins by call
ing attention to the fact that the enemy's battery, whose first shot only
reached the second battalion of regiment A accidentally, could hardly
fail to fire subsequently with great effect from its commanding position
upon the bridge, which is completely exposed to view, and also on the

* Does there appear to be any good reason for the brigadier getting his brigade into
so critical a situation ? — Tb.

70

road, the whole length of which is enfiladed. " Under these circum-
stances," points out the brigadier, " the great thing is to disable the
battery, with which object in view as powerful a fire as possible should
be brought to bear upon it. At from 700 to 800 meters, at which dis-
tance from the first and second battalions of regiment A the battery had
unlinibered, a well-directed mass fire of infantry may well be effective.
The fire, however, as actually delivered was neither heavy enough nor
properly directed, although very steady volleys were fired from all sides
on both cavalry and artillery.

" First of all, I must again touch upon what I consider the first con-
dition of a tactical exercise, the principal object of which is the training
of the lower grades of officers, namely, that whilst the director of the
maneuvers only gives out the supposition on which the operation is to be
based, and abstains from giving orders, commanding officers must, in
their turn, when making the dispositions necessary for acting upon the
suppositions, take care not to influence in any way their subordinates
in the distribution and tactical formation of the units under their com-
mand, leaving the responsibility for the same to those upon whom de-
volves in each particular case the duty of handling the troops in battle.
]S"o attention is to be paid to mere want of uniformity in such matters.
At the critique which will always follow the tactical exercise the di-
rector will discuss and determine whether the course adopted in each case
was appropriate, whether general unity of action was preserved, whether
the supreme direction of the operations was facilitated or impeded,
whether subordinate leaders overstepped the proper bounds of their au-
thority, and last, not least, whether they failed to exercise a proper in-
itiative within these limits. The commander of regiment A erred all
the more grievously by his interference that it contributed to prevent
the requisite development of fire. The chance shell which, according to
my assumption, fell in amongst the second battalion when still in close
formation, would, had the battalion already opened out into line of com-
pany columns, have probably expended itself in one of the intervals, and
would at any rate have had a less disturbing effect had it struck a sin-
gle company instead of the united battalion. The formation in com-
pany column, which was afterwards deemed advisable, would in actual
warfare, even more than in the case before us, have distracted the atten-
tion of the battalion and company commanders from the necessitj" of
immediate deployment to open fire, which might have been directed by
two companies on the battery and by the other two ou the cavalry.
All the battalion commander had to do was to give the following cau-
tions : ' Nos. 5 and 6 against the cavalry ; Nos. 7 and 8 against the ar-
tillery.' It would then have been the duty of the captains on the right to
make the necessary change of front, then to form line two or four deep,
according to the space available, and to fire volleys either from two or
four ranks, naming the range, whilst the captains on the left extended
their men as skirmishers, judging their distance from the battery, in

71

doing which on service they would be aided by observing the effect of
the volleys which the companies of the fusilier battalion would presum-
ably have already fired. At peace practice they would eitber have
heard the word of command given for the volleys or they would have
to find out at what the range had been estimated, afterwards forming:
their own opinion on the subject. The captain of No. 10 company, sup-
porting the left wing of the line of skirmishers, should not have con-
tented himself with merely deploying, which he wisely ordered upon
finding himself in the line of fire, but should have led his company up
to the skirmishing line at the double and have taken part in the fire on
the battery, an example which should have been followed by No. 11
company. That No. 12 should at once change front towards the cav-
alry was a necessary consequence of the situation, and an evident re-
sult of its position in echelon on the right. The men would have got
into action more quickly if the captain had combined the wheel, the de-
ployment, and the making ready to fire by giving the words 'Right
wheel,' ' Deploy and load,' ' Halt,' all together, in keeping with para-
graph 43 of the Field Exercise Book.* If, however, he could not feeE
sure that orders thus given would be carried out calmly and with regu-
larity, he did well in delaying the commencement of his fire rather than
make the men unsteady. But if companies are trained in accordance
with the paragraph just quoted, and if battalions are trained in accord-
ance with the concluding sections of paragraph 112, no doubt of this
kind need be entertained. t The first battalion of regiment A, which
was at the time in double column, and which the shell fire did not
prevent from maintaining this formation, got into square, its right
face opening fire from all four ranks. This was all done steadily
and properly, which I accept as a proof that the above-quoted para-
graphs are attended to in that battalion. A still greater develop-
ment of fire would, however, have been obtained if the commanding
officer had made the two companies of the right wing deploy to
to right and left. There would have been room for this, as the battal-
ion would not have been masked by Nos. 9 and 10 companies of the fu-
silier battalion of regiment B, which, as we know, although they had
completed the passage of the river, had returned to the south bank at
the double. This retrograde movement took place by order of the bat-
talion commander, who evidently wished to keep his battalion in hand
at this critical moment, and who afterwards deployed it at the double
on the right bank in a very orderly manner, afterwards opening fire on
the cavalry. I think it, however, worth considering whether the rapid
movement to the rear of those two companies, which might lmve come
into line in less time by moving to the front, and with no more exposure

* Paragraph 43 contains "general remarks" concluding the chapter upon company
drill, whilst paragraph 112 concludes in the same manner the chapter upon the battal-
ion.—Tk.

t "General observations" concluding tlie chapter on the brigade. — Tr.

72

to loss than fell to the lot of regiment B — whether, I say, this movement
might not have exercised a bad and demoralizing effect had the enemy's
shells really been falling all over the place. Besides which, the move-
ment was in this case the most unsuitable which could be made, be-
cause, as already stated, the bridge and the road leading to it would
most certainly have been the principal marks aimed at by the enemy's
guns, the distance of these objects from him being, of course, well known
to the battery commander from the map in his possession. The battal-
ion commander might well have left the captains of Nos. 9 and 10 free
to judge for themselves. The deployment of the whole battalion on the
south bank, moreover, took so much time that the good, steady volleys
of the companies would hardly have been fired soon enough to prevent
the success of the enemy's attack if this had not been already repulsed
by the troops on the other side of the river.

" That the first battalion, regiment B, which lay down on the slope of
the embankment, would not have found cover there from the enemy's
fire is evident from what has before been stated; it had better have
formed up close behind the fusilier battalion, or just to its right ; in
the former case the four ranks closed well up to the front, in the latter
case the two ranks of the battalions standing side by side would have
presented that formation of minimum depth recommended in paragraph
137, page 191, of the Field Exercise Book.* Moreover, the battalion
thus posted would have been ready to open fire at once in case of need.

" One last remark," says the brigadier, turning to the captain of No.
D company, regiment A, which had been extended. "Your company is
the only one which I did not hear fire any volleys. What orders did
you give upon this point ! " The captain admits that the leader of
the skirmishing Zug had forestalled him by giving the word "Three
rounds at 800 meters," which order was immediately conformed to by
the other two Zug leaders. He, the captain, was all the more un-
willing to interfere in the matter, believing the subalterns to have
judged the distance correctly, because he thought it a good thing to
combine the advantage of a better aim, resulting from independent fir-
ing restricted as to amount, with that of mass firing by volleys at word
of command which would follow. The brigadier neither blames the
rapid exercise of initiative on the part of the Zug leader nor the
views of the captain, but thinks the following criticism justifiable :
ii The company was about in the center of the practice ground, which
is 1,500 meters square; the battery supposed to be on the poplar hill is
thus about 700 meters from the company ; if the captain and his sub-
alterns had completely realized the assumed situation, they would have
said to themselves that the first shots to be fired should be less for the
purpose of hitting the battery which had suddenly appeared than for

* Half a company would be about equivalent to the number of men whose tire would
be available from one of the flauk faces of a battalion square formed from double col-
umn in the German fashion. — Tr.

73

finding out how far it was oft". The first fire should therefore have been
directed by the captain in person, and for the same reason volleys should
have been fired." And now a question to the commander of the fusil-
ier battalion of regiment A : " Why did you allow the whole of No. 9
to extend J? The battalion was intended to cover the deployment of the
brigade, but the enemy was still 3,000 meters distant, with cavalry in
front. Surely, then it would have been sufficient to post the company
in close order, or to place its three Ziige at intervals under the brow
of the hill, with a picket and patrols along the crest. I purposely left
this point uncertain yesterday when discussing the proceedings of regi-
ment B, expecting that the commander of regiment A would correct the
error if the commander of his fusilier battalion did not make the nec-
essary amendment. Let us now compare the number of companies
which actually came into action with that of the companies which might
have done so, in order that we may judge of the result:
" Against the artillery we have first

No. 9 company of regiment A, and immediately after
No. 11 company of the same regiment, both of which were brought
up in quite a regular manner, but did not hit off the range.
" We might have had in addition
No. 10,
No. 7,

No. 8 ; in short, five instead of two companies.
"Against the cavalry we have at once

No. 12 company of regiment A, and the right face of the square

formed by the first battalion of A regiment; later on
Nos. 9 and 10 companies, B regiment, the men of which would
certainly have been much excited ha d the occasion been one
of actual warfare, and would, moreover, have been exposed to
a heavy fire in recrossing the bridge after them,
IS os. 1L and 12 companies, regiment B.
" On the other hand, we might have had at once in action

Nos. 12, 5, and 6 companies, regiment A.
" The right face of the square of first battalion, regiment A; i. e.,
Nos. 1 and 2 companies deployed to the right, also
Nos. 9 and 10 companies of B regiment, and a little later on
Nos. 11 and 12 companies of B regiment, all without undue hurry;
"Finally, also,

First battalion of B regiment, making a total of seven companies

to commence with, ending with thirteen, instead of one and a

half to commence with, ending with five and a half.*

"Another observation," adds the brigadier, " will not be superfluous.

I have nowhere spoken of general principles for which infallibility is

* Half a company would be about equivalent to the number of men whose tire Avould
be available from the flank faces of a battaliou square formed from double coluins in
the German fashion. — Tr.

74

claimed, and to which exceptions are not admitted. I have only rea-
soned upon individual occurrences, with the intention of promoting re-
flection upon them. When the critic bases his observations upon lixed
rules, he only, in my opinion, creates confusion, the consequence of
which will be that subordinates will try to discover the views, the wishes,
and will of their superiors, and will not learn to act according to the
circumstances of the moment, to use their own intelligence, to recog-
nize and appreciate their own responsibility."

With these words the brigadier dismisses the officers, and on this
the second day of exercise will still find time enough to comply with
the requirements of the second part of section 3, treating of the " gen-
eral principles" to be kept in view at field exercise, as detailed in the
regulations of June 17, 1870. u Field exercise," we there read, "not
only serves to prepare the individual soldier and leaders of troops for
warlike operations, but also to strengthen discipline by a fixed adher-
ence to recognized forms." The brigadier will thus again practice parade
movements, marching past, and formations in column, the last of which
are peculiarly adapted to give troops which are brigaded together the
idea of interdependence, and also to impress upon them the necessity
of working together for a purpose common to all. Hence these evolu-
tions in close order should not be, as they are too frequently, a mere
succession of marches to front, to flank, and in oblique directions, com-
bined with changes of front without any apparent motive ; but they
should be executed with the distinct purpose of changing position from
one point to another, chosen beforehand, at no great distance, by the
shortest possible route, with varied formations and the necessary changes
of direction. Whenever a brigadier sets himself a task of this nature,
he finds out that, simple though it may appear, it is for that reason by
no means easy of execution, and that it makes considerable demands
upon the imagination. As, on account of changes of front and of for-
mation, the shortest way from point to point is by no means the most
direct, the director of the maneuver will have to exercise his imagina-
tion and come to a rapid conclusion, so as to go as little out of his way
as possible, and at the same time to select the most convenient inter-
mediate point for suitable changes of formation and of direction. By
having a distinct object in view, which object need not be pointed out,
because it will be instinctively recognized by the troops, the weariness
resulting from aimless drill will be dispelled. Variations of pace will
be at the same time practiced, the troops marching sometimes at atten-
tion, sometimes at ease, now and then at the double, a variety which
gives animation to the work conducive to discipline, which is, on the
contrary, impaired by a sleepy way of doing things.

L. G.

DRILL OR EDUCATION?*

[A lecture delivered at the Military Scientific Society of Vienna on the 3d Novem-
ber, 1883, by Lieutenant Field-Marshal the Archduke Jobn, commanding the Twenty-
fifth Infantry Division.]

Translated, by permission, from the German by Capt. W. A. H. Hare, R. E., D. A.

Q. M. G.

Motto: Bauheit hat mich oft gereut ; Milde niemah ; ein gates Wort, ein freundlicher
Blich erzwlngt Gehorsam und Liebe. — Rudolf von Hapsburg.

Brill as a talisman.

Success in war is no game of hazard, but the inevitable triumph of
the strong over the weak. Such strength — putting aside religious and
political grounds — is the result of better army organization, better ar-
mament, better generalship, and, finally, better fighting qualities. The
first three of these factors are matters which concern the war depart-
ment of the state concerned, and mainly depend on questions of finance
and the extent to which military service can be exacted from its citi-
zens. Generalship, that is to say, the higher military commands, is left
to a few individuals. But the fighting qualities of the private soldier,
or, in other words, his military value, is a matter which concerns us most,
for it' is, to a great extent, the result produced by our care and labor,
and the object of our work.

The terrible character of modern warfare, with its shattering effects
on the soldier's morale, its frightful carnage of human life in such re-
stricted spaces of time and place, aud the increased difficulties in the
way of personal influence of officer over man, makes the struggle be-
tween the natural instinct of self-preservation and the feeling of duty
go harder than ever against the latter. But it is exactly in this triumph
over the natural instinct of self-preservation that the fighting value of
the soldier lies, or, in other words, his use as an instrument in the hand
of a higher directing mind.

It is impossible while looking at this question not to call to mind
Frederick the Great at the battle of Kolin, who, when irritated at his
wavering grenadiers, led them on with the words, " Backers ! wollt
Ihr denn ewig leben ? " (Pascals ! do ye wisb. then, to live forever ■ )

With the slaughter of St. Privat and Plevna fresh in our memory,

*" Drill oder Erziehung?" Vortrag gehalten im militiir-wissenschaftlichen Ve-

reine zu Wien am 3. November 1883, von P. M. L. Erzherzog Johann. Wien, 1863. Ver-

lag des militiir-wissenschaftlichen Vereines.

75

76

there has been an effort in nearly every army to find some means of
checking the evil results of snch carnage on the soldier's mind, or, in
other words, counteracting the instincts which are so naturally brought
into play in the human mind by the character of modern fighting. And
in this respect it is certainly to be regretted that this has not been made
the subject of so much attention as should have been the case, and that
the man himself has not been considered as a factor of success in war
to the same extent, at any rate, as technical improvements in arms, the
minor details of drill, and such like matters of investigation. Had it
been so, indeed, our opinions would have been a deal clearer on the
subject.

Now, opinions on the way in which the man is to be fashioned into a sol-
dier are naturally just about as different as inclination, tastes, thoughts,
and individualities.

Where the training of the soldier, just as the carrying on of a war,
finds a firm and healthy support on some great feeling inspiring the
masses of the nation, on subjects of great national interests affecting
all, on the enthusiasm inspired by some great man, on the as yet unim-
paired power of religion, or on the passions, be they noble or ignoble,
of a people, the task of forming soldiers is an easy one, for it becomes
then merely a question of giving effect to such impulses. But it is a
very different thing when the training of the soldier can only look for
support to a very slight extent on a feeling generally pervading the
nation, and when, in other words, some great general motive power,
such as a universally popular war with the people, is out of the ques-
tion.

It is maintained by some that discipline alone can make troops reliable
in tvar, and that discipline can only be arrived at by strict drill. This
means to say that the systematic fashioning of the individual man, en-
tirely destroying all initiative of his own, can be carried to such an ex-
tent that the very thought of indiscipline is impossible in his mind, and
troops can consequently be relied on to carry through what is tactically
required of them without any regard to personal danger. In other
words, instead, then, of the moral motive power which, resting on the
honorable traditions of the imperial army, the Archduke Charles em-
bodied in his high-minded soldier's watchword in the three words,
" motive, thought, and mind," and which were embodied to such per-
fection in Marshal Eadetzky's army, we are to have stiffness, formality,
the parade step, and Prussian drill!

This is not my opinion.

But, first of all, to remove any false impression that may be made by
my allusion to Prussian "drill," let me say that I do not in any way
mean by this, Prussian " training." In Prussia soldiers are drilled and
educated. Scharnhorst said that a strong and natural thinking power
was one of the first qualities of the soldier. What I mean by " drill "
is — as carried on in Prussia, hand-in-hand with training for war — a series

77

of formalities which, thanks to the intelligence and previous educa-
tion of the Prussian recruit, is attended by no serious results to his real
military training. But the same could only be arrived at by us by sac-
rificing the real training of the soldier for war, as with the inferiority of
our raw material, and the consequent enormous difficulties in our way
of forming the soldier at all, training for war demands all our time and
care, and would suffer if these were devoted to any other purpose.

In Prussia parade drill may be looked upon as a luxury — a luxury
which may be tolerated, though not, perhaps, with impunity — but with
us it is nothing more nor less than a sin. The rich can afford to pay
for unnecessary luxuries without perhaps feeling the cost, though they
would be richer if they avoided such extravagance. The needy must
confine their expenditure to what is strictly necessary, and they only
injure themselves by aping the manners of the rich. An educated per-
son can in time master two languages, but with no foundation to build
on he must be content with one. Now, if the choice lies, so to speak,
between the two languages to be acquired by the soldier, that is to say,
training for war and training for the parade, we must decide at once for
the former.

By this we only mean to protest against the way in which drill is over-
done and carried to an absurdity, and precision imparted to matters
where it is quite out of place, with the view of training soldiers for
war ; in fact, we protest against the unreasonable inclination to imitate,
solely and alone, the German army — admired and respected as it is by
all of us — in certain unmeaning outward details which must surely cause
our friends the Germans a certain amount of amusement if not pity;
and not without reason. Qua nocitura tenes, quamvis sint cara, relinque.

Let us not forget that our great country, peopled as it is with so
many different races, is, not only from a geographical but from a social
point of view, really in a state, we may say, half-way between the
West and the East. Our raw material in men, taking it in all, what-
ever good fighting qualities it may have, does not permit us to play
with that dangerous game, parade precision; that is to say, it cannot
stand it, it loses efficiency by it.

The same rule cannot apply to all; "reason would become nonsense
and virtue a vice." But it is one of the hardest tasks that fall to the
lot of statesmen and soldiers in high responsible positions to correctly
understand the nature of the human element confided to their care and
turn it to the best account. On this nature must depend the system of
training and fashioning the soldier, and the character of the means
adopted for getting the best value out of his fighting capacity.

In things that we put the highest value on we do not, as a rule, imi-
tate the customs of our neighbors; we should be as we appear, and,
what is more, present ourselves as such. Nothing is done by borrow-
ing and aping the manners and customs of others; it merely goes to
show that we have little faith in ourselves.

78

We Austrians have a natural tendency — and it is an inherited weak-
ness in our character — to admire everything that is foreign, especially
if it be successful, no matter on what grounds. Who can forget when,
after the campaign of 1859, the order of the day was to imitate the
French, which we did, even to the fashion and cut of our uniforms and
such-like minor details. The misinterpreted imitation of our conquer-
ors, with their elan and their offensive tactics, brought about the fatal
shock tactics which cost us so much blood in 1866, and did more than
all our strategical blunders to bring about the disastrous results of that
campaign. And now we are copying our Prussian masters, being influ-
enced solely by the results they have achieved, and fancy we see the talisman
of success in a caricature of their stiff drill. Would it not be well to see
whether the new system, if overdone and trusted to implicitly, without any
regard to other factors in the case, might not lead us into the same paths of
error as did our old shock tactics copied from the French?

. German successes.

But Prussia, with her military system, was victorious in the campaign
of 1870-'71 — the most important of the present century — and the French
army, which was undrilled and slack, was beaten. This is a fact, say
the admirers of drill, and admits of no father argument.

Stiff drill, tolerated in Prussia without evil results, is in accordance
with the traditions of the Prussian army of last century, and is felt to
be all the less irksome as the first soldier in the country clings to it
with a justifiable kind of religious feeling.

There are, besides, many things to be seen in Prussia which the cred-
ulous might easily take for signs of military strength.

But it should not be ignored that in all their training schools and in
the education of the soldier the Prussians work on the man's power of
thought and power of resolve ; that during the sixty years in which the
Prussian army was triained for its final triumphs the Waldensee theory
was in force, and the tendency of this is to quicken the soldier's judg-
ment and train him in field duties; that this practical system still gives
unmistakable signs of being the right one to-day; and that field firing,
with its tactical application, and field training in the autumn and win-
ter, are practiced with the same amount of intelligence and success as
ever. Military opinions in Prussia openly declare that excessive drill
and the worship of forms must sooner or late disappear.

It was not drill or exterior forms that led the Germans from one vic-
tory to another; it was the national spirit with which the war was un-
dertaken and carried out; the excellent military law which had become
a second nature to the Germans; the iron determination which per-
vaded every branch of the service; the desire to press forward shown by
their marching and fighting exploits; the power of attraction the sound
of the cannon had on all generals, high or low, making them set their col-
umns in motion for the scene of strife, with or without orders, and with-

79

out shunning responsibility. The French soldier did his duty. The
graves of the slaughtered Germans are silent but grim proofs of the
bravery and devotion of their opponents. The French could not attribute
their failures to their .soldiers not having mastered the art of marching
past with a prancing step or mounting guard with Prussian rigidity and
stiffness; it was their bad organization ; their neglect to turn the strength
of the nation to proper account; the mobilization on the frontier; the
want of system in their leading; and the carrying on the war after the
fall of the empire by amateurs and dilettanti. These were the causes
of failure.

Obedience of intellect and strength of mind are, of course, indispen-
sable factors, but these are far more necessary with the higher ranks
than with the rank and file; it may be said that the necessity for relia-
ble discipline increases as the square of the importance of the command,
of the degree of responsibility, and of the danger of disobedience.

When the arrival of a column has been arranged to take place at a
certain time and place, but the officer in command has other ideas on
the subject, or does not comply with his orders, or finds that the march-
ing powers of the troops in his command have been overestimated, or
fancies that the probable action of the enemy will prevent his carrying
out his instructions; or when personal ambition is carried so far as to
subordinate the welfare of the whole to that of the individual, and gives
rise to reckless enterprise, then calculation is out of the question, and
failure more than probable. This kind of discipline may, to a certain
extent, have been faulty on the French side. And with us it is insuf-
ficiently fostered, too little practiced, and breaches of it are not alivays
severely enough dealt with. Discipline of this kind is, however, not to be
confounded with the strict drilling of the rank and file, and is certainly
not to be acquired by it.

A strait-jacket never cured a madman yet; the mind cannot be
disciplined through the body. The effect cannot be produced by work-
ing inwardly from the exterior, but just the other way; we must work
outwardly from the interior. The exterior of the trunk of a tree may
be perfect and sound, but, in spite of this deceptive covering, the inte-
rior may rot away and die, and the first, storm may blow the tree down
if the interior is unsound. It is inwardly that we want the soldier
beautiful; it is inwardly that we must make him smart and soldierlike.
It is the true beat of a stout heart in a manly breast that we must look
for, and not the mechanical beat of the drilled footstep on the parade-
ground.

How little strict drill really means discipline may be inferred from
the fact that many of our regiments that excel on parade in drill and
appearance are by no means the most highly disciplined ; whereas
other regiments the names of which have been associated for years
with the glory and honor of the past— regiments which from time im-
memorial have enjoyed all those glorious military traditions that make

80

the heart of the soldier and patriot beat high — have presented anything
but a smart appearance on parade. With the Turks, who are the next
thing to a mob on a parade, who move any way, without any kind of
time or step, with no words of command, with an absolute contempt for
dressing and appearances, there is, as a matter of course, the most com-
plete military subordination to the superior. The Prussian drill which
was in existence in Napoleon's time no more enabled the French to
fight as they did under the leadership of the great Oorsican than it did
some sixty-four years later on.

The real causes of the German successes in 1870 and 1871 we must
look for not in Prussian drill, but in Prussian sense of duty, Prussian de-
termination, and Prussian poicer of endurance ; these are what we must
try and copy.

Form and spirit.

The long-standing difference of opinion on the relative importance of
form or spirit will always exist as long as there are men ; but to those
who recognize both as necessary this difference of opinion has no mean-
ing.

The perfect man is he in whom the unity of body and soul, or, in other
words, form and spirit, is typified. The body without the soul, that is,
the form alone, is an inanimate object; the soul without the body is an
object of faith, but not one that can be demonstrated by science. Just
as great as is the support of a healthy body to the soul, and just as use-
ful as may be the right form to the spirit, so inversely can the wrong
form be injurious when it does not express the spirit, but rather forces
itself on the latter to the prejudice of its proper functions. The form
may be compared to the coat which gives a certain finished appearance
to the man without interfering with the action of his limbs. But if the
coat is without cut or fit, it impedes the man, cramps him, or interferes
with his freedom of limb. In a word, form and spirit are both impor-
tant, but the former must be subordinate to the latter ; form tvithout
spirit or contrary to spirit is not only useless, it is positively injurious.
And yet, notwithstanding this, does not the " one, two" of the drill ser-
geant mean the drilling of form— form ivithout a purpose?

The members of a certain party may sneer, if they like, at us Utopian
dreamers, and persuade themselves that strict discipline brought about
by strict drill is the only means of training soldiers, quite regardless of
all other factors which affect human nature and inspire a sense of duty.
But it is only false pride, after all, that makes them say, "What! en-
thusiasm, patriotism, devotion ? Rubbish! what we want is implicit obe-
dience, and this we get by strict drill."

But there is a twofold error in this theory, for, in the first place, obe-
dience is not everything, and, secondly, it cannot be arrived at by phys-
ical drill alone.

81

When the forced march, the bivouac without rest, and the difficult
forest and mountain path have knocked all the parade smartness out of
the heavily-weighted and exhausted soldier ; when the whistling bullets
are flying thick; when there is no cover from the enemy's Are, or when
a death-dealing line has to be stormed, then discipline alone is not
enough ; the authority of the officer loses its power, for the fear of the
enemy's bullets inspires a far greater dread than all his threats. Many
an officer who fancied he had got his men entirely in hand by strict
drill alone would certainly find out his mistake uuder such circum-
stances, and then see the utter collapse of a system which he had im-
plicit}' believed was infallible.

The courage of self sacrifice, be it inactive or passive, can only be the re-
sult of the higher or noble motives that govern us. " It is no normal con-
dition of our existence," writes a Prussian author. " It is one that can
be arrived at either by a fanatical or an ethical spirit ,; but the former is
inhuman, whereas the latter is elevating in character. The former we
cannot arouse in a civilized army ; it would be the source of endless dan-
ger to military discipline ; the latter is the end and object of all military
systems and tactics." The same author complains " that the soldier is
looked upon as part of a machine that works perfectly as a whole, but
that unfortunately in this no account is taken of the uncertainties of
human nature."

It is of course unaccountable that the officer and instructor should,
of his own free will, neglect all recourse to the more powerful moral in-
centives of the man, and trust solely to mechanical obedience induced
by the crushing out of all individuality — means which, under certain
conditions, are perfectly inadequate to the end. We might just as well,
instead of using language to express our thoughts and ideas, use nods
and signs ; it would, indeed, be just as reasonable. Even the dumb
animal is far more easily governed in many ways by the voice than the
rein or whip, and we may see this used every day by the plowman
with advantage with either horse or ox. But man, " God's own image,"
cannot be managed by means that appeal to the senses, such as these !
No appeal can be made to his thinking mind or feeling heart ! Such
theories are simply rubbish.

The discipline that is carried to such an extent as to crush out indi-
viduality is no discipline at all, for discipline is the feeling of the sub-
ordination of one's own will. But the will must be there. In fact, our
regulations for the training of the young soldier make a point of further-
ing the power of will. Not a machine, with no will of its own, which re-
mains motionless unless the motive power in the shape of the command-
ing officer sets it going — a mere disciplined apparatus which fails when it
is a question of spontaneous self-sacrifice or devotion. No ! the soldier
must be a human being and a man of strong determination, and rendered
thoroughly reliable and self-sacrificing by working on his spirit and
feeling.

2580— No. 18 0

82

We know Low often and often the well-known case of the company
of Prussian Guards at the battle of Rudersdorf is brought forward as an
example; we mean the ease of the company which, when it got out of
order in action, was carefully dressed as if on parade by the officer in
command. But how many hundreds or thousands of cases could be
brought forward of troops in critical moments having been encouraged
to acts of the greatest devotion by a few properly inspired words of their
leader, accompanied with his own example.

The races that people our empire, fall of high feeling and suscep-
tibility, tractable but proud, and manly but excitable, produce brave
and excellent soldiers if their good qualities are thoroughly turned to ac-
count.

At the time when stiff formality collapsed so completely at Jena, Aus-
tria would never have survived an Aspern, nor have offered the con-
queror the desperate resistance she did. had not a great man instilled
spirit and feeling into her army, and had not an appeal been made to
the high qualities of the Austrian people. Nor would the appeals of
Maria Theresa, in times of dire distress, have been answered with the
cry of " Moriamur pro rege nostro " from a people whose will had been
entirely crushed out; not a soul would have answered by word or deed
had anybody dared to raise the cry.

Overdrilling and its dangers.

As the desire of our supreme military chief, and consequently our
highest authority, is that " at all trainings and exercises the practical
object in war must alone be considered, and must never be lost sight of
by the instructor," all drill having for its object precision and stiffness
alone is in direct contradiction to the regulations, and represents ex-
ercises which not only have no object in real war, but are even detri-
mental to effective training for the same.

The regulations also say, " The position of the soldier should be easy
and unrestrained '.;" but the advocates of excessive drill get him into an
unnatural and almost ridiculous attitude, cramping and straining his
body from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet. The word of
command " Stand at ease," by which, we take it, the soldier is supposed
to get into a more comfortable position., the same advocates turn iuto a
strict motion of drill made with a telling slap, and instead of being a
position of ease it is merely a strict position of drill. The regulations
also require that " all movements of the soldier must be made with free
and unrestrained efforts of the body," and that particular attention
should be paid to a ufree and elastic step ;" but in spite of this the drill ad-
vocates insist upon an artificial step of throwing out the feet and bring-
ing them sharply to the ground, as tiring as it is useless, and quite
impossible on anything but an even parade-ground. uThe rifle is to
be carefully handled ; sharp raps on it purposely given to make the
motions ' tell' are to be avoided." So say the regulations. But we find

83

instead sharp and quick motions required by smart drill-masters, re-
gardless of injury to the rifle, just as if the care of the latter were quite
a secondary consideration. It is not to be wondered, then, that the z<;al
of these enthusiasts goes so far as beating time with the hand on the
pouch to mark the pace, and loosening the bands and screws of the
rifle to make the motions of the manual "tell," and other similar ab-
surdities.

The wheelings with faultlessly dressed ranks; the stepping short, with
the crawling motion of the feet; the advance in the line of several bat-
talions, to practice the feel and touch of large bodies; the slow exten-
sion of lines of skirmishers advancing and retiring in dressed Hues, to-
tally regardless of the nature of the grouad; the pernicious practice of
extending and closing the lines of skirmishers themselves; the cut-and-
dried formal formation for attack, which is just what the attempt to
carry out elaborate and rigid exercises with lines of skirmishers comes
to, and nothing more, and such-like performances, are one and all errors
leading to the conversion of the soldier sooner or later into a machine.

But is overdone drill and smartness, carried to au excess over and
beyond what is necessary, merely a useless, a harmless playing at sol-
diers f No; it is worse than this; it has dangerous results.

That excessive drill destroys the will, and consequently crushes the
man morally, is not the worst part of it. Far more serious is the stu-
pidity arising from the intellect and thinking power being systematic-
ally ignored, and the mau consequent^ never called upon to think.
We should appreciate, value, and turn to account the natural intelli-
gence, sharpness, aud powers of observation — if we like, the Indian
talents — of the many races that constitute our empire. To allow these
to get rusty — and everything rusts when not in use — seems to me to be
most unwarrantable.

But the very worst evil that arises from the system is when the man
has too strong an understanding to lose his individuality, for he then
shams obedience ; that is to say, he is trained to deceive. Nothing favors
this sort of thing more than unreasonable demands which are impos-
sible to comply with. As soon as the ground becomes difficult and
the men are tired, a natural reaction sets in, the change from the strictest
order into disorder is then all the more striking in proportion to the
degree in which the former has been enforced, and the authority of the
officers is then either unheeded or else these are deceived. Our regu-
lations take a perfectly correct view of this psychological effort, and say
that no more should be required " thau the nature of the ground per-
mits, or than would be possible under the circumstances of real war":
and in the Prussian regulations we find a strict line drawn between
what is required for parade purposes and what is required in the field.

But this is not all. The curse of evil is that it must continually begj-t
evil.

84

By crushing out individuality aud using a purely mechanical system
of drill — putting' aside the cruel strain it puts the soldier to, and the
immense trouble it gives subordinate instructors — a commanding offi-
cer can, with the least trouble and inconvenience to himself, attain what
appear to be the most astonishing* results, and by the apparent ma-
chine like precision with which his men are drilled gives the impres-
sion, or rather he fancies that he gives the impression, that his men arc
perfectly trained. But this requires no power of thought, no military
knowledge, no gift of instructing, no appeal to the mind, no personal
moral efficiency — in fact, no understanding or personal characteristics.
The most incapable man can train troops in this way. But if this
strictness acquired by drill be taken as the exclusive test for the effi-
ciency of a regiment, and consequently for that of its commanding offi-
cer, then it amounts to a positive danger both for the army and the
country.

I have asked myself involuntarily the question : What on earth is it
that leads men into such paths of error, and men of sufficient experi-
ence to know perfectly well that success in war must depend very
much more on other factors ? Is it conviction or is it convenience, or
is it, in fact, the natural outcome of that desire for power which is more
or less active in the breast of man, and which delights in subjecting
the will of others — no matter how — to his own 1 But to try and satisfy
our desires, even in this respect, by means of a purely mechanical na-
ture, would lead us almost to suppose that it were impossible to arrive
at the same results by means of an intellectual aud moral nature. I
myself think that not one alone but that a considerable portion of all
the above causes have something to say in it. For the belief of the
men we allude to cannot possibly be so blind as to fancy the.v see the
promising words uin hoc signo vinces" written over their imaginary
perfect human automatons.

But the most remarkable irony of facts in the whole case is that
whereas all this strict drill, arrived at with so much trouble aud ex-
pense, has for its end aud object the complete disciplining of the man
and his implicit obedience, those that employ the means referred to are
themselves guilty in doing so of the most flagrant act of disobedience of
the highest military authority. Turn, for example, to page 0 of the
introductory part, where it says that strict discipline " is best enforced
by the example of implicit obedience on the part of the superiors."

Mechanical drill has, however, found its re-echo in military literature,
and this way of propagating the poison is an especially dangerous one,
as under the cloak of science, and as a handy kind of sophistry for the
ignorant aud lazy, it finds many believers, aud perverts or at auy rate
confuses them. Such authors literally worship the golden calf of strict
drill, withasupreme contempt of all appeal to spirit and feeling, amount-
in g to fanaticism.

85

" Fighting- efficiency," says one of these writers, " will be found among
those excellent qualities which troops arrive at by the process of smart
and strict drill, that is to say, by drilling in close formation on the parade-
ground. * * * This is the secret of concentrated and reliable order
and strength which troops can and must, above all things, arrive at
and possess for the day of battle and the hour of danger, and nothing
else will do in its placed A lecture which has been published says:
"Strict drill in close formation and the manual exercises are training
necessities without which modern armies could not exist. * * * All
these considerations point to the necessity for adding fresh power to for-
mal drill.'1'' * * * Another and in other respects excellent publica-
tion alludes to the drill-ground in the following strain : "Troops must
be well, often, and unceasingly drilled in peace time. The parade-
ground, that excellent training school of implicit obedience, that gymnasiwn
of bodily and mental discipline, cannot be used too much."

But what are we to expect if young officers are taught doctrines such
as these as a preparation for the next campaign, and if they are told at
the same time that it is better to pass the winter time with drills of this
kind instead of schools for the men ? Those who hold the parade-ground
alone in such high esteem have certainly but a poor opinion of school-
ing. If contemplations such as these were to get a hold on the army,
we might certainly say, " We had neither learned nor forgotten any-
thing."

The theory of strict drill goes, however, beyond this ; it lays down
the normal formation for attack for even large bodies of infantry, the
misleading form or pattern — the refuge of the incapable — and pretends
to be able to drill brigades and divisions just as the drill corporal does
a squad.

Theories such as these must have a positively sickening effect on
the sensible officer and thoughtful patriot, in view of the consternation
that would arise in critical times ; he might well indeed think that
peace had lasted a little too long.

Requirements based on common sense.

It is, however, a pleasant thing to think that we can rest assured
that the drill system, with its bad effects, cannot really get a firm foot-
hold in our army, as common sense and discernment have really shown
themselves averse to it. With the exception of some minor details —
and let us hope that we shall soon see these vanish too — our training
may be said to be generally based on what is really required for war.

As a matter of fact, it would never occur to any reasonable man to
underrate the value of the strictest performance of all minor details, ac-
companied as it must be with a certain necessary formality. Nobody, for
instance, would ignore the value to be attached, from a disciplinary point
of view, to the correct giving and returning of military salutes ; but we
must not think that this is done to make the soldier "see," but rather

86

to instill him with respect for his superiors, and feel a certain amount of
personal pride in having- his salute correctly returned. The most de-
termined opponents of drill will certainly admit that the strict closing
up and keeping distance in columns must be practiced and insisted on.
Even those who have the greatest horror of formalities must again agree
that smart drill in close formation must be practiced not only on the
parade-ground but in the field — if not as a means of instilling discipline
at any rate as practice for moving troops in compact bodies* as a pre-
liminary to engaging the enemy. Everybody must, however, admit
that the greatest stress must be laid on such points as self-reliance and
precision on the part of officers ; their emancipation from the mechan-
ically commanded battalion ; on rapid change to the order of attack,
and vice versa; on skill with the rifle till it is loaded and fired with
mechanical precision ; on the strictest tire discipline ; on correct and
well-delivered volleys ; and on steady and well-controlled file firing. But
if the cut-aud-dried form is to be preferred to dispositions made to suit
time and place, which certainly no man in his senses could dream of,
the dressing and grouping of skirmishers would be first thought of, and
only afterwards the configuration of the grouud. But we cannot hope
to get steadiness, attention, and what is generally termed " troops well
in hand " by drilling in close formation only ; we must use and practice
the formation for attack and defense where there is less immediate
supervision of the superiors, where the chains of responsibility are long
and consequently weak, and where it is consequently desirable to ap-
peal to the spirit and intelligence of the individual and subordinate
commanders. For what do we really get in the end in the way of dis-
cipline brought about by everlasting drill ? Surely the man who in-
tentionally goes to the " left about" when ordered to the " right about"
is simply a lunatic.

Besides, it can be practically shown that a regiment, without being
overdrilled, can with rational education and training be quite smart
and steady enough for all tactical purposes, and quite enough so even
to please the eye. A regiment must Ionic well, and there is no reason
in the world why it should not and be efficient at the same time; in
point of fact, being efficient ought to make it look well. But ugly ab-
surdities should not be mistaken for good looks ; stiffness and clumsi-
ness should not be preferred to suppleness and activity ; it is much bet-
ter to have a few simple, easy forms, useful and applicable at all times
and places, than a variety of complicated ones, of use only under certain
conditions.

It is a peculiar feature in our profession to be strictly exacting, and
to set to work, regardless of consequences, without misapplied philan-
thropy or misplaced indulgence, in spite of all our natural feelings of
kindliness and mercy for others.

But all this, like every other sensible system of training the soldier*

87

has an object; it makes the man think. It is not, in fact, only the im-
perative of discipline ; it is the postulate of reason as well.

But I deny most emphatically that I wish in any way to interfere
with the most implicit obedience ; on the contrary, I wish to strengthen
it, but on ethical principles. Some may say to this that the superior
cannot be " requested" to give with every order the "reason why";
this needs of no argument. But do not let us lose sight of the fact that
if the inferior has by training and experience once grasped the feeling
that all orders arise from necessity, this idea will not forsake him either
in peace or war, and will exact implicit obedience from him in all matters,
no matter whether he knows or understands the reasons or grounds.

Next comes the question, Should we to a certain extent practice in
one way and execute in another ?

Now, the disciples of strict drill maintain that discipline is best at-
tained by the drilling of certain forms, which, however, have nothing to say
to such as would be used for training troops for war; "for the very fact
of these forms having no practical object hills the last vestige of refractori-
ness by sup>pressing all private conviction in the matter.'11 In other words?
this means that the soldier must be made pliable by destroying his
power of thought, as if in making any reasonable demands we ought to
be afraid of the reasoning powers of the individual on whom they are
made ! The tendency of all this drill is then clearly and designedly to
paralyze the power of reasoning.

Such an unconcealed, I may say barefaced, avowal of the object of
drill as is given in the work " The Method of Disciplining Troops "
is positively nothing more than a disgrace to the nineteenth century.

Of course all skill, all dexterity, all accomplishments, are arrived at
by preliminary practice. We learn to write by first making strokes or
portions of the letters ; but we do not polish up our hands to discipline
them for writing. We learn to shoot by practicing, presenting, aiming,
and pulling the trigger ; but the rifleman would profit little if, as a pre-
liminary to shooting, he was first taught skating or some other totally
different accomplishment. In fact, the preliminary training must form
part of what we expect to see performed, or what constitutes the sub-
ject of the training, and not something totally different. Ordinary com-
mon sense must look upon the time spent in such absurdities as lost,
and it is so as a fact.

Looked upon by the light of day the whole thing is a delusion, a
kind of nervous excitement produced by the "one, two" of a well-
drilled company — a nervous excitement by which men of a sensitive
nature are impressed with ideas of order, flexibility, discipline, and
high fighting qualities. But unless ice look upon it in the light of a
medium it can only give the impression of a poor attempt at playing at
soldiers.

Listen to the opinion of a Prussian author, one whom we have already
quoted: "The bravest soldier," he says, "is the man who has never

&8

been under tire. The habit of drill can be so strong in him that lie
moves for a certain time on the held of battle as if he were at maneu-
vers; but only for a certain time, that is to say, so long as he does not
know the danger he is exposed to. * * * These are critical mo-
ments. A few officers have the strength of mind to be equal to it, and
have the power of reviving the expiring courage of their men and carry-
ing them with them."

In other words, this means the charm or spell by which drill is sup-
posed to hold men fast vanishes in time of danger, and only moral power
is then equal to the occasion.

Moral power.

We have paid much attention to the knowledge and power of the sol-
dier, almost exclusively so, as if the wish hung back of itself. But the
wish is the chief thing, and care should be taken that the negative wish
should not only be suppressed but the positive wish strengthened. It
is only thus that the "most daring'''' determination which our regula-
tions describe as u the best" can really be arrived at. The same regula-
tions do not without reason describe the first principles of training the
recruit as " based on mural education.''''

And even granting that we have no such strong impulse to awaken
the fighting powers of our army as, for instance, there is in the Turk-
ish fanatical faith, the Russian gravitation towards Constantinople, or
the French national burning for revenge, we should all the more, on
this score, by fostering the love for the dynasty, strengthening the bonds
between officer and soldier, raising and strengthening the tone and feeling,
and awakening a spirit of duty and self-sacrifice, find some other means
of really training our army to be a thoroughly devoted and reliable one.

A distinguished general once said to me that when he was command-
ing a Hungarian regiment in the Italian campaign he was asked whether
he could rely on his men, aud he felt he could answer that tuey would
certainly do their duty for the sake of their colonel. And this proved
to be true. The affection of men for their commanding officer can do
great things, but it must be more than mere sympathy ; it must be an
affection amounting to a devotion of the most completely confiding and
self-sacrificing nature. To be able to gain an affection of this hind,
however, is not the gift of all, for a good disposition and study is not
sufficient; popularity hunting will never do it. We must have a fellow-
feeling for our subordinates, and then only can we gain their hearts*
But to display this fellow-feeling only will do no good. You will never
win the hearts of men unless your heart is really with them. Unfeel-
ing men are to be avoided, just as those hypocrites who are cunning
enough to feign a fellow-feeling. They are left in the lurch the moment
the game they are playing is laid bare, and they are then the more
hateful, as we feel they have deceived us. Ordinary individuals have

89

far greater instinctive powers of discernment in these matters than
most people give them credit for.

It might be urged by those who object to these principles that it would
never do if a regiment would only follow Colonel A and not Colonel B.
And it would certainly never do ; but the other kinds of moral motive
power which I have alluded to insure troops doing their duty under
any leader. If, however, our aims are higher than this, nothing but
personal influence cau attain them. Kustow is perfectly right in say-
ing, "The influence of a commanding officer does not arise from chance
or accident. He who can get more from his men than can his opponent
from his is always at an advantage."

An Austrian author, describing the habit of discipline in the obser-
vation of certain forms as the only means at our disposal, says, literally,
"It is a myth that in the rapid conversion of our human material so-
called beloved leaders arise, round whom men rally with devotion in
the hour of battle." Now, to those who know troops by personal con-
tact, and have a fellow-feeling for them, there is, thank goodness, no
myth about it whatever. Affection is a thing quickly acquired, but habit
is a matter of time. If the rapid conversion of our human material is
dangerous to one of these, then I should say that habit is most likely
to suffer in this respect. The filling up of the ranks with the reserves,
the marches for concentration, and the first, though perhaps ever so
small, engagement, are enough to make a commander liked or disliked
by his men. Ay, it only requires a moment or so in the hour of dan-
ger for a really first-rate man to gain the affection of his inferiors.

One of the most important conditions, and at the same time a useful
le^er for morally improving the soldier, is the relation that exists be-
tween officer and man.

This relation is in certain armies based on tradition. Based on con-
ditions that have still something patriarchal about them, and the so-
cial standing of the subaltern officers, it is in Russia far more direct
and intimate than in other countries, and is, perhaps, too familiar. The
Prussian officer, as we all know, having a social standing of the first
rank in the country, moves in the best society in consequence, and
being represented with his men by excellent non-commissioned officers,
is brought far less in contact with them; in fact, his relations with them
are almost of a purely duty nature. With us the relation varies very
much in the different branches of the service, according as the officer
lives more or less in close contact with the men.

But on the whole we might observe that, having due regard to the pe-
culiarities of the majority of nationalities in our army, the relation might
with advantage be a closer one in the infantry.

The soldier should, in fact, be looked on as a man, and. what is more,
be made to feel as a man. The officer need not to be always on duty
from his point of view. Without causing any undue familiarity, he can,
by daily intercourse with his men, get opportunities, while fully main-

taining his position, of showing- himself in the light of a sympathizing
fellow-creature instead of the mere superior, in caring for their inter-
ests and doing all in his power for their material welfare.

If the bonds between officer and man be closely drawn, the former
ought never to find it difficult to arouse, without the use of empty
phrases, in a way that suits the individual character of the man, such
qualities as love for king and country, pride in himself as a soldier,
ambition, amour propre, a soldier-like feeling of obedience from self-con-
viction, and a feeling of camaraderie and attachment to his regiment. No
stone should be left unturned to raise the tone and feeling of the soldier.
We can well afford in this to be a little indulgent in insignificant matters ;
we must not think it serious if regimental feeling goes so far as to make
the soldier look down upon other regiments; give the soldier if possible
recreation at the right time; put up with his ligkt-hearteduess, and
even turn it to account; and, above all things, take care not to get into the
habit of continually finding fault ; rather bestow praise, even if it is only
half due. Approbation is better than blame; it is the indispensable
forerunner of amour propre, attachment, and cheerful labor. Constaut
finding fault produces, by the blunting effect it has on the feeling, the
most difficult evil to get rid of — apathy.

The officer should have all those moral qualities we look for in the
soldier in a higher degree. We have to produce military characters,
independent, cheerfully energetic, and thoroughly conscientious men.
Though many may look on converting soldiers into machines as a prepa-
ration for our next war, the intelligent man will look for it more by fos-
tering their individuality and initiative. For the shorter the time the
fight lasts, the greater is the necessity for seizing opportunities without
waiting for orders. The more murderous the fire, the more questionable
is the possibility of giving orders, and the more frequent the loss in
commanding officers, whose regiments, however, cannot stop in critical
moments to have the command taken over. The greater the friction,
the more is it desirable to have, instead of a machine like army, a living
organism, the parts of which can act independently in the spirit of the
general desire.

It would appear, therefore, all the more desirable that the higher
leader should, instead of making his subordinate officers go iu leading-
strings, direct them intellectually, and so fashion their ideas that he
may confine himself to ordering what is only absolutely necessary, and
leave the remainder to the initiative of his subordinates, feeling sure
that though they may not act strictly in accordance with his orders, they
are certain to act in accordance with his intentions. This, again, requires
the relations between senior and junior officers to be of the closest kind ;
to communicate our own ideas and convey our own ways of thinking to
others is only possible with close personal contact. There are some
colonels and generals who keep almost quite aloof from their officers;
very often this arises from an unfounded fear on their part that close

91

contact with juniors is likely to affect their dignity. But the man who
is firm iu the saddle as a member of the military hierarchy feels no
necessity for surrounding his person with obstacles to approach, which
after all afford a very poor protection to the authority belonging to the
rank only and not to the person, against the skepticism of juniors. A
colonel or a general should have the courage to be a friend and comrade
off duty.

But when the increased demand for independent and self-relying offi-
cers has been alluded to, it has been sometimes met with the question
whether independence did not already exists and only required to be
tolerated. No! unfortunately it must be cultivated, for there are too
many of our juniors whose minds are dull and without desire, who are
only too glad to be relieved of all responsibility by the guardian of in-
activity ; and the lethargy which is the consequence lasts long after
the original cause has been removed. Let every oue be given the full,
free scope allowed by the spirit of the regulations, and let us trust to
the responsible spontaneous action of our juniors. We must satisfy
ourselves beforehand, however, by the strictest tests, that what is re-
quired is likely to be forthcoming, and distinguish between the criminal
presumption of the impostor and the proved and consequently esteemed
conscientiousness of the reliable man.

Everything that the junior does cannot always be improved on. Many
an error in execution or even in resolution inay be overlooked in order
that power of resolve and self-reliance may not be interfered with. We
should never let ourselves be influenced by temper or passion, and never
color the meaning of others. The eye-servant who tries to curry favor
should never be encouraged, nor should the honest man, who, rather
than try to ingratiate himself, makes himself perhaps disagreeable, be
snubbed. This is the way to produce military characters ; otherwise we
shall only produce slaves, who in the choice of "to be" or "not to be"
purchase the "to be" with the surrender of their individuality, at first,
perhaps, against the grain, but gradually with their moral emasculation
appeased.

The officer must be naturally inspired by an ideal conception of his pro-
fession. He will thus be proof against the attacks of materialism, and
encouraged to face the trying duties of his calling.

Let the officer remember that if he can oppose a living darn to the
flood of the disorganizing tendencies of our days, these will break help-
lessly on the soundness of his strength of character. Let him acquire
a pride in himself from the thought of the meritorious work he has done
in yearly instilling into the minds of the 100,000 men or so that annually
join the colors, a higher moral tone, a love of justice and order, and feel-
ing and character — in fact, the blessings of civilization, which they take
with them to their distant homes, to there produce further benefits. The
officer thus fulfills in peace a mission just as noble in itself as is his
bloody work in war. Let our officers be firmly convinced that in days

02

when opposite disuniting efforts are tending to undermine the mon-
archy it is the officers' duty to strengthen to their utmost the bonds that
unite it, by instilling into the minds of the thousands that come from
all parts of our wide empire a feeling of unity in the whole fatherland,
and the desire to raise the national colors high above the petty strife of
faction and party, remembering the noble words of the poet, "Austria
is in the camp."

Let the officer fully understand his position ; let him raise himself
above the ordinary level of moral courage, so as to be, in the closest
sense of the term, the soul of his men, aud lead them to victory. But
the soldier, if the call or even the example of the officer is to have any
effect, must be susceptible and attached to him.

"Bubbish," I hear again the opponents of these ideas exclaim, with
a cold, scornful sneer. Well, may they never be taught by disaster that
troops that are drilled only and not educated will fail them in the hour
of trial ; may they never have to feel in the bitter hour of defeat what
a difference there is between possessing and not possessing the affec-
tion— this supposed myth — of their men.

And now enough !

In view of the possibility of the monarchy haviug, at some not very
distant date, to engage in a serious conflict, the traditional patriotism
of the Austrian army must and can imperatively call upon every man
belonging to it, no matter what his station be, to take the most com-
plete loyal faith as his sole guide, and follow the line which most surely
leads to success.

There can be only one right way, for there is only one kind of truth.
But it is difficult sometimes to find and recoguize it; hence different
views, different faiths.

Supported as I am in my belief when I think of the many high-minded
and great men whose wise and reforming doctrines have led me to my
present conviction, and when I call to mind how often many excellent
troops of our army, though undrilled, have showu the highest discipline
in the dark days of misfortune, aud by their spirit and moral strength
have given the most unmistakable proofs of the greatest devotion, I
will preserve unimpaired a belief in men, a belief in my ideal, and a belief
in the way in which it is attained.

The meaning of this belief is contained in the answer to the title of
his lecture, " Let us not merely drill, let us educated

THE INSTRUCTION OF SOLDIERS.

[Translated from the Militiir-Wochenblatt, by Maj. E. Guntkr, garrison instructor,

S. E. D.]

[Although there are in this translation some valuable hints on the instruction of
the soldier, the main object of its insertion is to show the vast influence which can
be exercised by the officers of an army in a nation where liability to military service
is universal, and where the Government is monarchical. — L. A. H.l

There appeared in jSTos. 37, 47, and 56 of this publication, in the year
1884, certain essays on this subject, which, besides being interesting
in themselves, especially merit our attention, as indicating clearly the
very divergent views that prevail on the subject of theoretical instruc-
tion.

The views of the author of the essay in No. 37, viz, that it is desirable
to have an official instruction book, drawn up as concisely as possible,
is amply refuted in the subsequent essays ; but General Prince Kraft zu
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen expresses the same wish in his " Letters about
Infantry," and at the first glance it appears, in fact, as if such a wish
were justified. Meanwhile the authorities will, it is presumed, never
fetter the spirit of officers by systematizing and regulating the theoret-
ical instruction of the soldier, and every wish to this effect will, it is to
be hoped, remain ungratitied.

Decades ago such desires found expression, and have often recurred,
but as yet without result.

The existing instruction books are fully sufficient, and a new issue,
which should contain only that which it is obligatory for a soldier to
know, ought to meet with little approval in the service.

On the other haud, it would be a false conception to substitute a more
comprehensive book, which, while making good all the defects of the
textbooks hitherto in use, included and combined all their advantages.
And for this reason, that the power of comprehension and capacity of
the soldier is always very different according to his home and early school
training. Is the sharp-witted, loquacious Berlin man only to learn just
as much as one who cannot speak German at all; the soldier of ex-
cellent school education no more than he who has never crossed its
threshold ; the man of active mind only as much as the man of dull
and slothful brain "?

I am of opinion that but little depends on the book of instruction.
That work which is most suitable for the particular branch of the serv-
ice is best. Beyond this it is almost a matter of indifference which book
is chosen. All books are, however, written more for the officer, whose

93

94

business it is, with their aid, to teach as much as he possibly can to the
soldier in whose hands he places them.

One thing — and in my opinion the most important of all — I miss in
the three essays, viz, that to attain success it must never be forgotten
that it is " the spirit which giveth life." It is the soul which enlightens
the whole teaching. Above all, it is necessary that the officer be a good
instructor.

In regard to this I should here like to make a few special remarks.

An entire mastery of the subject, constant practice, and a quick prac-
tical understanding do not suffice to make a good instructor.

Fortunately the gift of rhetoric is not necessary for this, but under
all circumstances the officer must possess a certain military eloquence
in order to make himself entirely the master of his pupils. In a few
powerful words he must be able to indicate the main points of his mean-
ing.

Then he must be able, in order to kindle enthusiasm in his hearers,
to feel it himself ; he must have a high ideal of his high calling. Only
thus can lie, in teaching, gain the hearts and engross the attention of
his hearers.

According to the essay in No. 56, the teacher must especially take
into consideration the soldier's capacity for thought. I am of this opin-
ion, but think rather that, in teaching, the feelings of the men must be
at least equally considered. In the first place, therefore, the officer
must win the implicit confidence of his men. These must see and feel
that their officers have a warm sympathy for them; that they are not
only concerned about their own welfare but are also anxious for the
well-being of those under them ; that they do not always blame even
faults and blunders, but, wherever it is practicable, approach them with
words of guidance and instruction, and only punish where the laws of
good conduct, of right, and military discipline have been willfully in-
fringed.

In teaching, the officer should speak simply and fluently. He must
place himself on a level with his soldiers in order to make himself un-
derstood by them ; but then, again, he must raise them as far as possi-
ble to his own level, giving due consideration to the difference of their
intellectual powers and characters.

There are two other poiuts I would urge :

First. The officer often has opportunities, in imparting instruction, of
working on the sense of religion of his men. He is their teacher, their
instructor, and therefore it is his duty to influence them beneficially
in this respect also. This is by no means difficult for the officer pro-
vided he does not pose as a saint, but chiefly gives proof by his own
personal bearing that he is deeply penetrated with the teaching and
spirit of the Christian religion.

If he calls on his men in a quiet, moderate way to hold fast to the fear
of God and to an honest, right-minded life, if he appeals to the sense of
right latent in the heart of even the most reprobate of men, it will be

B5

easier for hi in to produce good soldiers than if he attempted to do it in
any other way. 1 have often seen in my experience that when an officer
has spoken iu inspired tones about the sanctity of the oath, the colors,
the call of duty, &c, the men are more deeply moved than when, later
on, in cLurch, a preacher has touched on the same themes.

The men willingly allow themselves to be influenced by their officer
if he only once begins in a right manner, because they are in daily in-
tercourse with him. For this reason the calling of the officer and
teacher is no unthankful one. Let the officer but first bring up the
soldier as a good man, and then he will of himself become a good and
efficient soldier.

After 1866 it was often asserted that the Prussian schoolmaster had
won the battles ! I am deeply impressed by the truth of the expression,
if by "schoolmaster" is meant the instructor in uniform, the officer
who through long years of painstaking, laborious instruction had taken
care, at every opportunity that afforded practical instruction, to incul-
cate at the same time a deep sense of duty and a high feeling of honor.
Hooted in these two qualities, all military virtues spring up of them-
selves.

Secondly. We live in anxious times. The crassest egotism, pursuit
of pleasure, shirking of work, predominate. The powers of evil and of
darkness burrow hidden under ground, and gnaw at the roots and the
marrow of the state. It is, therefore, surely the duty of every right-
minded man not to look on idly, but to step forward boldly, with raised
visor, and grapple with the difficulties in that position in which Provi-
dence has placed him, mindful of the exhortation of our most ideal poet :

* " However small thy world may be,
Do thou but lead it right ;
Thy work for good let all men see,
Although that work be slight."

The officer shall not and must not enter into politics. * * #
Division of property and universal equality ! That is, and has been
as long as the world has existed, the object of anarchical efforts.

Xow, the dullest recruit comprehends that even as a company cannot
stand and can effect nothing without a vigorous, well-ordered regiment,
so without a similar state government a nation must perish. More-
over, every one must understand that the ideas of the so-called benefact-
ors of the people are mad folly if he only pictures to himself the land
of his village parceled out in equal proportions to all the inhabitants,
and if it be considered that one is strong and healthy, another weakly ;
one must support parents and relations, the other not ; one has many
stalwart sons who help him in husbandry, another is childless or with
only weakly children who require constant care ; one is industrious and
economical, the other idle, wasteful, drunken, &c. How long would

* I must apologize for paraphrasing this little bit from Schiller, but I thiuk I have
reudered the writer's meauiug plainer thau I could by giviug the bare translation of
the words. — Tk.

96

the mnch-prized equality and equal division of property remain ; and
when would it require to be redistributed ? In my view such and simi-
lar observations should equally form part of tbe instruction given.

Not only during the instruction in the already-mentioned themes —
profession of the soldier, the oath, the colons, the call of duty — but the
instruction on "duties in general," "use of weapons," "the duties of
reserves," &c., will afford fit opportunity for similar observations.

The sense of the people, and especially that of the simple, straight-
forward man, is sound. It is only necessary for every one in authority
whose calling it is to influence the broad masses in a proper manner.
I consider no one is more called on to do this than the officer through
whose hands pass in the course of years so many thousands of Germany's
best sons.

The officer has unlimited influence. He can especially form and
mold the minds of the recruits, and the good seed sown by the young-
officer, who, inspired with glowing zeal, is an enthusiast in his high
calling, will bear fruit iu yet wider circles, and for a lifetime.

If each officer will work in this spirit, then the state need never be
endangered, for then the army, the reserves, the militia — I think even
the Landsturm — will be and continue a bright, sharp weapon in the
hands of the commander.

Loyalty to the throne, faithfulness to the state, and warlike spirit are
deeply imprinted in the hearts of every German. In no other country
in the world would the officer find a more fruitful soil for culture than
with us. The spirit, the understanding, necessary to the reception of
these lessons are transmitted by inheritance from father to son. In
every laborer's cottage the portrait of the " Old Fritz," as well as the
members of the royal family and of the most celebrated generals, are
to be seen. This spirit must, however, be again and again carefully
nourished and cherished if it is not, in time, to be extinguished in the
hard-fought struggle for existence.

The story of the exalted house of Hohenzollern, to whom God himself
has imparted a special mission, the history of the ruling house, stands
at the head of all military instruction as the history of our fatherland.
Above all things, let the young officer inspire his soldiers with the
motto "For king and fatherland." Let him describe to them the feat-
ures of Prussia and of Germany, the mighty power of our people in
arms, and the great respect which, after hard fighting, it has won for
us abroad. Let him detail to them the imposing strength of the army
and of the navy, let him sketch their well-ordered organization.

Let him show them how our nation becomes more and more powerful
under an energetic Government, and at the same time time happier and
more prosperous ; but let him also lay stress on the fact that this proud
edifice must totter and fall to pieces without the fear of God, without
loyalty to the throne and patriotism.

I INSTITUTION LIBRARIES

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